Summary
holding there is no constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system
Summary of this case from Blair v. ThompsonOpinion
No. C 02-2940 MMC (PR), (Docket No. 2)
August 8, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Kevin Ainsworth ("plaintiff"), a California prisoner, has filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that after being exonerated of charges of violating prison rules, he was transferred from High Dessert State Prison ("HDSP") to Salinas Valley State Prison ("SVSP"), and his parole eligibility date was delayed. Plaintiff also alleges that there were delays in the processing of his administrative appeals regarding his classification score. He has paid his filing fee.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. Legal Claims
Plaintiff claims that after a hearing conducted on October 4, 2001 before the HDSP classification committee, he was transferred from SVSP. He claims that this transfer violated his constitutional right to due process because in earlier proceedings he was exonerated of charges that he had violated prison rules at HDSP.
Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources: the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations authorized by state law that are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e. give the inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty interest in question is one of "real substance." See id. at 477-87.
"It is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators' expertise." McKune v. Lile, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 2027 (2002). Prisoners have no constitutional right to incarceration in a particular institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983). A prisoner's liberty interests are sufficiently extinguished by his conviction such that the state may generally confine or transfer him to any of its institutions, to prisons in another state or to federal prisons, without offending the Constitution. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225) (holding intrastate prison transfer does not implicate Due Process Clause), and Olim, 461 U.S. at 244-48 (holding interstate prison transfer does not implicate Due Process Clause)). A non-consensual transfer is not per se violative of either due process or equal protection rights see Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991); Stinson v. Nelson, 525 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1975); and no due process protections such as notice or a hearing need be afforded before a prisoner is transferred, even if the transfer is for disciplinary reasons or to a considerably less favorable institution see Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976); Johnson, 948 F.2d at 519; see also Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1989).
California has adopted regulations concerning the subject of transfers of prisoners within the state prison system. Those regulations, however, contain no substantive limitations on the prison officials' discretion to grant or refuse such transfers. See Cal Penal Code § 5080; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3379; People v. Lara, 155 Cal.App.3d 570, 575-76 (1984). A provision that merely provides procedural requirements, even if mandatory; cannot provide the basis for a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1993). Because the statutory language does not meet the first prong of the Sandin test, no protected liberty interest requiring constitutional protection is created.
Accordingly, plaintiffs allegation that he was transferred from HDSP to SVSP does not implicate his constitutional rights and does not state a cognizable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Parole Date
Plaintiff also claims that following his transfer to SVSP, his parole eligibility date was delayed by six months. A prisoner must bring a habeas petition if the nature of his claim is such that it may result in entitlement to an earlier release, e.g., a parole or time credit claim. See Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876-78 (9th Cir. 1990). A civil rights complaint seeking habeas relief should be dismissed without prejudice to the prisoner's bringing it as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, plaintiff's claim that his parole eligibility date was unconstitutionally delayed is dismissed without prejudice to his raising it in a habeas petition.
C. Administrative Appeals
Plaintiff also claims that the delays by prison officials in responding to his various grievances violated his right to due process. There is no constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); accord Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974) (accepting Nebraska system wherein no provision made for administrative review of disciplinary decisions). California Code of Regulations, title 15 section 3084 grants prisoners in the state prisons a purely procedural right to bring an appeal. Basically, the regulations require the establishment of a procedural structure for reviewing prisoner complaints but set forth no substantive standards. Instead, they provide for flexible time limits see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6, and the general protection that "no reprisal shall be taken against an inmate or parolee for filing an appeal," Id., § 3084.1(d). As noted, a provision that merely provides procedural requirements, even if mandatory, cannot form the basis of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. See Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1430 (holding prison grievance procedure is procedural right that does not give rise to protected liberty interest requiring procedural protections of Due Process Clause); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same). Accordingly, a prison official's failure to process grievances, without more, is not actionable under § 1983. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, plaintiffs claims under § 1983 are DISMISSED. Plaintiffs claim that his parole eligibility date was delayed by SVSP officials following his transfer is dismissed without prejudice to refiling in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
All pending motions are terminated and the clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED plaintiff's claims under 1983 are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's claim that his parole eligibility date was delayed by SVSP officials following his transfer is dismissed without prejudice to refiling in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
All pending motions are TERMINATED.