Summary
In Willingham, supra, the supreme court said that the defendant's plea of guilty to driving at the rate of 60 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone, having due regard for the conditions then existing, was an admission that he was driving "without due regard for the rights of others."
Summary of this case from State v. WilsonOpinion
No. 35072
Decided May 8, 1957.
Motor vehicles — Drivers' License Law — Suspension or revocation of license — Grounds for — Violation of laws or ordinances prohibiting reckless operation — Section 4507.34, Revised Code — Violation of speed regulation a reckless operation.
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County.
Defendant was charged with violating Section 79 of Chapter 24 of the Code of the City of Akron, a speed regulation very similar to Section 4511.21, Revised Code. He appeared before the Akron Municipal Court, pleaded guilty, and was assessed a fine of $10 and costs and his driver's license was suspended for a period of 30 days.
No complaint is made as to the conviction, but it is claimed by defendant that the court was without authority to suspend his driver's license for the violation of a speed ordinance.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that that part of the judgment suspending defendant's driver's license was beyond the authority of the court to order and to that extent reversed the judgment of the Municipal Court and remanded the cause to that court with instructions to restore to defendant his driver's license.
The judges of the Court of Appeals, finding that the judgment, on which they agreed, is in conflict with a judgment pronounced upon the same question by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District in the case of State v. Joiner, 77 Ohio App. 298, 66 N.E.2d 161, certified the record to this court for review and final determination of the cause.
Mr. John M. Kelly, director of law, and Mr. Irving A. Portman, for appellant.
Mr. R.C. Norris, for appellee.
The issue presented is whether a violation of an ordinance regulating the speed of motor vehicles is an offense "relating to reckless operation" of motor vehicles warranting a court to suspend the offender's driver's license, under authority of Section 4507.34, Revised Code. That section provides as follows:
"Whenever a person is found guilty under the laws of this state or any ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, of operating a motor vehicle in violation of such laws or ordinances, relating to reckless operation, the trial court of any court of record may, in addition to or independent of all other penalties provided by law, suspend for any period of time or revoke the license to drive of any person so convicted or pleading guilty to such offenses for such period as it determines, not to exceed one year."
In Chapter 4511, Revised Code, setting forth traffic laws for the operation of motor vehicles, there is a section titled "Reckless Operation of Vehicles" (Section 4511.20, Revised Code) and which reads as follows:
"No person shall operate a vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar without due regard for the safety and rights of pedestrians and drivers and occupants of all other vehicles, trackless trolleys, and streetcars, so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person while in the lawful use of the streets or highways."
Since Section 4507.34, Revised Code, hereinbefore quoted, refers to "laws," "ordinances," and "offenses" in the plural, it was clearly not the intention of the General Assembly to relate "reckless operation" to Section 4511.20 only. A law or ordinance prohibiting speeding is a prohibition "relating to reckless operation" of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 4507.34, supra, and authorizes suspension of a driver's license.
By Section 6296-30, General Code (now Section 4507.34, Revised Code), all courts of record are empowered to suspend driver's licenses for not exceeding one year upon conviction of the violation of laws and ordinances relating to reckless driving. See State v. Joiner, supra.
This court is of the opinion that defendant's plea of guilty to a charge of unlawfully operating a motor vehicle "at the rate of 60 miles per hour, in a 25-mile zone, such speed being greater than was reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of said street, and other conditions then existing, in violation of Section 79, Chapter No. 24, Code of the City of Akron," is an admission that he was driving without "due regard" for the rights of others.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, STEWART, BELL, TAFT, MATTHIAS and HERBERT, JJ., concur.