In evaluating the unfairness of the objectionable conduct, this court may "assess `the equities between the parties,' including what both parties knew or should have known." Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 798 (1st Cir. 1996). As correctly argued by Dawson, a mere breach of contract, without more, will not create liability under the statute.
Ahernv. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 798 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Shepard's Pharmacy, Inc.v. Stop &Shop Cos., 640 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)). "The courts are not invited by the statute to punish every departure from 'the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive', but they may enforce standards of behavior measurably higher than perfidy."
Section 11 "does not contemplate an overly precise standard of ethical or moral behavior" but rather implies "the standard of the commercial marketplace." Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 798 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Shepard's Pharmacy, Inc. v. Stop & Shop Cos., 37 Mass.App.Ct. 516, 640 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (1994) ). "The courts are not invited by the statute to punish every departure from ‘the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive’, but they may enforce standards of behavior measurably higher than perfidy."
Although a district court wields "broad legal authority" when considering a motion for a new trial, de Pérez v. Hospital del Maestro, 910 F.2d 1004, 1006 (1st Cir. 1990), we have often emphasized that a "district judge cannot displace a jury's verdict merely because he disagrees with it" or because "a contrary verdict may have been equally . . . supportable." Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 780 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have repeatedly observed, trial judges do not sit as thirteenth jurors, empowered to reject any verdict with which they disagree.
It is the standard of the commercial marketplace." Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 798 (1st Cir. 1996). To trigger liability under 93A, courts have said that the conduct in question "must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce," Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1513 (1st Cir. 1989); have "an extortionate quality that gives it the rancid flavor of unfairness," Atkinson v. Rosenthal, 598 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Mass.App.Ct. 1992); or fall "'within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness' or [be] 'immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous,'" Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 752, 769 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass.
4. In making that unfairness determination under § 11, courts consider the totality of the circumstances ( Duclersaint v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 427 Mass. 809, 696 N.E.2d 536, 540 (1998) ), which includes the "nature of challenged conduct and [ ] the purpose and effect of that conduct" ( Peabody Essex Museum, Inc., 802 F.3d at 54 ), "the standard of the commercial marketplace" and "the equities between the parties, including what both parties knew or should have known." Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 798 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 5. Although the plaintiff corporations compete with Uber for riders in the for-hire vehicle industry, they have failed to prove that Uber, under the totality of the circumstances, committed an extreme or egregious wrong when they launched and continued to operate UberX P2P in Boston, Massachusetts throughout the conduct period.
(See Ahernv. Scholz (1st Cir. 1996) 85 F.3d 774, 794.) Plaintiffs have not cited any evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the relationship between defendants and Mr. Crosby was anything other than an arm’s-length arrangement between a record company and a recording artist.
In addition, the conduct must be "'in disregard of known contractual arrangements' and intended to secure benefits for the breaching party." See Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 799 (1996), quoting Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 466 (1991). At bar, this court is persuaded that the purpose of Paul Revere's conduct in changing first year commissions to be paid upon the exercise of disability options was to help the company cope with an $18 million shortfall, notwithstanding that the change would work, inevitably, to the brokers' financial detriment.
and governing state law, we conclude that reversal is required because the court's decision rests on a legal error and the record does not, as a matter of law, support a finding of unfair settlement conduct actionable under Chapter 93A. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. HPSC, Inc., 480 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.2007); Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 797 (1st Cir.1996). We have considered the materials that both parties provided to the district court, mindful that U.S. Fire does not press before us the evidentiary objection about the settlement documents that was raised below.
Fed. Ins. Co. v. HPSC, Inc., 480 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.2007). “[W]hether a particular set of acts, in their factual setting, is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact,” Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 147 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir.1998) (quoting Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 797 (1st Cir.1996) ), “but whether that conduct rises to the level of a chapter 93A violation is a question of law.” Fed. Ins. Co., 480 F.3d at 34 ; see also Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 952 N.E.2d 908, 911–12 (2011) (whether an act is unfair or deceptive is a factual question, but “[a] ruling that conduct violates [ch. 93A] is a legal, not a factual, determination” (quoting R.W. Granger & Sons v. J & S Insulation, Inc., 435 Mass. 66, 754 N.E.2d 668, 675 (2001) )).