Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC 293186, Lee Smalley Edmon, Judge.
Westfall & Associates, Curtis A. Westfall; The Ball Law Firm, Byron T. Ball for Plaintiffs and Appellants John Ahrens, Shabnam Akhoundzadeh, Elaine Antonio, Katrina Boghouzian, Debra Burdette, Tatyana Cantor, Rina Dolmayan, Diana Duzdabanyan, Allison Drucker, Cynthia Fisher, Sabrina Gill, Sam Helmi-Kabir, Michael Johnson, Kelly Koerner, Eun Kwon, Tristen Lazareff, Annie Marandjian, Frank McCallick, Lina McMeans-Muloway, Charles Swain, Peggy Gross, Nima Farahani, Jeane Soriano and Armen Demirchyan.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith and William Archer for Defendant and Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
Plaintiffs, former law students, filed suit against the University of La Verne after it sold the law school at which they were enrolled to the University of West Los Angeles. Plaintiffs alleged seven claims, including breach of contract, fraud, and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the University of La Verne on all claims. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 1983, the San Fernando Valley College of Law became part of the University of La Verne, merged with the University of La Verne College of Law, and became known as the University of La Verne College of Law Woodland Hills Campus (ULV Woodland Hills). In late 2000, the University of La Verne conveyed ULV Woodland Hills to a separate nonprofit subsidiary corporation of the University of La Verne and changed ULV Woodland Hills’ name back to the San Fernando Valley College of Law (SFVCL). Plaintiffs are former law students who first enrolled at ULV Woodland Hills or SFVCL between 1998 and 2002.
In 2002, SFVCL was sold to, and its academic program merged with, the University of West Los Angeles. Thereafter, the school was known as the University of West Los Angeles School of Law’s San Fernando campus. Plaintiffs completed their degrees between 2002 and 2004, after the school was sold to the University of West Los Angeles.
Several of plaintiffs filed suit against the University of La Verne in 2003. The remainder filed suit in 2005, and the trial court consolidated the actions. Plaintiffs’ operative amended complaints alleged seven claims for relief, including breach of contract, fraud, and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. The fraud claim was based on allegations that the University of La Verne concealed certain material facts—such as the university’s intention to sell ULV Woodland Hills or SFVCL—from plaintiffs, and that the university thereby induced plaintiffs to enroll in and remain at ULV Woodland Hills or SFVCL to plaintiffs’ detriment. In support of the breach of contract claim, plaintiffs alleged that they were contractually entitled to diplomas and transcripts from the University of La Verne, rather than from the University of West Los Angeles, and that the University of La Verne breached its obligation to provide those transcripts and diplomas.
The University of La Verne moved for summary judgment on numerous grounds. Substantial portions of plaintiffs’ evidentiary showing in opposition to the motion consisted of plaintiffs’ own responses to the university’s interrogatories. The university objected to the interrogatory responses on numerous grounds, including that Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.410 does not permit a party to use its own interrogatory responses in such a manner.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
After receiving extensive briefing and evidentiary submissions from the parties and conducting several hearings, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The court also sustained many of the university’s evidentiary objections, including, in some instances, the objection based on section 2030.410.
The court concluded that none of plaintiffs’ evidence, including plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses, showed the existence a contract between plaintiffs and the University of La Verne after 2000 (i.e., the year in which ULV Woodland Hills was transferred to a subsidiary corporation and renamed). Because plaintiffs proffered no evidence of the contract alleged in the complaint, there was likewise no evidence of the alleged contractual duties and hence no evidence of a breach of such duties. The court further concluded that plaintiffs had not proffered any admissible evidence of damages caused by any alleged breach. As for the fraud claim, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to introduce sufficient admissible evidence of damages.
The court entered judgment on April 25, 2006. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60.)
DISCUSSION
I. The Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in determining that they did not introduce sufficient admissible evidence of damages to support their claim for breach of contract. (See McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489 [damages are a necessary element of a cause of action for breach of contract].) In support of their argument, plaintiffs quote nine purported facts from their separate statement of disputed material facts. We address each of them in turn.
The first purported fact is: “Before it concluded the sale to [the University of West Los Angeles], [the University of La Verne] knew that the reputation of [the University of West Los Angeles] was inferior to [the University of La Verne].” In order for this purported fact to be even arguably relevant to proving plaintiffs’ damages, it must mean that the University of West Los Angeles’ reputation was inferior to that of ULV Woodland Hills (or SFVCL), so that is how we will interpret it. The only evidence plaintiffs cite for this fact is the deposition testimony of the University of La Verne’s Dean Kenneth Held, in which he said that in 1998 it was his opinion that “the University of La Verne had a better reputation” than the University of West Los Angeles. On the same page of the transcript, however, Held went on to clarify that his opinion was that “the La Verne campus” had a better reputation, and he said that he did not know whether ULV Woodland Hills had a better reputation than the University of West Los Angeles. Thus, if the purported fact is interpreted so as to make it arguably relevant to proof of plaintiffs’ damages, Held’s deposition testimony does not support it, and plaintiffs cite no other evidence. This purported fact therefore does not assist plaintiffs in showing that they introduced sufficient evidence of damages.
The second purported fact is: “In March 1998, [the University of La Verne] was put on notice that it owed the Woodland Hills students duties based both on legal obligations and professional ethics in connection with [the University of La Verne] severing ties to the Woodland Hills campus and students.” This purported fact has no tendency to prove that plaintiffs were in fact damaged by the university’s conduct.
The third purported fact is: “As a matter of [the University of La Verne’s] sale transaction due diligence, it failed to consider [the University of West Los Angeles’] dismal bar passage rates.” This purported fact has no tendency to prove that plaintiffs were in fact damaged by the university’s conduct. It does not even indicate that the University of West Los Angeles’ bar passage rates were worse than those of ULV Woodland Hills or SFVCL.
The fourth purported fact is: “[The University of La Verne] knew that a school’s historical bar passage rates reflected upon its reputation.” This purported fact has no tendency to prove that plaintiffs were in fact damaged by the university’s conduct.
The fifth purported fact is: “[The University of La Verne] sold the [ULV] Woodland Hills students to [the University of West Los Angeles] as part of the transaction.” It is not entirely clear what this purported fact is supposed to mean, but it has no tendency to prove that plaintiffs were in fact damaged by the university’s conduct.
The sixth purported fact is: “[The University of La Verne] was aware that the better the reputation of the educational institution a student attends, the better his or her job opportunities will be.” In the absence of evidence that the University of West Los Angeles’ reputation was inferior to that of ULV Woodland Hills (or SFVCL), this purported fact has no tendency to prove that plaintiffs were in fact damaged by the university’s conduct.
The seventh purported fact is: “In concluding the sale of [ULV] Woodland Hills to [the University of West Los Angeles], [the University of La Verne] relieved itself of the obligation to continue to provide an annual subsidy to [ULV] Woodland Hills of more than $750,000.” This purported fact has no tendency to prove that plaintiffs were in fact damaged by the university’s conduct.
The eighth purported fact is: “[The University of La Verne] was admonished by [the University of West Los Angeles] that, as a matter of [the University of La Verne’s] own due diligence, it must determine whether concluding the sale violated commitments it owed and promises it made to the [ULV] Woodland Hills students.” This purported fact has no tendency to prove that plaintiffs were in fact damaged by the university’s conduct.
The ninth purported fact is: “[The University of La Verne] failed to consider the adverse economic impact and damage to plaintiffs’ earning capacity being forced to accept a degree from [the University of West Los Angeles] would have upon them.” This purported fact has no tendency to prove that plaintiffs were in fact damaged by the university’s conduct. If adequately supported by evidence, it would show only that the University of La Verne failed to consider the issue, not that any plaintiffs were in fact harmed.
In sum, plaintiffs have failed to identify any record evidence of damages to support their breach of contract claim.
Kashmiri v. Regents of University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, does not affect our analysis because in that case the plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence of damages. (See Id. at p. 849.)
II. The Fraud Claim
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in determining that plaintiffs did not introduce sufficient admissible evidence of damages to support their fraud claim. We disagree.
Plaintiffs contend that they introduced admissible evidence of emotional distress damages, which the trial court erroneously excluded by sustaining defendant’s objection based on section 2030.410. The evidence in question consists of interrogatory responses stating that “[r]esponding party has suffered emotional distress as a result of this incident, the same as any reasonable person would as a result of [d]efendant’s conduct,” and that “[p]laintiff continues to suffer emotional distress as a result of this incident, the same as any reasonable person would as a result of [d]efendant’s conduct.”
We need not decide whether the exclusion of the evidence was proper, because “damages for emotional distress can be recovered in a fraud cause of action . . . only as an aggravation of other damages.” (Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1269 [“[D]amages for emotional distress alone are not recoverable.”].) Thus, in the absence of evidence of other recoverable damages, plaintiffs’ evidence of emotional distress is insufficient to support the fraud claim. But plaintiffs cite no other admitted or excluded evidence of any damages caused by defendant’s alleged fraud.
Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiffs have not identified sufficient evidence of damages to support their fraud claim.
Plaintiffs also argue that because summary judgment should be reversed as to the breach of contract and fraud claims, it should also be reversed as to the claims for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 and for injunctive relief. Because we reject plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the former two claims, we must reject their argument concerning the latter two claims as well.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs of appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, Acting P. J. VOGEL, J.