Aldridge v. Muirhead

7 Citing cases

  1. Fiehe v. Householder Co.

    98 Fla. 627 (Fla. 1929)   Cited 34 times
    In Fiehe v. Householder Co., 98 Fla. 627, 125 So. 2, we adopted the general definition found in 6 R. C. L. 446 of the essential elements of due process of law and in Tibbetts v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679.

    Howard v. Landsberg's Committee, 60 So. E. R. 769; 14 R. C. L. 570. A proceeding for the sale of the property of one who has been previously adjudged by competent authority to be a lunatic, or insane, is a proceeding in rem. Howard v. Landsberg's Committee, supra; Yaple v. Titus, 41 Pa. 195; 80 Am. Dec. 604; Eaves v. Mullen, 107 Pac. R. 433; Moffer v. Jones, supra; Dewalt v. Cline, 128 Pac. R. 121; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. (U.S.) 211; 17 L.Ed. 783; Mohr v. Manierre, 101 U.S. 397; 25 L.Ed. 1052; 32 C. J. 720. The procedure prescribed by our statutes for an inquisition and adjudication of lunacy and the appointment of a guardian (Sec. 3654, et seq., Comp. Gen. Laws 1927) affords the person whose sanity is in question the full benefit of due process of law. Ex parte Scudamore, 55 Fla. 211, 46 So. R. 279.

  2. Boering v. Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co.

    193 U.S. 442 (1904)   Cited 41 times
    In Boering v. Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co., 193 U.S. 442, 24 S.Ct. 515, 516, 48 L.Ed. 742, the stipulations on a free pass were held valid, although the user was not aware of the conditions.

    The power of a husband to act as the agent of his wife in relation to her separate or individual personal or property rights is well settled. Voorhees v. Bonesteel Wife, 16 Wall. 16; Aldridge v. Muirhead, 101 U.S. 397; Weisbrod v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 18 Wis. 35, and other cases cited in 1 A. E. Ency. Law, 2d ed. 947. If, on the other hand, the conclusion of the same court in the case of Howard v. C. O. Railway Co., 11 App.D.C. 300, 337, holding that the right of action for personal injuries sustained by the wife is not the statutory property of the wife, be, as we think it is, a correct statement of the law of this district on that subject, then, at the time this cause of action arose and suit thereon was instituted, the common law rule prevailed in this district and the female plaintiff could not have sued without joining her husband in such action, as she did do. Any damages recovered or reduced to possession as a result of such joint action during the coverture would have been the property of the husband alone.

  3. Mallory S.S. Co. v. Garfield

    10 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1926)   Cited 9 times

    An authorized agent is not liable for breach of a contract which it makes on behalf of the principal, except where the agency is concealed, or where it is contracting as ostensible principal. Aldridge v. Muirhead, 101 U.S. 397, 25 L. Ed. 1013; The Jungshoved (C.C.A.) 290 F. 733; Walker v. Cross, 160 F. 372, 87 C.C.A. 324. There was no allegation of the complaint which would support the theory of an undisclosed principal.

  4. Buckles v. Waggoner

    188 P.2d 873 (Okla. 1948)   Cited 1 times

    " To the same effect, though dealing with a somewhat different state of facts, is the case of Aldridge v. Muirhead, 101 U.S. 397, 25 L.Ed. 1013, which was cited by the Wisconsin court. Therein the Supreme Court of the United States used the following language: " . . . While the negotiations were all made by the husband, the titles were openly taken in the name of the wife.

  5. Roman v. Albert

    81 Mont. 393 (Mont. 1928)   Cited 30 times

    Much appears to have been made in the lower court of the fact that the husband, in many particulars, after the execution of the deeds, acted, with their children, as his wife's agent in the management of her property. We find great encouragement upon that question in the following cases: Aldridge v. Muirhead, 101 U.S. 397, 25 L.Ed. 1013 [see, also, Rose's U.S. Notes]; Wasam v. Raben, 45 Ind. App. 221, 90 N.E. 636; Geo. Adams Burke Co. v. James Cook Son (Iowa), 15 N.W. 478; Shircliffe v. Casebeer, 122 Iowa, 618, 98 N.W. 486. Upon the question of consideration for the giving of the deeds, and that a meritorious or equitable consideration, even though inadequate, will justify reformation of a deed at the instance of the grantee, see the following cases: Stover v. Hill, 208 Ala. 575, 94 So. 827; Robertson v. Melville, 60 Cal.App. 354, 212 P. 723; Smith v. Barksdale, 110 Ga. 278, 34 S.E. 582; Wilson v. Talley, 144 Ind. 74, 42 N.E. 362, 1009; Bronston v. Bronston Heirs, 141 Ky. 639, 133 S.W. 584; Bartlett v. White (Mo.), 272 S.W. 944; Partridge v. Partridge, 220 Mo. 321, 132 Am. St. Rep. 584, 119 S.W. 415; 34 Cyc. 929; 23 R.C.L. 344, pars. 38-40.

  6. Talcott v. Arnold

    54 N.J. Eq. 570 (Ch. Div. 1896)   Cited 3 times

    In Voorhees v. Bonesteel, 16 Wall. 31, the supreme court of the United States, on appeal from the circuit court of the Eastern district of New York, followed the cases in the state courts in holding that a wife could employ her husband to manage her business, and that the application of a portion of the income of the wife's separate property to the support of the husband would not impair the title of the wife. In Aldridge v. Muirbead, 101 U. S. 397, on appeal from the circuit court for the district of New Jersey, Chief Justice Waite held that the fact that the husband had rendered services in employing the wife's capital in the purchase of lands would not invalidate her title thereto, if his services were devoted to her separate property. These cases were cited with approval by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet, in his opinion in Tresch v. Wirtz, 34 N. J. Eq. 124.

  7. de Grauw v. Mechan

    48 N.J. Eq. 219 (Ch. Div. 1891)   Cited 10 times
    In De Grauw v. Median, 48 N.J.Eq. 219, 21 A. 193, and in Truesdell v. Lehman, supra, a delay of twelve years in filing a bill to subject an equitable interest in lands to the lien of a judgment was held fatal and it is elementary that "equity will not assist a man whose condition is attributable to his failure to exercise that diligence which may be fairly expected from a reasonable person".

    Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, and, therefore, from thebeginning of this jurisdiction, there was always a limitation to suits in this court." Doughty v. Doughty, 10 N. J. Eq. 349; Shipman v. Cook, 16 N. J. Eq. 251; Cooper v. Carlisle, 17 N. J. Eq. 525; Brown v. Insurance Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 809; Wood v. Chetwood, 33 N. J. Eq. 9, 21; McCartin v. Traphagen. 43 N. J. Eq. 323, 338, 11 Atl. Rep. 156; Collins v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 813, 820, 18 Atl. Rep. 860; Van Houten v. Van Winkle, 46 N. J. Eq. 380, 382, 20 Atl. Rep. 34; Lynch's Adm'r v. Vanneman, (N. J.) 18 Atl. Rep. 468; Sullivan v. Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 806, 811; Stearns v. Page, 7 How. 819, 829; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201: Aldridge v. Muirhead, 101 U. S. 402; Randolph v. Quidnick Co., 135 U. S. 457, 462, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655; Story, Eq. Jur. ยง 1520.