Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-4139-DCC-MGB
11-27-2022
Bilal A. Al-Haqq, a/k/a Michael Dion McFadden, a/k/a Michael D. McFadden, Plaintiff, v. Warden Evonne Willingham, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Bilal A. Al-Haqq is an inmate in custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) who currently is housed at Lieber Correctional Institution (“LCI”) in Ridgeville, South Carolina. At the time of some of the underlying events, Plaintiff was housed at Trenton Correctional Institution (“TCI”) in Trenton, South Carolina. On December 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1, 4.) Plaintiff filed an “Amended and Supplemental Complaint” on January 27, 2022 against, among others, Defendants Bryan P. Stirling, Director of SCDC; Warden Evonne Willingham, Warden of TCI; Elaine Freeman, Associate Warden of TCI; and Ann Sheppard, Associate Warden at LCI. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Dkt. No. 8, 8.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., Plaintiff's complaint was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for pretrial handling.
In his original complaint, Plaintiff named as Defendants SCDC, Warden Evonne Willingham, and Associate Warden Elaine Freeman. (Dkt. No. 8.) Plaintiff dropped SCDC as a Defendant in his amended complaint. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff named as Defendants Stirling, Willingham, Freeman, and Sheppard, as well as Warden Brian Kendall, Nurse Grissom, Patti Britt-Pooser, and Ms. Brown. Defendants Kendall, Grissom, Britt-Pooser, and Brown were dismissed by order filed May 3, 2021. (Dkt. No. 35.)
On April 13, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint as frivolous. (Dkt. No. 29.) On April 14, 2022, this court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' motion. (Dkt. No. 33.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants' motion on May 13, 2022 (Dkt. No. 39), to which Defendants filed a reply on May 19, 2022 (Dkt. No. 40). Plaintiff filed a surreply on June 3, 2022. (Dkt. No. 41.) The motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for review.
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 29) be granted, and that Plaintiff's case be dismissed in full.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted by a correctional officer at TCI in June 2019. Plaintiff states that he reported the assault and filed a grievance regarding the matter, but that Defendant Freeman, as PREA [Prison Rape Elimination Act] Coordinator at TCI, failed to report the assault. Plaintiff states that he filed a grievance and Defendant Williamson denied the grievance in part and agreed in part. Plaintiff alleges word spread among the correctional officers that Plaintiff was seeking legal redress for the assault and the officers began a campaign of harassment against Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to nine 903 disciplinary charges without being drug tested or given the opportunity to refuse a drug test. (Dkt. No. 8, 4.)
Disciplinary Offense 903 references trafficking, use, and/or possession of narcotics, marijuana, or unauthorized drugs, including prescription drugs, inhalants, intoxicants, and synthetics; being under the influence of such intoxicants; or failing a drug test (Level 1 Disciplinary Offense).
Plaintiff alleges that in August 2020 Defendant Willingham called a meeting with Plaintiff and Defendant Freeman. Plaintiff alleges that after the meeting he was placed in segregated housing and told that if he “stopped his foolishness” with his legal work he would be placed back into the general population. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of refusing to stop his legal activities at TCI, Defendants Willingham and Freeman arranged to have Plaintiff transferred from TCI to LCI. Plaintiff reports that TCI had no reported cases of COVID-19 when he left, but two dormitories at LCI were on COVID-19 quarantine upon Plaintiff's arrival. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff states he was placed in the most dangerous unit at LCI. Plaintiff reports that LCI is constantly on quarantine because of COVID-19 and he rarely received any outside activities. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff states he was moved to a different unit in mid-2021, where he witnessed stabbings and knife fights on a daily basis. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that correctional staff would “turn a blind eye to the assaults and mayhem.” (Id. at 6.)
According to Plaintiff, he was transferred to a different housing unit because of his age and because he had received no disciplinary reports. Plaintiff states that the LCI medical personnel authorized him to obtain his eyeglasses and tennis shoes from home. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sheppard prohibited him from obtaining his eyeglasses and tennis shoes because Plaintiff had reported Defendant Sheppard for interfering in a mental health session. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges he was diagnosed with COVID-19 on October 1, 2021 and placed in quarantine for two weeks, with no contact with nurses or staff. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff contends he was removed from his unit and placed in the infirmary. He was not allowed to bring anything and had several court deadlines when placed on quarantine. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff states he was moved from the infirmary to an abandoned building with over forty other inmates who tested positive for COVID-19. Plaintiff asserts he was unable to access his legal materials, was denied legal supplies, and did not receive his property for nearly two weeks. According to Plaintiff, he remained on quarantine for over thirty days, during which time his court dates passed. (Id.)
Plaintiff states that he tried to exhaust his administrative remedies but the grievance coordinator at LCI refused to process every grievance Plaintiff filed. Plaintiff claims that the grievance system at LCI is an “ineffective rogue system designed to deter grievances.” (Id. at 8.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Stirling failed to properly staff SCDC during a pandemic, which placed inmates and staff in danger. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaration that the acts and omissions described in the amended complaint violated Plaintiff's rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States; (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering the immediate emergency release of Plaintiff to home confinement; (3) compensatory damages in the amount of $50,000 against each Defendant; (4) punitive damages in the amount of $75,000 against each Defendant, (5) a jury trial, and (6) his costs in this litigation. (Id. at 10.)
Plaintiff's allegations against the dismissed Defendants are not repeated here.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motions to Dismiss Generally
A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Ceriani v. Dionysus, Case No.: 4:21cv108, 2022 WL 1185896, at *1 (E.D.Va. Apr. 20, 2022). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While the court must accept the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments. Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (2d ed. 1990 & 1998 Supp.)) In resolving motions to dismiss, courts generally do not “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999).
B. In forma, pauperis Litigation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-....
(B) the action or appeal-
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A finding of frivolity is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). A litigant may be deemed to act maliciously if his allegations indicate a motive on the part of the litigant “‘to merely harass or vex the defendants rather than to seek redress for a legitimate legal claim.'” Cain v. Virginia, 98 F. Suppl. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Va. 1997) (quoting Daves v. Scranton, 66 F.R.D. 5, 7 (E.D. Pa.1975)). A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim when the plaintiff's factual allegations do not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 provides a remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See City of Monterey v. del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973). The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 1996).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Duplicative Allegations
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) on the grounds that Plaintiff's allegations are duplicative and redundant of claims pending in Al-Haqq v. James, 2:21-cv-1721-DCC-MGB. (“Al-Haqq I.”) Defendants state that Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Freeman and Willingham of failing to comply with PREA procedures and arranging his allegedly retaliatory transfer from TCI to FCI also are included in Al-Haqq I, as well as Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Sheppard regarding Plaintiff's shoes and glasses. Defendants argue that duplicative or redundant lawsuits may be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).
In response, Plaintiff reiterates the allegations of his amended complaint, as well as numerous other allegations that are not before this Court. Plaintiff does not address the question whether Plaintiff's allegations against Sheppard, Freeman, and Willingham are duplicative of claims in Al-Haqq I.
The undersigned's review of Al-Haqq I shows the following. Plaintiff alleges he was sexually assaulted by a correctional officer on or about June 24, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1-1, 4.) The next day Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Freeman, who stated she would start a PREA investigation. (Id.) Plaintiff states he asked Defendant Freeman about the investigation two months later, only to discover Defendant Freeman had neither reported the incident nor informed Defendant Willingham about what allegedly occurred. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that about a year later he was called into a meeting with Defendant Willingham, Defendant Freeman, and others. Plaintiff alleges he explained to Defendant Willingham about the assault, and Defendant Willingham stated she had not been informed about the incident. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Willingham transferred Plaintiff to LCI because Plaintiff refused to drop the assault incident. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff asserts he was transferred from TCI, an institution with no reported cases of COVID-19, to LCI, where two entire dormitories contained nearly 400 quarantined inmates. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his family sent soft shoes and eyeglasses to him through Amazon, but Defendant Sheppard told Plaintiff she was going to ask the Warden to prohibit Defendant from receiving the items. (Dkt. No. 66, 3.) Plaintiff says he has not been provided his property, all in retaliation for his activities. (Id. at 5-6.)
The citations to the record in this remainder of this paragraph are to Al-Haqq I.
The undersigned finds that the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint in this action are duplicative of the allegations contained in Al-Haqq I. The undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted as to this issue.
B. Failure to State A Claim
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Willingham and Freeman concerning his transfer between institutions, his claim against Defendant Sheppard regarding his transfers within LCI, and his claim for injunctive relief, in the form of a release from incarceration within SCDC, all fail to state claims for which relief can be granted against these Defendants. As noted supra, Plaintiff did not address the merits of Defendants' argument.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has no right to a particular placement or housing unit within SCDC. Defendants are correct that prisoners have no constitutional right “to be housed in a particular institution, at a particular custody level, or in a particular portion or unit of a correctional institution.” Pevia v. Hogan, 443 F.Supp.3d 612, 634 (D. Md. 2020) (collecting authority). There being no liberty or property interest enforceable under § 1983 regarding the facility where Plaintiff is confined, Plaintiff's complaints about his transfer to LCI from TCI and his placement within the LCI facility are not cognizable under § 1983.
Defendants argue that the court is not authorized to release an inmate convicted in South Carolina and committed by the state to the custody of SCDC. The undersigned agrees. When a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking a writ of mandamus directing state officials to authorize Plaintiff's immediate release, the federal courts' authority to issue a writ of mandamus extends only to federal officers, employees, or agencies. Newell v. Soloman, 1:17CV254, 2017 WL 7058234, at *6 (Dec. 1. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1361; AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd., 172 F.3d 307, 312 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999)). The District Judge is without authority under § 1983 to order Plaintiff's immediate release.
Defendants further argue that the complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants because Plaintiff fails to allege Defendants personally engaged in any conduct that would amount to a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Defendants contend that most of the allegations in the amended complaint are not directed at any specific Defendant and are not actionable under § 1983 in any event.
To assert a viable § 1983 claim against a public official, a causal connection or affirmative link must exist between the public official and his or her conduct. Holmes v. Riddell, C/A No.1:20-224-JFA-SVH, 2020 WL 135401, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 11, 2020) (citing cases). In this case, Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants violated his rights under § 1983 are speculative and not supported by SCDC procedures. Specifically as to Plaintiff's housing status, Defendants note that the determination regarding a prisoner's placement is made pursuant to an Inmate Classification Plan developed and implemented by the Division Director of Classification and Inmate Records. See SCDC Policy No. OP-21-04 “Inmate Classification Plan.” The Plan provides that “Inmate custody classification is based on different factors and embodies correctional discretion. The inmate's custody will be based on behavior and criminal history. An inmate has no right to any particular custody level.” Id. ¶ 2.7.
The undersigned further finds that, to the extent Plaintiff asserts Defendants have violated his constitutional rights by violating SCDC's PREA policies, he has not alleged a plausible claim because a violation of an SCDC policy or rule, on its own, does not constitute a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Fishbourne v. Williams, C/A No. 8:21-cv-02964-TMC-JDA, at *7 (Sep. 24, 2021) (citing Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992)).
The undersigned finds no support in the record for a finding that Defendants personally engaged in any conduct that would amount to a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. The undersigned further recommends a finding that any amendment to the complaint would be futile. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)). However, the undersigned does not find the instant civil action so frivolous as to warrant a “strike” against Plaintiff and therefore declines to recommend that dismissal of Plaintiff's case constitute a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4thCir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).