DSS claims that is acquired custody of Krystie when the court terminated the fathers' parental rights on the ground of abandonment under Section 20-7-1590 and when Krystie's mother relinquished the child for adoption to DSS under Section 20-7-1710(d). Because DSS has custody, it claims that its consent is necessary for an adoption to occur. DSS relies on the case of Akers v. Hard, 275 S.C. 100, 267 S.E.2d 536 (1980), which states in a footnote: Adoptions in South Carolina are purely statutory; the process by which an adoption takes place is determined

We agree for the reasons set forth herein. Adoption is a creation of statutory law in this State. Akers v. Hard, S.C. 267 S.E.2d 536 (1980). Recognizing that children are at times born into circumstances wherein their natural parents cannot or will not care for them, the State in its role as parens patriae developed the adoption process to assure stable homes for these children.

A demurrer admits all facts that are well pleaded in the complaint, but it does not admit the inferences drawn by the plaintiff from such facts and it does not admit conclusions of law pleaded therein. Akers v. Hard, 275 S.C. 100, 267 S.E.2d 536 (1980). A demurrer may be sustained only where the complaint, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, fails to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

A demurrer admits the well pleaded facts in the complaint; it does not admit conclusions of law. Akers v. Hard, 275 S.C. 100, 267 S.E.2d 536 (1980). I.

In passing on a demurrer, this Court is limited to consideration of the allegations of the complaint. A demurrer admits the facts well pleaded in the complaint but does not admit the inferences drawn by the plaintiff from such facts, nor does it admit conclusions of law. Akers v. Hard, 275 S.C. 100, 267 S.E.2d 536 (1980); Charleston County School District v. South Carolina StatePorts Authority, 320 S.E.2d 727 (S.C.App. 1984). According to the well pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, Carrington was injured on November 4, 1980.

A demurrer admits the facts well pleaded in the complaint but does not admit the inferences drawn by the plaintiff from such facts, nor does it admit conclusions of law. Greneker v. Sprouse, 263 S.C. 571, 211 S.E.2d 879 (1975); Sease v. City of Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963); Akers v. Hard, 275 S.C. 100, 267 S.E.2d 536 (1980). The use and determination of the demurrer in declaratory judgment actions is controlled by the same principles as apply in other cases. Dantzler v. Callison, 227 S.C. 317, 88 S.E.2d 64 (1955).

A demurrer admits the facts well pleaded in the complaint but does not admit the inferences drawn by the plaintiff from such facts, nor does it admit conclusions of law. Greneker v. Sprouse, 263 S.C. 571, 211 S.E.2d 879 (1975); Akers v. Hard, 275 S.C. 100, 267 S.E.2d 536 (1980); Sease v. City of Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963). The same rule applies to a demurrer to a petition for a writ of mandamus, Dowling v. Charleston W.C. Ry. Co., 105 S.C. 475, 81 S.E. 313 (1913).