Opinion
Civil Action Nos. 03-0253 (RMC), 03-0682 (RMC).
March 31, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The question presented is straightforward: should an organization that represents or is comprised entirely of public-sector employees, but that is subordinate to an entity that represents private-sector employees, be considered a "labor organization" as that term is understood under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. ("LMRDA")? Because answering in the affirmative would slip the LMRDA loose from its moorings in the private sector and be contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, its legislative history, and the congressional purpose behind the law, the Court finds that such an organization is not a "labor organization."
BACKGROUND
Congress adopted the LMRDA to prevent union corruption, to protect "the rights and interests of employees[,]" and "to eliminate or prevent improper practices" in labor organizations. 29 U.S.C. § 401(b), (c). As part of the statutory scheme to achieve these objectives, Congress required labor organizations to file financial reports annually with the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 431(b). However, "[a] labor organization composed entirely of employees of the governmental entities excluded by section 3(3) would not be a labor organization for purposes of the [LMRDA]" and not be subject to the annual financial reporting obligation. 29 C.F.R. § 451.3(a)(4) (2003).The Alabama Education Association and other State Education Associations ("SEAs") and the Delaware Federation of Teachers and other State Federations of Teachers ("SFTs") are comprised of local unions and individual members. These organizations represent public sector employees in dealing with employers "concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 402(i). Although the SEAs and SFTs do not directly represent private sector employees, they are affiliated with umbrella groups, the National Education Association ("NEA") and American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO ("AFT"), respectively, that do.
In November and December of 2002, various Department of Labor ("DOL") regional offices notified certain SEAs and SFTs that, pursuant to a new interpretation of the LMRDA, they would be required to file financial reports with the DOL. The DOL's new interpretation of the LMRDA changes forty years of precedent, treating the SEAs and SFTs as if they were private-sector unions — despite their uncontested public-sector focus — because of their respective relationships to the NEA and AFT, which are both covered by the LMRDA. The SEAs and SFTs brought separate suits, which were later consolidated, for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of Labor contesting this interpretation and a new regulation that would impose the reporting requirements of the LMRDA upon the SEAs and SFTs.
The parties have stipulated that the SEAs and SFTs represent or are comprised entirely of wholly public-sector employees:
To the extent permitted by state and local law, Plaintiffs, state education associations and state federations, engage in the types of activities in the public sector that in the private sector constitute "dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, and they engage in these activities through their own employees and by providing various forms of assistance to their local affiliates. Neither Plaintiffs nor any of their local affiliates deal with any private sector employers. They deal only with public sector employers — i.e., the state and political subdivisions thereof, including public school districts, public colleges and universities, and other public educational institutions.
Stipulation at 1-2.
Since passage of the LMRDA in 1959, the Secretary of Labor has consistently determined that organizations such as the SEAs and SFTs are public-sector unions and are not required to submit annual financial reports. These reports, filed by all other labor organizations, are submitted on "LM" forms to the DOL.
That the SEAs and SFTs originally qualified for exemption as public-sector unions (and therefore were not statutory "labor organizations") is undisputed. However, on December 27, 2002, the DOL issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making ("NPRM") whereby the Form LM-2 and its accompanying rules would be changed. Labor Organization Annual Financial Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 79280 (December 27, 2002). The NPRM stated, "The instructions for form LM-2 adopt the recent holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Chao v. Bremerton Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 294 F.3d 1114 (2002)," which had held that an intermediate union body with no private-sector membership could be covered by the LMRDA if it is subordinate to a national or international union covered by the LMRDA. Id. at 79284.
Between November 2002 — before publication of the NPRM — and December 2003, the SEAs and SFTs received letters from DOL regional offices. These letters essentially stated that "it appears your organization is subject to [the LMRDA] and should be filing reports with this office." SFTs' Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute ("SFT Facts") ¶ 2. The letters directed the SEAs and SFTs to file form LM-1 (the initial LM filing form) within thirty days and to file annual financial reports for each of the last three fiscal years within sixty days. Id. When the AFT protested to DOL, it was advised that the "Office of Labor Management Standard[s] disagrees with your analysis and conclusions. As such, the State Federations should file the previously requested reports within 60 days." Id. ¶ 4.
The NEA filed suit on behalf of its twenty-two affiliated SEAs on February 14, 2003, alleging that the Secretary's new position violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., and was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a). See Alabama Educ. Ass'n v. Chao, No. 03-cv-253 (D.D.C. filed February 14, 2003). AFT filed a similar suit on March 14, 2003, on behalf of the seven affected SFTs. See Delaware Fed. of Teachers v. Chao, No. 03-cv-682 (D.D.C. filed March 14, 2003). On June 17, 2003, the Court granted the parties' motions to consolidate the two cases and stayed both cases until September 30, 2003, pending completion of the DOL's policy re-evaluation and rulemaking proceedings.
The Secretary published her final rule on October 9, 2003, revising the annual financial forms used by unions under the LMRDA. See Labor Organization Annual Financial Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 58374 (October 9, 2003). The final rule retained the proposal to follow Chao v. Bremerton Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO. Id. at 58383-84. The Secretary proposed to add instructions on forms LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 "clarifying that `any conference, general committee, joint or system board or joint council' that is subordinate to a national or international labor organization will be required to file an annual financial report" if the national or international union is covered by the LMRDA. Id. at 58384. Nonetheless, DOL provided a status report to the Court on November 26, 2003 in which it stated that it had made "no final determination whether any of the Plaintiffs in these cases" are covered by the LMRDA. Def.'s Status Report at 2.
The Court issued an Order on December 12, 2003, directing the Secretary to inform the Court of her position. On February 10, 2004, the Secretary responded, stating that "the Department has concluded that the Plaintiffs are labor organizations within the meaning of the LMRDA." Declaration of John H. Heaney (Chief of the Enforcement Division, Office of Labor Management Standards) ¶ 6. On March 1, 2004, the Court granted the parties' motions to lift the stay in the case, denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss, and ordered her to answer the complaint within twenty days. A briefing schedule was set and the matter is now before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Because the relevant facts are undisputed and because the issues raised concern only questions of statutory interpretation, this case may be appropriately resolved on a motion for summary judgment. See 325-343 E. 56th St. Corp. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 906 F. Supp. 669, 674 (D.D.C. 1995) ("When the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate.").
In deciding these cross motions for summary judgment, the Court is mindful of the framework for reviewing an agency's construction of a statute set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Under Chevron, a court must first ascertain "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. "In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished." Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)).
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The LMRDA provides a definition of "labor organization" in Section 3(i):
"Labor organization" means a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce and includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization, other than a State or local central body.29 U.S.C. § 402(i). This language divides covered labor organizations into two categories: (1) those that are "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" and that deal with employers concerning grievances and the like, and (2) those conferences, general committees, joint or system boards or joint councils that are "so engaged" in an industry affecting commerce and are subordinate to a national or international labor organization, i.e., a national or international labor organization that is, itself, "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" and that deals with employers concerning grievances and the like. Id. For LMRDA purposes, the term "employer" specifically excludes the United States or any corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof. 29 U.S.C. § 402(e).
Further, Section 3(j) of the statute presents the circumstances under which a "labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 402(j). The question raised here is whether the SEAs and SFTs have properly been found by the Secretary to be labor organizations engaged in commerce pursuant to Section 3(j)(5):
(j) A labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce if it —
(1) is the certified representative of employees under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended [ 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.] or the Railway Labor Act, as amended [ 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.]; or
(2) although not certified, is a national or international labor organization or a local labor organization recognized or acting as the representative of employees of an employer or employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce; or
(3) has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary body which is representing or actively seeking to represent employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2); or
(4) has been chartered by a labor organization representing or actively seeking to represent employees within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) as the local or subordinate body through which such employees may enjoy membership or become affiliated with such labor organization; or
(5) is a conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council, subordinate to a national or international labor organization, which includes a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection, other than a State or local central body.29 U.S.C. § 402(j). In Chao v. Bremerton, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the language in Section 3(j)(5) as directing the inquiry into whether a conference is "subordinate to" a national or international "labor organization" that has a member that deals with employers and not whether the conference itself has a member that deals with employers. 294 F.3d at 1117 ("We must decide not whether the Bremerton Council bargains directly with any private employers but, instead, whether the Metal Trades Department, the organization to which the Bremerton Council is subordinate, is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.").
Although the statutory language covers more kinds of intermediate bodies than a "conference," for ease of review, the Court will use "conference" to stand for the entire litany.
ANALYSIS
This matter presents questions of statutory interpretation and the degree of deference that should be given to the Secretary's new reading of the LMRDA. The analysis would be easier to follow if more common terms could be used, which the Court believes can be adopted here without harm to the task of interpreting the text.
The common term for a labor organization is a "union" and the Court will use that term hereafter, recognizing that it covers a host of different structures. Section 3(i) of the LMRDA assigns two characteristics to all unions covered by that statute: they must "deal with employers" and be "engaged in . . . commerce." 29 U.S.C. 402(i). Statutory "employers" under the LMRDA are all in the private sector, id., and will be referenced as "Employers." Employees of such Employers are, perforce, also in the private sector and will be referenced as "Employees." Employees in the public sector — teachers, firemen, university professors, etc. — are not statutory employees under the LMRDA. Id. The parties agree on these points. Where they part company is defining how the SEAs and SFTs fit within the definition of what it means for an LMRDA union to be "engaged in commerce" under Section 3(j), at 29 U.S.C. § 402(j).
Traditional unions exist for the purpose of representing employees in dealing with employers. This "dealing with" covers a multitude of subjects including those identified in the LMRDA: "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 402(i). A union attains its representative status either by: (1) winning an election among the employees pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") or Railway Labor Act ("RLA") after which the union is "certified" as the employees' representative; or (2) obtaining voluntary "recognition" as the employees' representative from the employer without an election (or winning a State-conducted election for workers not covered by the NLRA or RLA). These methods of achieving representative status are specifically recognized in Sections 3(j)(1) and (2): a union is "engaged in . . . commerce" if it (1) is a certified representative under the NLRA or RLA or (2) is "recognized or acting as" a representative. 29 U.S.C. § 402(j)(1), (j)(2).
Translated into common terms, Section 3(j) specifies that a union is engaged in commerce if:
(1) it is a representative of Employees that is certified by a federal agency [ 29 U.S.C. § 402(j)(1)];
(2) it is a representative of Employees that is "recognized" or "acting as" a representative [ 29 U.S.C. § 402(j)(2)];
(3) it is chartered by a local union which already represents or seeks to represent Employees under (1) or (2) [ 29 U.S.C. § 402(j)(3)];
(4) it is chartered as a local union by a union which represents or seeks to represent Employees under (1) or (2) [ 29 U.S.C. § 402(j)(4)]; or
(5) it is a conference, subordinate to a national or international union that is certified or recognized as a representative of Employees and "deals with" Employers under Section 3(i), which includes a union that is certified or recognized as a representative of Employees. [ 29 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5)].See 29 U.S.C. § 402(j). Thus, a union is "engaged in . . . commerce" if it is a certified or recognized representative of Employees and is a "labor organization" if it is a certified or recognized Employee representative that also deals with an Employer. Id. The engagement in commerce occurs because, as the representative of Employees, the union affects Employer costs and work processes by way of wages, hours, benefits, work rules, and possibly engaging in a labor dispute that disrupts commerce. Subsections (3), (4), and (5) of Section 3(j) describe various union organizational structures and ensure that, whatever configuration is adopted, if a union represents (private-sector) Employees (and thus is "engaged in commerce") and deals with (private-sector) Employers, it will be covered by the LMRDA and will be required to submit annual financial reports.
Of course, these two criteria meet each other across the bargaining table and in the myriad other venues for "dealing with" each other.
With this basic understanding, does one read Section 3(j)(5) in the Secretary's "old" way as meaning a conference that includes among its members a union that represents Employees; or in the Secretary's "new" way as meaning a conference that is "subordinate to" a national or international union that includes among its members a union that represents Employees? In other words, where in the text does one place "which includes a union that deals with private-sector employers" — does it modify "conference" or does it modify "national or international [union]?" 29 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5).
A statute must be considered "against the background of legislative history and in the light of the general objectives Congress sought to achieve." Writz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968). It is clear from the legislative history that unions comprised solely of public-sector employees were meant to be entirely excluded from the bill's coverage. In fact, an amendment to broaden the bill to specifically include unions of government employees was rejected by the Senate. Senator Barry Goldwater explained the importance of excluding such unions from the requirements of LMRDA:
Inasmuch as these unions, in most instances, do not have the right to strike or even to compel their governmental employers to bargain collectively with them, and even more significantly, are powerless to compel employees to join and hence are truly voluntary associations, I believe that they should be free from the regulations imposed by the new bill. As long as their members were free to resign from such unions without any harm or injury to themselves resulting therefrom, the members exercised an ultimate control over their officers sufficient, if properly exercised, to assure freedom from corruption, racketeering, and other abuses.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 234 (1959).
From passage of the LMRDA, with the intent of Congress ringing in its ears, until 2002, the DOL gave a consistent meaning to the statutory text. As its regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 451.3(a)(4) stated, and as the Secretary explained to the Ninth Circuit, "`[a] labor organization composed entirely of employees of the governmental entities excluded by section 3(e) [publicsector employees] would not be a labor organization for purposes of the Act,' while `national, international or intermediate labor organization[s] composed both of government locals and non-government or mixed locals' are `subject to the Act.'" Chao v. Bremerton Metal Trades Council, DOL Reply Brief at 4. Prior to 2002, therefore, a conference that included a union that dealt with Employers was covered by the LMRDA but a conference that included only unions that dealt with public-sector employers was not. Id.
At the request of the Court, the Secretary submitted her Bremerton briefs to the Ninth Circuit for this record. They can be found at Docket # 34.
The Secretary's interpretation has changed because of one line in Bremerton, adopting a position not even argued by the Secretary in that case. Bremerton is obviously worthy of study. There, the Secretary charged that the Bremerton Metal Trades Council ("BMTC") had violated the LMRDA when it denied a member in good standing the right to be a candidate for union office. The Secretary described the BMTC in her brief to the Ninth Circuit:
The BMTC is an intermediate-level labor organization that serves as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. The BMTC is also a joint council of labor organizations: It is subordinate to the Metal Trades Department AFL-CIO ("MTD") and is composed of 13 affiliated local labor organizations that, in turn, are affiliated with various other national or international labor organizations. Some of the local unions have members who work in the private sector, while others consist of solely government employees.Chao v. Bremerton Metal Trades Council, DOL Mem. at 8. As an intermediate organization composed of a mix of local unions that deal with private and public sector entities, the BMTC was a quintessential union subject to the LMRDA under the Secretary's extant regulations. The BMTC, however, argued that despite its mixed membership, it dealt only with public-sector entities as an employee representative and should be exempt from the LMRDA. The District Court disagreed and accepted the Secretary's interpretation of the statute. Herman v. Bremerton Metal Trades Council, No. 99-5283, slip op. at 2 (W.D.Wash. June 21, 2000) (While the BMTC "may represent only federal employees, it is itself formed of unions that have non-governmental members who are subject to the . . . LMRDA."). On the merits, however, the District Court rejected the Secretary's argument that the BMTC had imposed an illegal condition on candidacy for union office. Id. at 3-5. The Secretary appealed to the Ninth Circuit and argued:
The statute makes clear that joint councils need not directly deal with private employers to be subject to the Act; so long as they are subordinate to a national organization and have some locals that include private employees, they fall within the scope of the Act . . . Both the plain language of the statute and the Department's interpretative regulations thus support the district court's holding that the BMTC falls within the scope of the LMRDA.Chao v. Bremerton Metal Trades Council, DOL Mem. at 18-19 (emphasis added). The Secretary thus argued to the Ninth Circuit that a conference is covered by the LMRDA if (1) it reports to a national labor organization and (2) it has at least one local within the conference that deals with Employers.
To be clear, as discussed above, "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" means, under Section 3(j), that a union entity must be a certified, recognized, or "acting as" a representative of Employees (or seek to be). 29 U.S.C. § 402(j). It is impossible for a union (in its representative capacity) to be "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" without some connection to commerce, i.e., representation of private-sector employees. Id. Thus, a conference that may not directly "deal with" an employer or have employee members (as would a local union) can still constitute a "labor organization" under the LMRDA if it (i) "engage[s] in . . . commerce" by acting as a representative of Employees and (ii) is subordinate to a national or international union that represents Employees and deals with Employers. 29 C.F.R. § 451.3(b). The whole point of adding "conference" to the bill that became the LMRDA was to cover these kinds of intermediate union entities that are "associations of labor unions rather than of individual employees" that "do not bargain collectively, do not represent employees for collective bargaining purposes, do not enter into collective-bargaining agreements, and employees neither participate in their activities nor hold direct membership therein." See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LABOR-MANAGEMENTREPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, S. REP. NO. 86-187, at 2406 (1959). The regulation at Section 451.3(b) fulfills this goal by ensuring that conferences — which are made up of local unions and rarely engage in collective bargaining — are required to submit financial reports as long as they are " engaged in . . . commerce" by acting as a representative of Employees. 29 C.F.R. § 451.3(b) (emphasis added).
This discussion addresses the union's role as a representative of employees, not as an entity that also employs people and purchases goods and services.
The Secretary now asks the Court to contort the otherwise-clear language of Section 3(j)(5) which, despite great respect for the Ninth Circuit and the Secretary, this Court declines to do. Subsection 3(j)(5) cannot be read without reference to subsections 3(j)(1) (2): in fact, it specifically directs us to do so. See 29 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5) (a conference must be "engaged in commerce within the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection"). As is clear, the prior preceding paragraphs tie a union's engagement in commerce to its role as a representative (certified, recognized, or "acting") of (private-sector) Employees.
As a result, the phrase from Section 3(j)(5) under scrutiny here must be read as: "which includes a union that represents private-sector employees as a certified, recognized or `acting as a' representative." That exact concept, however, is already subsumed in the "national or international" union to which the conference is subordinate: to be such a national or international union, the entity must represent Employees and deal with Employers. See Sections 3(i) and (j). Thus, the Secretary's rendition of the text would result in this anomaly:
A union that deals with Employers [under Section 3(i)] "shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce if it" —
(5) is a conference, subordinate to a national or international union that represents Employees [under Section 3(j)(1) or (2)] and deals with Employers [under Section 3(j)(i)], which includes a union that represents Employees [under Section 3(j)(1) or (2)].
Such a reading would be entirely circuitous and would make the phrase "which includes a union that represents Employees" superfluous. The statute only makes sense — giving meaning to each word, avoiding redundancy and achieving the congressional purpose — if it is read as the Secretary did for 40-odd years:
A union that deals with Employers [under Section 3(j)] shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce, if it —
(5) is a conference, which includes a union that represents Employees [under Section 3(j)(1) or (2)], [and] is subordinate to a national or international union that represents Employees and deals with Employers.See Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("An endlessly reiterated principle of statutory construction is that all words in a statute are to be assigned meaning, and that nothing therein is to be construed as surplusage."). This interpretation of Section 3(j)(5) is not only fully consistent with the text but also removes any potential nonconformity that may be perceived between Sections 3(i) and 3(j)(5). Turning back to Section 3(i), it states that a covered "labor organization" includes a conference "so engaged [in commerce]" that is subordinate to a national or international union. 29 U.S.C. § 402(i). It is worth stressing that "engaged in commerce" means representing or acting as a representative of Employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 402(j). This full reading of Section 3(i) tells us that a covered labor organization includes a conference that is certified, recognized or acting as a representative of Employees and that is subordinate to a national or international union that represents Employees and deals with Employers.
The Secretary's new interpretation of Section 3(j)(5) is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, its legislative history, and the congressional purpose behind the law. The decision from the Ninth Circuit is too limited in analysis to constitute persuasive precedent because it does not analyze the meaning and significance of the term "engaged in commerce." See United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that the first step in any issue of statutory interpretation is to determine whether the words of the statute are unambiguous). The Secretary's reliance on the Ninth Circuit's single sentence from Bremerton is therefore not persuasive. See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43 (where the intent of Congress is clear and Congress has directly spoken to the issue, that is the end of the matter); id. at 843 n. 9 ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.").
CONCLUSION
The motions of the SEAs and SFTs for summary judgment will be GRANTED. In light of this disposition, the Court need not address whether the SEAs and SFTs are "subordinate" to the NEA and AFT, respectively. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.