"On appeal, the father argues that the mother failed to establish that he had abandoned the child or that all viable alternatives to the termination of his parental rights were exhausted. He also relies on the following statement from Ex parte J.E., 1 So.3d 1002, 1013 (Ala. 2008) (Cobb, C.J., concurring specially) (quoting A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394, 407 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)): 'Courts of this State have often found that "termination of parental rights is not appropriate in cases ... in which the children are safely residing with the custodial parent and the continuation of the noncustodial parent's parental rights does not present any harm" to the children's best interests. ...'

Ex parte J.E., 1 So.3d at 1011. This case does not concern abandonment as a ground for terminating the father's parental rights; it appears to be more analogous to A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007), in which the termination of the parental rights of a noncustodial parent was held proper when that parent had not had any contact for four years with the pertinent children. In this case, the record reveals that the father had been absent throughout much of the child's life.

“Since [1987] this court has consistently held that termination of parental rights is not appropriate in cases like this one in which the children are safely residing with the custodial parent and the continuation of the noncustodial parent's parental rights does not present any harm to the children.”A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394, 406–07 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So.3d 1117, 1143 n. 14 (Ala.2009) (Murdock, J., dissenting) (noting that cases “come before the appellate courts of this State in which the record suggests that an effort to terminate has occurred because of animosity or spite, out of convenience, or simply to accommodate a new spouse who wishes to adopt a child ” (emphasis added)).

“Since [1987] this court has consistently held that termination of parental rights is not appropriate in cases like this one in which the children are safely residing with the custodial parent and the continuation of the noncustodial parent's parental rights does not present any harm to the children.”A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394, 406–07 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So.3d 1117, 1143 n. 14 (Ala.2009) (Murdock, J., dissenting) (noting that cases “come before the appellate courts of this State in which the record suggests that an effort to terminate has occurred because of animosity or spite, out of convenience, or simply to accommodate a new spouse who wishes to adopt a child ” (emphasis added)).

However, the courts of this State have consistently applied subsection (b) in considering whether to terminate a noncustodial parent's rights, even when the child is in the physical custody of the custodial parent. See In re T.M.A., 590 So.2d 298, 299 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991) (stating that, "[w]hen the child is not in the physical custody of the parent in question, the court may properly consider the parent's failure to provide for the child's material needs," a factor from subsection (b)); see also, e.g., A.S. v. W.J.T., 984 So.2d 1196 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007) (considering evidence of father's child-support arrearage in reviewing trial court's ruling on the mother's petition to terminate the father's parental rights, where the mother had primary physical custody of the children); A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007) (considering evidence of mother's child-support arrearage, failure to visit or to maintain contact, and inability to adjust circumstances to meet children's needs, in addressing the father's petition to terminate the mother's parental rights where the father had physical custody of the children). Moreover, in terminating parental rights, in addition to the factors listed in § 26-18-7, a court may consider "any other factors that are relevant to the child's welfare."

See AJ.H.T.J1XOX, 983 So.2d 394, 407 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (Moore, J., concurring specially) (citing Sutton v. Elrod, 724 So.2d 551 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998); In re Beasley, 564 So.2d 959 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Miller v. Knight, 562 So.2d 274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Talley v. Oliver, 628 So.2d 690 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); S.M.W. v. J.M.C., 679 So.2d 256 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); and Thornton v. Thornton, 519 So.2d 960 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)). In a private termination-of-parental-rights case, when a juvenile court terminates parental rights despite the viability of maintaining the status quo, this court has regularly reversed the judgment.

On appeal, the father argues that the mother failed to establish that he had abandoned the child or that all viable alternatives to the termination of his parental rights were exhausted. He also relies on the following statement from Ex parte J.E., 1 So.3d 1002, 1013 (Ala. 2008) (Cobb, C.J., concurring specially) (quoting A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394, 407 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)): "Courts of this State have often found that 'termination of parental rights is not appropriate in cases ... in which the children are safely residing with the custodial parent and the continuation of the noncustodial parent's parental rights does not present any harm' to the children's best interests.....'" In his reply brief, he expands that argument, relying on this court's opinion in W.W. v. H.W., 384 So.3d 663, 670 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), in which

s custodians and, in the meantime, the child "had formed a de facto parent-child relationship with his foster parents, who desired to adopt him and who he knew as his `mama' and `daddy'"); B.S. v. Cullman County Dep't of Human Res., 865 So.2d 1188, 1196-97 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (rejecting sister of mother's second husband as a viable alternative because the child was unfamiliar with husband's sister and other members of husband's family, sister was first mentioned by mother as possible alternative at termination hearing itself, and mother's last-minute questioning of husband's sister to determine whether she would be willing to serve as a placement for child was not sufficient to demonstrate that she was a viable alternative); and Z.G. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 717 So.2d 801, 803 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998) (dismissing maternal uncle as a viable alternative because he had declined to serve as a custodian 10 years earlier and the children had had no contact with him in the meantime). As in A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007), the mother has evidently overcome a drug dependency and succeeded in improving her life, but her absence from the life of the child for four and one-half years has a consequence. As Judge, now Justice, Murdock stated in his dissent in K.W.J. v. J.W.B., 933 So.2d 1075, 1081 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005), rev'd, 933 So.2d 1081 (Ala. 2005):

Like the State of Kansas, the purpose of our juvenile laws, particularly in termination cases, is to provide children with stability and permanency. See § 26-18-2, Ala. Code 1975; and A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394, 402 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007) (Bryan, J., concurring specially, with Thomas, J., joining). Our juvenile code contemplates that a child should have a permanent placement that could include, among other plans, adoption after termination.

See S.M.W. v. J.M.C., 679 So. 2d 256 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); Talley v. Oliver, 628 So. 2d 690 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); In re Beasley, 564 So. 2d 959 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); and Miller v. Knight, 562 So. 2d 274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990). See also A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So. 2d 394, 406-07 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)." 180 So. 3d at 901.