Likewise, Defendants' attempted comparisons to nonbinding district court and unpublished Third Circuit opinions are of no help either. See, e.g. , King v. City of Phila. , 66 Fed.Appx. 300, 303 (3d Cir. 2003) (although a fired police officer was called the "n-word," and for that reason we did in fact determine he "had established a prima facie case," defendants carried their burden under the McDonnell-Douglas framework of providing evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination); Miller , 565 Fed.Appx. 88 (did not deal with an isolated incident); Al-Salem v. Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth. , Civ. A. No. 97-6843, 1999 WL 167729 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999) (employee who resigned to accept a higher paying job was called the "n-word" but there was no evidence on the record that he was detrimentally affected). Here Plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor used a racially charged slur in front of them and their non-African-American coworkers. Within the same breath, the use of this word was accompanied by threats of termination (which ultimately occurred).
, a rational factfinder could not conclude that these incidents, which took place over the course of more than a decade, amounted to the sort of “steady barrage of opprobrious . . . comments” that characterize claims of pervasive harassment. Al-Salem v. Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth., No. 97-6843, 1999 WL 167729, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999) (quoting Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1997)). Hostile work environment claims require discrimination to take place with far greater frequency to be sustained. See, e.g., Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 258-59, 263 (holding that a rational factfinder could find a hostile work environment where, over the course of about three years, the plaintiff, a Hispanic man: (1) had been called “the boy from the barrio” and “an affirmative-action hire;” was asked “why he had anglicized his name” and “whether [he] intended to pull out a switchblade” to resolve workplace disagreements; (3) had his cubicle regularly defaced with “derogatory” messages, including one that called him a “wetback”; (4) had his performance ratings systematically lowered compared to his White colleagues'; and, (5) had been given “knowingly contradictory instructions and assignments incompatible with his staff
See Hanani v. State of New Jersey Dep't of Env't Prot., 205 F. App'x 71, 79 (3d Cir. 2006); Sherrod v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 57 F. App'x 68, 77 (3d Cir. 2003); Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Southeastern Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999); Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 2021 WL 4860742, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2021); Pineda v. Philadelphia Media Holdings, LLC, 542 F. Supp. 2d 419, 428-29 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Palma v. Volunteers of America, 2006 WL 328352, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2006); Boyer v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 2005 WL 35893, at *16 n.24 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2005); Walden v. Saint Gobain Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 637, 643-44 (E.D. Pa. 2004); James v. Allentown Bus. Sch., 2003 WL 21652189, at *17 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2003); Gharzouzi v. Northwestern Human Servs. of Pa., 225 F. Supp. 2d 514, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Al-Salem v. Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth., 1999 WL 167729, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999). Defendants also cite Bellamy v. Waterfront Square Condominiums, 2013 WL 607848 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2013), in support of their position.
Racial comments that are "sporadic or part of casual conversations do not violate Title VII." Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 09-774, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54392, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2013) (quoting Al-Salem v. Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth., No. 97-6843, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3609, at *15-16 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999)), aff'd, 636 F App'x 831 (3d Cir. 2016). Instead, "for racist comments, slurs, and jokes to constitute a hostile work environment, there must be more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity, meaning that instead of sporadic racist slurs, there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments."
Further, "'[r]acial comments that are sporadic or part of casual conversation do not violate Title VII.'" Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., Civil Action No. 09-0774, 2013 WL 1628603, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting Al-Salem v. Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth., No. 97-6843, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3609, at *15-16 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999)). Instead, "'[f]or racist comments, slurs and jokes to constitute a hostile work environment, there must be more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity, meaning that instead of sporadic racist slurs, there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments.'"
For racist comments, slurs and jokes to constitute a hostile work environment, there must be more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity, meaning that instead of sporadic racist slurs, there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments.Al-Salem v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Authority, No. 97-6843, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3609, at * 15-16 (E.D. Pa. March 25, 1999). District courts have found that arguably more offensive actions are insufficient to satisfy a prima facie case.
While they should never be condoned, "[r]acial comments that are sporadic or part of casual conversation do not violate Title VII." Al-Salem v. Bucks Cnty. Water Sewer Auth., No. 97-6843, 1999 WL 167729, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). "For racist comments, slurs, and jokes to constitute a hostile work environment, there must be more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity, meaning that instead of sporadic racial slurs, there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments."
Along these lines, "[w]hile they should never be condoned, `[r]acial comments that are sporadic or part of casual conversation do not violate Title VII.'" Al-Salem v. Bucks County Water Sewer Auth., Civ. A. No. 97-6843, 1999 WL 167729, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999) ( quoting McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 288, 293 (E.D. Tex. 1996)). Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim is based on Mayberry's alleged statements that Plaintiff "had to do better than the Charlies and Dennises," that Plaintiff "had to represent his people" and "wasn't supporting his people," and Mayberry's asking Plaintiff "what kind of Puerto Rican are you?"
However, "sporadic racial slurs," alone are insufficient to establish a hostile work environment for Title VII purposes; in this circuit "there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments" to support such a claim. Boyer v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., No. 02-8382, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171, at *58 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2005) (citing Al-Salem v. Bucks County Water Sewer Auth., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3609, at *15-16 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999). In this case, Jones has come forward with evidence of a single, racially charged, highly inappropriate outburst by a fellow employee.
) The use of the term "nigger," which was not made with respect to Boyer and which was not used in his presence, although offensive, does not constitute regular and pervasive harassment of Boyer. See Al-Salem v. Bucks County Water Sewer Auth., Civ. A. No. 97-6843, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3609, at *15-16 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 1999) In addition, the comments which were directed at members of other protected classes were not similar to the offending remarks directed at Boyer.