Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2019-0171
05-28-2020
A.K., Appellant, v. KAY K. AND DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Appellees.
COUNSEL Pima County Office of Children's Counsel, Tucson By Christopher Lloyd Counsel for Appellant Sarah Michèle Martin, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Kay K. Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. S20180065
The Honorable Lisa Bibbens, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Pima County Office of Children's Counsel, Tucson
By Christopher Lloyd
Counsel for Appellant Sarah Michèle Martin, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Kay K. Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Eckerstrom concurred. EPPICH, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Appellant A.K., born April 2017, challenges the juvenile court's order of November 26, 2019, denying the Department of Child Safety's (DCS) petition for termination of his mother's parental rights. On appeal, A.K. argues the court erred "in ignoring the minor[']s best interest" and by "defer[ring] its best interest findings to another court." Finding no error, we affirm.
¶2 To sever a parent's rights, the juvenile court must find there is clear and convincing evidence at least one of the statutory grounds for termination exists, and that a preponderance of the evidence establishes severing the parent's rights is in the child's best interest. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶¶ 32, 41 (2005). We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal; rather, we defer to the court's factual findings because, as the trier of fact, that court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Consequently, we will affirm the order if reasonable evidence supports the factual findings upon which the order is based. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).
¶3 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's order. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, ¶ 12 (App. 2007). In 2017, Kay, who suffered from mental illness including paranoia and delusions, stabbed A.K. with a knife and injured herself with a drill. DCS filed a petition to terminate her parental rights in March 2018, and A.K. was adjudicated dependent as to Kay in June 2018. A.K. was moved to live with his father in Texas. The court held severance hearings over the course of more than a year and, in November 2019, denied the petition. It concluded DCS had established abuse as a ground for severance, but had failed to establish the mental-health ground also alleged or that severance was in A.K.'s best interest. It therefore denied the petition for termination.
¶4 On appeal, A.K. argues the juvenile court erred in finding it was not in his best interest to terminate Kay's parental rights. Termination is in a child's best interest if either the child will benefit from severance or the child will be harmed if severance is denied. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, ¶ 16 (2016). In this case, the court's detailed forty-four page ruling addressed A.K.'s best interest at length. Its ruling clearly and correctly addressed the question of best interest and "little would be gained by our further 'rehashing the . . . court's correct ruling' in our decision." See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 16 (quoting State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272 (App. 1993)). In challenging the juvenile court's findings on appeal, A.K. essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence presented, which we will not do. See id. ¶ 12. Rather, we defer to the court's resolution of conflicting inferences when, as in this case, they are supported by the record. See In re Pima County Adoption of B-6355 & H-533, 118 Ariz. 111, 115 (1978).
¶5 Furthermore, we reject A.K.'s claim that the juvenile court "deferred the best interest findings[,] indicating 'a family law court can fashion and enforce appropriate orders for contact between the parties or through third parties, as the facts dictate.'" The court made this comment in the context of addressing what it characterized as DCS's position "that if [Kay's] rights are not terminated, [A.K.'s] Father will be forced to have contact with her that will be detrimental to him and his ability to parent." Thus, it was in reference not to some future court determining A.K.'s best interest, but in determining how Kay and A.K.'s father might handle contact with one another in regard to A.K.
¶6 We likewise reject A.K.'s apparent contention that the juvenile court erred in considering DCS's lack of effort toward reunification because it is not required "to provide reasonable efforts to remedy physical abuse to a child." But DCS also alleged Kay would be "unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness," A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), and it was in that context that the court considered DCS's efforts. Its reference to DCS's "lack of attention to rehabilitation efforts" in its best-interest findings went to its credibility findings in regard to A.K.'s father's understanding of her mental health issues and his assessment of the danger to A.K. The court rejected his assessment of the risk to A.K. and therefore found it did not support DCS's claim that severance was in A.K.'s best interest. We cannot say the court abused its discretion in weighing this evidence in regard to the harm DCS claimed would arise from Kay's continued parental rights. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. 1, ¶ 16 (termination in child's best interest if child would be harmed by continued relationship).
The court noted that A.K.'s father had "acknowledged in his trial testimony his belief that Mother is dangerous is based on his review of her medical records from 2015 and 2017, and that he has formed his position about Mother largely from the information included in DCS progress reports." The court pointed out that these reports reflected DCS's "single-minded focus on severance" and that father had not read reports from other doctors explaining Kay's mental illness. --------
¶7 For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's order denying DCS's petition to terminate Kay's parental rights.