Opinion
A146270
01-19-2017
In re J.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Respondent and cross-appellant, v. J.B., Appellant and cross-respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. C181973-03)
21-year-old J.B. appeals from the juvenile court's August 19, 2015 order terminating his status as a non-minor dependent (NMD) under the California Fostering Connection to Success Act and dismissing his dependency on the ground he did not comply with the eligibility requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code, section 11403, subdivision (b). He contends the court erred in terminating him as an NMD because he was meeting the requirements as of the contested hearing date—August 19, 2015—and because termination was not in his best interest.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. The California Fostering Connections to Success Act, known as AB12, became operative January 1, 2012, and allows NMDs to remain under dependency jurisdiction and receive financial assistance until age 21 if they comply with certain statutory requirements. (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess); Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess).) Section 11400, subdivision (v), defines NMD and sets forth the age criteria and the requirements that the NMD be in an approved placement—"in foster care under the placement and care responsibility of the county welfare department"—and have a transitional independent living case plan.
Alameda County Social Services Agency (the Agency) cross appeals and argues the juvenile court erred in requiring the Agency to pay benefits to J.B. as an NMD from April 2015 to August 2015—the period during which he had not yet been terminated as an NMD, but was not in compliance with the eligibility requirements. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating J.B. as an NMD, and did not err in ordering the Agency to pay benefits to J.B. for the April to August 2015 period. We therefore affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2001, then-five-year-old J.B. was declared a dependent on the grounds he was at substantial risk of physical harm and neglect by his parents and had been left with no provision for support. Thereafter, he never saw his parents and was moved from one placement to another, totaling almost 30 placements. He was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Depressive Disorder, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and Oppositional Defiant Disorder.
In September 2009, J.B. was arrested for petty theft and possession of a concealed firearm and was placed on probation. In October 2012, the juvenile court found he resisted arrest and provided false information to a police officer. In June 2013, the court found J.B. violated his probation by absconding from his placement. The probation department noted that J.B. was not engaged in services, but recommended that his probation be dismissed so that he could participate in California's extended foster care program. The court adopted the recommendation, and J.B. became an NMD on his eighteenth birthday, in October 2013. His transitional independent living case plan (TILCP) required him to enroll in high school.
According to an Agency report prepared for a March 26, 2014 review hearing, J.B. was not attending school. He smoked cigarettes and used marijuana. His social worker wanted him to complete his education, but he wanted to work and had been applying for jobs. He had been placed in a cousin's home but absconded from that placement in November 2013 and did not maintain contact with his social worker. He was hospitalized for mental health issues for six days and was prescribed medication for Bipolar Disorder. His cousin agreed to allow J.B. to return to her home as long as he took his medication and attended therapy, but J.B. stopped taking his medication three weeks after returning to the home, and refused to see his therapist after two visits. His relationship with his cousin deteriorated, and at the time of the report, he was in a supervised independent living placement in Patterson, California.
J.B. had been receiving $1,133 per month in Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Of that, $820 was paid to him monthly, with the remainder being placed in a trust fund. Because he was now an adult, the Social Security Administration (SSA) was evaluating whether he continued to qualify for SSI. The Agency was working on submitting documentation to SSA.
The Agency stated that while J.B.'s progress in meeting his TILCP goals was minimal, he should be given "some leeway" because he had only recently become an NMD. The Agency recommended that the juvenile court find he met his AB12 requirements by "attend[ing] a program or engag[ing] in an activity that will remove barriers to employment." For the next reporting period, J.B.'s TILCP would be for him to work 80 hours per month or engage in activities to remove barriers to employment. J.B. did not appear at the March 26, 2015 hearing, but the court adopted the Agency's recommendation and continued J.B. as an NMD, and scheduled the next review hearing for September 10, 2014.
The Agency reported for the September 10, 2014 hearing that J.B. had not completed any of his TILCP goals. Despite the Agency's repeated attempts to contact him, he failed to remain in contact with his social worker. He did not engage in school or the employment options available to him. He said he wanted to attend community college and obtain a job, but "made minimal steps toward completing this goal." He was not participating in therapy and was not taking his medication. He was incarcerated for part of the reporting period for being involved in a domestic violence incident; a restraining order was issued against him and he was ordered to complete domestic violence classes. His social worker recommended that J.B. remain an NMD, but she was unable to identify how he satisfied the AB12 eligibility requirements.
After several continuances, the juvenile court found on October 20, 2014, that J.B. met the criteria for AB12 by "attend[ing] a program or engag[ing] in an activity that will remove barriers to employment." For the next reporting period, J.B. could meet AB12 criteria through attending high school, a GED program, college, or a vocational program.
According to an Agency report prepared for an April 6, 2015 review hearing, J.B. had not participated in any activities required for AB12 eligibility. His social worker continued to remind him about the need to engage in school or work. She encouraged him to meet with a school counselor and helped him fill out a financial aid application, but he had only "looked into" attending community college. He had attended only 10 of the 42 domestic violence classes required as a condition of his probation, but despite his minimal attendance, he claimed the classes were preventing him from completing his education and/or obtaining a job. J.B. said he inquired about a job at Dollar Tree but there was no available shift. J.B. smoked marijuana regularly, was not attending therapy, and "appear[ed] to lack motivation to complete necessary tasks."
SSA denied J.B.'s SSI application due to his failure to attend an appointment. The Agency was appealing the decision, but had only 60 days to complete the paperwork. The Agency provided J.B. with the packet to complete and return for submission to SSA but he did not do so within the deadline.
The Agency reported that J.B. had not satisfied eligibility for AB12 during the reporting period, and had in fact failed to satisfy the requirements over the course of the year. He had made no progress toward his educational and employment goals, and continued to lack motivation and follow-through. The social worker recognized that terminating him as an NMD was the most appropriate action but recommended giving him an additional six months "in hopes that he can get on track." The Agency later changed this recommendation stating termination was appropriate given that J.B. had been continuously noncompliant for nearly 18 months. J.B. objected to termination, and the juvenile court scheduled a contested hearing for April 29, 2015.
In an Agency report prepared for the April 29, 2015 hearing, J.B.'s social worker reported she had worked with him for 10 years, had met with him monthly, and had regularly discussed the steps needed to comply with AB12. She had driven him to take a college assessment test, but it was unclear whether he had enrolled in any classes. The social worker said, "J.B.'s lack of compliance cannot continue to be overlooked and the undersigned cannot continue to want more for J.B. than he wants for himself[;] it really is up to J.B. to fulfill his desires for success."
J.B. did not appear at the April 29, 2015 hearing. His counsel requested a continuance and reported that J.B. had applied for community college, had put in job applications, and was enrolled in adult school. The juvenile court said it was not convinced that such last-minute action, performed after the reporting period, would qualify J.B. for AB12: "it seems like there's been a lack of follow-through altogether by J.B. And my concern is that we're at the last minute throwing a lot of things on the table that J.B. may or may not be doing that may not rise to the level of him qualifying for these services under AB12." The court ordered J.B. to provide evidence of his compliance and continued the hearing to June 8, 2015, stating, "I don't want any more continuances or excuses to be quite frank. If [he's not in compliance], . . . that's the drop dead date." The court ordered J.B. to contact the Agency within one week to state what transportation assistance he needed to be able to attend the hearing.
J.B. did not timely contact the Agency to arrange for transportation, and the social worker was unable to reach him because his phone was disconnected. J.B. appeared telephonically for the June 8, 2015 hearing and stated, "They know I'm trying to do everything I can, and it's just kind of hard. But at the same time, I can't get a job in like a week, and I've been really trying." J.B.'s counsel asked for a two week continuance to allow J.B. to appear in person and stated, "[J.B.] may very well have a full-time job by then. He's enrolled to begin school in August. We'll be closer to that. He completed some classes in the adult school. He's doing everything he can to meet these requirements."
The juvenile court noted it had no evidence J.B. was meeting any of the AB12 requirements, but declined to proceed with the hearing to terminate him as an NMD due to complications related to J.B. receiving his SSI benefits. The court ordered J.B. to sign the necessary documents to obtain SSI benefits, and stated, "I'm putting this case over . . . because I do have some significant concerns about the fact that there was this glitch with the SSI. Because if that were in place, I would be terminating this today, and you would have to reapply for AB12 services based on what I have in front of me." "But because we don't have the SSI, and the trust fund is emptied out, I'm willing to put this over." The court continued the matter to July 21, 2015 and stated: "[J.B.] needs to follow through with certain things to get certain benefits. [¶] That's just a lesson that you need to learn right now, is that nothing is for free. It's not going to fall out of the sky. There's certain things that you need to do to be able to get certain benefits, including SSI. So the fact that there was a mistake made, and [t]he Agency is more than willing to make sure that they help you fix that mistake, you need to engage them."
J.B. appeared for the July 21, 2015 hearing. His attorney reported the SSI benefits issue had not been resolved. The social worker explained that SSA had closed J.B.'s case, and that the Agency was assisting him in reinstating his benefits; Agency's counsel added that the reason the case was closed was because J.B. failed to attend an appointment. Agency's counsel further stated: "And we can't apply to the State of California for any [AB12] funding . . . because he's not complying with AB12 requirements. It would just simply be denied because we can't choose to state that he's complying with these requirements so the State of California would pay then, which is then making it a County-pay issue. And the County doesn't like to pay any way. I meant, doesn't like to pay out of its own coffers when it should have been a State-reimbursed issue." J.B.'s counsel argued J.B. should be receiving AB12 benefits because there had been no judicial determination that he was no longer an NMD. Counsel noted there is no statute authorizing the Agency to "cut off the money before the judicial adjudication is made that he is not qualified to continue as [an NMD]."
The juvenile court then proceeded with the contested hearing. J.B. testified he had not attended school or worked during the September 2014 to April 2015 reporting period. He was not taking his medication. He had applied for jobs at places like Walmart, Save Mart, Jack in the Box, and Dollar Tree, and had completed an application for Modesto Junior College. He acknowledged the social worker assisted him in completing a financial aid application and taking assessment tests. He knew he was supposed to contact a counselor to determine when he could start school, but had not done so. He testified he had attended adult school two evenings a week for four weeks, in or about April 2015.
J.B. also testified he had done "volunteer work" at the Mini Mart in Patterson during the reporting period and was paid "under the table." He identified a person named Benji as his contact at the Mini Mart. The juvenile court stopped the proceedings after receiving this information and ordered J.B. to provide his social worker with Benji's contact information and with documentation detailing his work history and job duties.
The juvenile court then returned to the issue of SSI benefits, stating, "I would just say to the Agency, between now and then, I don't know if there's a bit of a stop gap to create less financial stress for [J.B.], because he's not been terminated yet as [an NMD], so I do think that there is a[n] argument to be made that if he's not receiving benefits from the State at this time, whether it's his fault or not, that because he's not been terminated as [an NMD], he should be receiving some monies." "I think that The Agency is responsible for paying him up and until there's a time that he's terminated as [an NMD]. And if SSI is not providing those benefits right now, [t]he Agency has to, because the only reason the Agency hasn't been [paying benefits] is because SSI was in place." "And the Court is ordering that he receive those benefits." "I understand it's a little complicated because he was receiving SSI and then that was cut off. But any other time if he were receiving [NMD] benefits and he wasn't doing what he was supposed to do, you would [have to] come to the Court and ask the Court to terminate."
Agency's counsel agreed, stating, "Correct," but nevertheless objected to paying the benefits, stating, "The problem here is that that then becomes a County-pay issue, and that he could double dip and take both his [SSI] benefits and his [NMD] benefits." "And it is The Agency's position that it is not required to pay for things that the state doesn't otherwise reimburse." Counsel requested a stay of the order pending appeal, and the court granted the request.
The juvenile court then stated, "I understand your position that he could double dip, but he can't double dip if he doesn't have SSI. And he's kind of left out there . . . without benefits, and he still should have the [NMD] designation." "The Agency can't say 'We're going to wait because he could double-dip.' He's not double-dipping. He's not getting those monies right now. And you should in fact be aware of that when he does get the money, because you're [the one] helping him through every bit of the process." "So as far as hearing about the double-dipping piece, I kind of feel like it's disingenuous, because he's not. He can't receive those benefits right now as we speak. We don't know if he'll ever receive them again." "I think that's not a great place to be from County Counsel's space, because you do have [an NMD] who's not receiving monies now for three months going on four months, and the position is just because the State isn't paying it, it's their obligation to pay it, it's not ours." "What I know to be a fact is he no longer is getting those benefits from the State. And for The Agency to say, 'Hands off. We're not going to help him now as [an NMD] because we're not going to get reimbursed for that by the State,' is an unusual position to be in based upon how we got here." With that, the court continued the hearing to August 19, 2015.
According to an August 19, 2015 addendum report, J.B. had not provided Benji's contact information to his social worker, and the social worker had made multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact J.B. J.B. finally contacted the social worker the Saturday before the hearing at 6:22 p.m., stating he would email her Benji's contact information. J.B. also told her he had begun working at Kohl's doing maintenance work approximately three weeks prior.
J.B. arrived almost an hour late for the August 19, 2015 hearing. J.B.'s counsel called J.B.'s social worker, Carmen Jones, as a witness. Jones testified she had been J.B.'s social worker for over ten years. She initially recommended J.B.'s NMD status be maintained, and continued to provide services to him even after recommending termination. She drove him to Modesto Junior College and to the library to apply for financial aid, and visited with him monthly. She provided him bus tickets to attend hearings, spoke with his trust officer regarding the SSI issues, and helped him fill out the SSI paperwork.
J.B.'s counsel recalled J.B. to the witness stand. J.B. testified Jones had not provided the assistance he needed; for example, she did not give him the resources to enroll in therapy. He testified that his four weeks of adult education courses were not related to obtaining a GED, but that he enrolled in an attempt to meet AB12 requirements. J.B. further testified he had been doing part-time work babysitting and doing handyman work for a woman, J.W., for the past year. He did not previously mention J.W. because he knew J.W. was upset at him for leaving her house without cleaning the floors. As of the date of the hearing, he was working 35 hours per week for Diversified Services at Kohl's. He began the job "two weeks ago" and had worked 1.5 days during the pay period.
The juvenile court issued its decision, stating: "[T]he intent of AB12 was to create a safety net for young people to extend foster care so that there was not a free-fall for children who turn 18 years old and have absolutely no support and no finances. I also think that the intent of the legislature was to make sure that we created an avenue, or a path for young people to be able to be self-sufficient on their own. That's why there's the need for the eligibility requirements to receive this money. . . . The [NMD] has to do something to earn that money, just like all of us have to do something to earn money, whether it's work, or go to school, et cetera." The court found J.B. had failed to engage in any activity to comply with AB12 during the reporting period. There was also insufficient information to show he was currently meeting AB12 eligibility requirements. The court stated, "So I do have some hope for [J.B.] because he has a job," and told him he could apply to reenter the AB12 program "because the Court keeps general jurisdiction for that purpose." The court found that remaining under juvenile court jurisdiction was not in J.B.'s best interest, terminated his NMD status, and dismissed the dependency.
DISCUSSION
Termination of NMD Status
J.B. contends the juvenile court erred in terminating him as an NMD because he was meeting AB12's eligibility requirements on the day of the contested hearing—August 19, 2015—and because the termination was not in his best interest. We disagree.
Before 2008, most dependent children became ineligible for foster care on their 18th birthday. Due to concerns about youths "aging out" of foster care before gaining the skills necessary to become productive members of society, Congress passed the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-351 (Oct. 7, 2008) 122 Stat. 3949). The Act, among other things, provides federal funding to reimburse states for part of the cost of providing maintenance payments to eligible youths who remain in foster care after their 18th birthdays, so long as those youths have not reached their 21st birthdays and are either enrolled in school, employed at least 80 hours a month, or participating in "an activity designed to promote or remove barriers to employment." (Congressional Research Service, "Child Welfare: The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-351)," Oct. 9, 2008, p. 9.) Effective January 1, 2012, our state legislature enacted the California Fostering Connections to Success Act (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.)), which authorizes juvenile courts to continue to exercise dependency jurisdiction and provide foster care benefits, also known as AFDC-FC benefits, to eligible NMDs until age 21.
An NMD is defined as "a foster child . . . who is a current dependent child or ward of the juvenile court . . . who satisfies all of the following criteria: [¶] (1) He or she has attained 18 years of age while under an order of foster care placement by the juvenile court, and is not more than 19 years of age on or after January 1, 2012. . . . [¶] (2) He or she is in foster care under the placement and care responsibility of the county welfare department. . . . [¶] (3) He or she is participating in a [TILCP] . . . as described in Section 11403." (§ 11400, subd. (v); In re K.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 632, 637.)
NMDs who satisfy at least one of five educational and vocational conditions listed in section 11403, subdivision (b), are considered to be participating in a TILCP, and are eligible to receive financial support until age 21. (In re K.L., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 638; In re Aaron S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 507, 516 [an NMD's failure to meet at least one of these five conditions "constitutes a failure to participate in a [TILCP]"].) The five criteria are: (1) The NMD is completing secondary education or a program leading to an equivalent credential; (2) The NMD is enrolled in an institution that provides postsecondary or vocational education; (3) The NMD is participating in a program or activity designed to promote, or remove barriers to employment; (4) The NMD is employed for at least 80 hours per month; or (5) The NMD is incapable of doing any of the above activities due to a medical condition, and that incapability is supported by regularly updated information in the case plan of the NMD. (§ 11403, subd. (b).)
To determine a youth's eligibility for continuing dependency jurisdiction and AB12 benefits, the juvenile court is required to conduct a review hearing every six months. (§ 391, subd. (b)(1), (2).) At each review, the Agency must "verify and obtain assurances that the [NMD] continues to satisfy at least one of the conditions." (§ 11403, subd. (c).) Under section 391, the court is required to continue dependency jurisdiction over—and order continuing benefits for—a youth if the youth meets the definition of an NMD, unless the court finds the NMD "does not wish to remain subject to dependency jurisdiction" or "is not participating in a reasonable and appropriate [TILCP]," i.e., is not meeting one of the five criteria set forth in section 11403, subdivision (b). (§ 391, subd. (c)(1).) We review the court's decision to terminate jurisdiction over an NMD for an abuse of discretion. (In re Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 517.)
Even if the court terminates dependency jurisdiction, it retains general jurisdiction over the NMD to allow for the filing of a petition to resume dependency jurisdiction until the NMD attains age 21. (§ 391, subd. (d)(2).)
Here, there was ample evidence that J.B. was not complying with AB12's eligibility requirements. Despite being given leeway on multiple occasions, J.B. lacked motivation to complete necessary tasks, including taking his medication, engaging in therapy, and completing secondary education or a program leading to an equivalent credential. He claimed to have applied for jobs but did not provide documentation, and despite being granted a continuance to present evidence he worked for Mini Mart, failed to do so. He did not remain in contact with his social worker, and failed to contact the social worker when ordered by the court to do so.
J.B. asserts, "While his efforts may not have been perfect, . . . they were sufficient." He points out that the court held in In re R.G. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1098, 1099, that "a setback does not automatically disqualify [NMDs] from the program." Although the court in that case noted that "there will be times when NMDs will be in transition" and may, for example, "lose a job or have a medical crisis and have to quit school," (In re R.G., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1098-1099), here, J.B.'s lack of engagement was not a brief "transition" between participation activities. Rather, there was evidence he failed to adequately work toward his TILCP goals during much of the time he was an NMD.
J.B. argues the juvenile court should have nevertheless continued him as an NMD because he was meeting the employment eligibility requirement of section 11403, subdivision (b), as of the contested hearing date of August 19, 2015. He asserts the court erroneously focused its review on his actions during the six-month reporting period of September 2014 through April 2015. The Agency responds that "the relevant time is the six-month reporting period" and that under J.B.'s position, an NMD could simply request multiple continuances—as J.B.'s counsel did in this case—in order to " 'buy more time' " to meet the eligibility requirements. We need not—and therefore will not—decide whether the court erred in focusing on the six-month reporting period because there was sufficient evidence to support an implied finding that J.B. was not meeting the employment requirement even as of August 19, 2015.
As noted, J.B. testified on August 19, 2015 that he had begun working at Kohl's only "two weeks ago." When asked how many days he had worked during the pay period, he said he had worked for 1.5 days. Section 11403, subdivision (b), requires that the NMD be working 80 hours per month. Because there was no evidence J.B. had worked 80 hours in any one-month-period, even if the juvenile court had considered J.B.'s last-minute employment, it would not have been able to find he was meeting the employment eligibility requirement of section 11403, subdivision (b).
Finally, J.B. argues that termination was not in his best interest. He asserts that without NMD services, he "has little hope of successfully navigating the rather overwhelming tasks that lie ahead." The maintenance of jurisdiction for an NMD, however, "cannot realistically be expected to prevent any future harm to [the NMD] where [the NMD] has repeatedly rejected nearly all efforts of assistance from the Department and where the Department is working harder than [the NMD] to maintain dependency jurisdiction." (In re Nadia G. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1120.) Moreover, "[t]hough Section 391 requires consideration of 'whether it is in the [NMD's] best interests to remain under the court's dependency jurisdiction,' the juvenile court is nonetheless authorized to terminate jurisdiction over a [NMD] if he or she is not participating in her case plan. . . . As it is axiomatic that it would be detrimental for any nonminor dependent to stop receiving services, the mere assertion of such detriment without any proof of reasonable participation by the nonminor in his or her case plan does not demonstrate that the court abused its discretion." (In re Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 519-520.) In light of J.B.'s lack of compliance and failure to make adequate progress toward his educational and employment goals, the juvenile court could reasonably determine that rewarding J.B. with continued NMD status was not in his best interest.
Benefits for the April to August 2015 Period
The Agency contends the juvenile court erred in requiring the Agency to pay benefits to J.B. as an NMD from April to August 2015—the period during which he had not yet been terminated as an NMD, but was not in compliance with the statutory requirements of section 11403, subdivision (b). We disagree.
"By way of background, the federal government offers financial support to foster care providers by making block grants to the states through the AFDC-FC program. [Citation.] California receives AFDC-FC block grants, supplements the federal grants with state funds, and distributes the money through the State Department of Social Services and county social services agencies." (In re A.F. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 51, 54.) "The federal and state AFDC-FC statutes and the benefits they provide are complementary but not coextensive. For example, children placed under a guardianship rather than in foster care are not eligible for federal funds, but under California law, a minor who is placed in the home of a nonrelated legal guardian is eligible for state AFDC-FC. [Citations.] Regardless of the state's ability to receive reimbursement from federal sources, social services agencies are obligated to work with eligible persons to help them receive the aid (state or federal) to which they are entitled." (Id. at p. 55.)
While AFDC-FC funding is a common source of AB12 financial benefits, not all youth designated as NMDs receive AFDC-FC funds. NMDs receiving SSI are also eligible to participate in AB12 even if they receive an SSI payment benefit instead of AFDC-FC. (ACL 11-61, dated October 13, 2011, p. 6; Section 13754.) When an individual is eligible for two different benefit amounts in the same setting, he or she will receive whichever benefit amount is the highest. (California Department of Social Services Manual of Policy and Procedures § 45-302.)
Here, as noted, J.B. was receiving SSI benefits until they were discontinued in or about April 2015. At the time the benefits were discontinued, J.B. was still an NMD, and was therefore entitled to receive financial assistance as an NMD until August 19, 2015, when the juvenile court terminated him as an NMD. (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess); Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess) [NMDs are entitled to remain under dependency jurisdiction and receive financial assistance until age 21 as long as they meet certain eligibility requirements].) Thus, the juvenile court was correct in stating that J.B. was entitled to benefits as an NMD until he was terminated as an NMD on August 19, 2015.
The Agency argues it should not be required to pay benefits to J.B. for the April to August 2015 period because J.B. was not meeting AB12's eligibility requirements during that period. It also asserts that because J.B. was not compliant, the juvenile court's order constituted an improper gift of public funds, and violated the prohibition against "spend[ing] County treasury funds in excess of what state law mandates." What the Agency fails to recognize, however, is that there had been no determination of non-eligibility as of April 2015, and J.B. was still an NMD until the juvenile court terminated his status on August 19, 2015. In fact, Agency's counsel agreed with the court's statement that if an NMD is receiving benefits "and he wasn't doing what he was supposed to do, [the Agency would have to] come to the Court and ask the Court to terminate." Because the Agency did not obtain an order terminating J.B.'s status as an NMD until August 19, 2015, the court did not err in determining he was entitled to NMD benefits until that date. The Agency cites no authority to support its purported position that the Agency has the right to unilaterally refuse to pay benefits to an NMD in the absence of a judicial determination of noncompliance, simply because the Agency believes the NMD is not compliant.
The Agency also argues the juvenile court's order violated the separation of powers doctrine because it "adjudicate[d] eligibility for AFDC-FC/AB12 funding" instead of deferring to the Agency, and that J.B. should have been required to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Agency relies primarily on two cases, but both are inapposite. In In re Darlene T. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 929, 932, the court was found to have exceeded its authority when it ordered the Agency to make foster care payments to a dependent minor's caregiver even though the caregiver had not exhausted her administrative remedies by seeking a determination as to her eligibility for payments under an administrative review statute. In In re Ashley M. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1, 4, the Court of Appeal held the juvenile court erred in ordering the Agency to assign a particular social worker to the dependency case, because "[t]he determination of how best to assign duties to employees and otherwise allocate the agency's resources is not a judicial function and must be left to the agency's own discretion." (Id. at p. 9.) In contrast, in our case, the decision whether to exercise dependency jurisdiction over—and provide benefits to—a youth as an NMD is within the juvenile court's discretion, and the requirements and factors are set forth in sections 391 and 11403. No administrative review statute is at issue here. It is settled that the interpretation and application of statutes are judicial functions. (McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 470, 473.) Thus, J.B. was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, and the court did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by continuing J.B. as an NMD until August 19, 2015, and in ordering that he be provided with financial assistance as an NMD until that date.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.
/s/_________
McGuiness, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Pollak, J. /s/_________
Siggins, J.