Opinion
22-cv-03233-AMO
04-22-2024
A. H., Plaintiff, v. WEST CONTRA COSTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISMISS PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT RE: DKT. NO. 61
ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN United States District Judge.
Defendants Summer Sigler and West Contra Costa Unified School District (“the District”) move to strike and to dismiss portions of Plaintiff A.H.'s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). The matter is fully briefed and suitable for decision without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-6. The Court hereby VACATES the hearing set for May 9, 2024. Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the Court hereby rules as follows.
The alleged facts in the TAC are largely the same as in earlier iterations. For purposes of this Order, the Court assumes familiarity with the factual background set forth in its earlier rulings.
I. MOTION TO STRIKE
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to “strike from a pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Courts routinely strike or dismiss claims or defendants from pleadings where those claims or defendants had already been dismissed with prejudice because repleading dismissed claims causes confusion and inefficiency with no practical benefit. Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“For claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend, we will not require that they be repled in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal.”).
Defendants move to strike paragraphs 113, 116-118, 122, 123, 125-132 in the TAC on the ground that the allegations contained therein have already been dismissed with prejudice. The Court agrees. The allegations contained in the fourth claim in the TAC remain the same -verbatim - as the allegations set forth in the previous version of the complaint, which were dismissed with prejudice. Compare ECF 40 (SAC ¶¶ 113-133) with ECF 60 (TAC ¶¶ 112-132); see also Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss (ECF 59). While Plaintiff has removed the District from the heading of the fourth cause of action, the claim continues to contain several allegations directed at the District, including allegations seeking punitive damages and attorney fees against the District. TAC ¶¶ 112-132. Plaintiff's suggestion that the repeated reference to “Defendants” throughout the fourth cause of action is limited to Defendant Sigler and the Doe Defendants ignores the actual language of her allegations and is belied by the fact that she did not change the allegations from the previous complaint, when the claim was undisputedly being asserted against the District. Because the District is no longer a defendant as to the fourth cause of action, all references of misconduct allegedly perpetrated by the District must be removed. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Sigler's and the District's motion to strike paragraphs 113, 116-118, 122, 123, and 125-132 from the TAC.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Defendants Sigler and the District move to dismiss Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims (the seventh, eighth, and tenth causes of action) from the TAC on the ground that the amended pleading fails to cure defects identified by the Court in granting dismissal of these claims in earlier pleadings. On September 28, 2023, the Court issued an Order dismissing - for the third time - Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims. ECF 59. The Court clarified that, to state a claim that she experienced discrimination “by reason of” her disability, a plaintiff must do more than allege that she is disabled and was abused. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff did not cure the defects identified in the Court's September Order. The redline comparison of the TAC to the earlier complaint shows that the now-operative pleading does not present additional facts or substantively change the allegations from the previous version. See ECF 69. The disability discrimination claims remain insufficiently pleaded and must again be DISMISSED.
Plaintiff requests leave to amend again. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where a plaintiff repeatedly fails “to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiencies highlighted in the Court's earlier orders, and because it would be unduly prejudicial to Defendants Sigler and the District to litigate another motion to dismiss regarding the same deficiencies, leave to amend is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Sigler's and the District's motion to strike the paragraphs in the fourth cause of action directed at the District. The Court additionally GRANTS Sigler's and the District's motion to dismiss the disability discrimination claims (the seventh, eighth, and tenth causes of action). Those causes of action are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants shall file an answer responding to the remaining claims within 30 days from the date of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.