Opinion
No. D.D. 88-29
Submitted March 15, 1989 —
Decided May 17, 1989.
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Neglect of legal matters — Improperly withdrawing from employment — Credit for time served under suspension granted, when.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 7-88-B.
On March 10, 1988, relator, Akron Bar Association, filed a complaint against respondent, Michael C. Conway, alleging two counts of misconduct. The matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court ("board") on September 16, 1988. At the hearing, respondent stipulated to having violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him) as charged, inter alia, in Count I of the complaint, and to having violated DR 1-102(A) (misconduct), DR 2-110(A) (improperly withdrawing from employment with a client), DR 6-101 (failing to act competently), and DR 7-101 (failing to represent client zealously) as charged in Count II. Respondent further stipulated that, on July 29, 1987, he had been suspended from the practice of law for six months and placed on a one-year probation period by order of this court after committing misconduct similar to the misconduct at issue herein.
See Akron Bar Assn. v. Conway (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 318, 31 OBR 594, 511 N.E.2d 395.
The stipulations in support of Count I establish that respondent was retained by Merle Dennis in March 1987 to defend Dennis in a civil action in municipal court. Dennis paid respondent a $150 retainer fee. Within ten days of being retained, respondent told Dennis that he had filed an answer and a counterclaim in the matter. Thereafter, Dennis attempted to contact respondent by telephone, but respondent did not return his calls. Dennis subsequently learned from the court that no answer had been filed and that he did not have an attorney of record in the case.
On April 22, 1987, Dennis employed another attorney to represent him in the municipal court suit. Dennis' second attorney directed a letter to respondent asking for Dennis' file and for the return of his retainer fee. Respondent did not immediately answer that letter, but he did eventually return both the file and the $150 fee.
The stipulations in support of Count II establish that respondent was retained by Aisha A. Allen to obtain a divorce for her in or around May 1986. By October 1986, Allen had paid respondent a $150 retainer fee and an $80 filing fee. Thereafter, respondent represented to Allen that her divorce action was pending and that a hearing had been set in the matter. Respondent, however, had never filed the complaint, and Allen discovered this in May 1987. Respondent has not refunded any of Allen's payments.
The panel found that respondent had committed the misconduct to which he had stipulated. Before making its recommendation to the board, the panel considered the testimony of Robert L. Lance, Ph.D., a psychologist who had interviewed respondent. Dr. Lance testified that respondent was suffering from depression during the events at bar, although he considered respondent treatable. Afterward, respondent expressed remorse for his misconduct and stated his intention to continue his treatment with Dr. Lance. The panel also considered a number of letters from other attorneys, as well as a common pleas court judge, that were forwarded on respondent's behalf. All of these essentially described respondent as competent and trustworthy. Thereafter, the panel recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. The board adopted the panel's findings and recommendation.
Hershey Browne, David Friedman and Joseph Gibson, for relator.
Donald E. George, for respondent.
Having reviewed the instant record, this court concurs that respondent violated the Disciplinary Rules cited. We therefore adopt the board's findings and its recommendation. Accordingly, we order respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. However, we note that the misconduct at bar was committed before we issued our order of July 29, 1987, and that respondent made remedial efforts in response to that order. We also note that respondent has been prevented from practicing law since July 29, 1987 due to his inability to deposit the costs for the earlier disciplinary proceeding as required by Gov. Bar R. V(27). As a result, we further find it appropriate to give him credit for eighteen months of the time during which he has already been suspended.
Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.