Opinion
December 3, 1970
Order of the Supreme Court, New York County, entered on June 2, 1970, vacating service of the summons, unanimously reversed, on the law, the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant is denied, with leave to answer within 20 days after service upon defendant by plaintiff of a copy of the order herein with notice of entry thereon, and the judgment so appealed from is vacated. Appellant shall recover of respondent $50 costs and disbursements of this appeal. Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of Hale's Bedding Stores of New York, Inc. (Hale's), allegedly insolvent, seeks the satisfaction of its judgment out of the proceeds of the surrender of a lease, expiring in 1974, and Hale's security deposit thereunder, with respect to land and building located at 52 East 57th Street, in Manhattan. Said proceeds allegedly were applied in partial satisfaction of Hale's indebtedness to the defendant, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Philadelphia, Pa. Defendant allegedly is a moneyed corporation and does not have an office or conduct business in New York. On September 5, 1962 defendant and Hale's entered into an agreement for the advance of moneys to Hale's providing for a security interest covering Hale's inventory, accounts receivable and "contract rights" within the State of New York. To perfect the security interest, defendant on September 28, 1964 filed a financing statement with the Secretary of State and the County Clerk of New York County. In or about November, 1968, Hale's assets, including the lease and security were liquidated and applied in partial satisfaction of defendant's loan. Plaintiff alleges the said application of the proceeds of the lease and security was effected by defendant with knowledge of Hale's insolvency, and unauthorized under the terms of the security agreement. It is concluded that the cause of action is grounded on the perfection of the security agreement resulting from the filing of the required financing statement with the Secretary of State and County Clerk, touching assets located in New York, owned by Hale's, a New York corporation, and the liquidation of the New York leasehold of Hale's. These purposeful acts of the defendant form the basis of the complaint. The action is grounded on transactions of the defendant within this State within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd. [a]). "Proof of a 'single transaction in New York' would satisfy this statutory requirement. ( Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 456, supra; see McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentary to CPLR 302, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B [1969 Cum. Supp.], pp. 129-130; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y. Civ. Prac., par. 302.06.) As one authoritative commentator put it, 'CPLR 302 is a single-act statute requiring but one transaction — albeit a purposeful transaction — to confer jurisdiction in New York.'" ( Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 16-17.)
Concur — McGivern, J.P., Markewich, Nunez, McNally and Macken, JJ.