Opinion
20-cv-00151
10-27-2022
A.H. et al v. French et al
ADDENDUM TO MODIFIED STIPULATED JUDGMENT
CHRISTINA REISS, DISTRICT JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1. The court hereby incorporates by reference the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re A.H., 999 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2021).
2. The court clarifies that “Defendants” in the Modified Stipulated Judgment refers only to Defendant French as the Modified Stipulated Judgment states: “Plaintiffs and Defendant French hereby AGREE and STIPULATE[.]” (Doc. 77-1 at 2.)
3. The court DENIES the parties' request for a permanent injunction enjoining “Defendant French, his officers, agents, and assigns” from “advis[ing], direct[ing], or providing] guidance to school districts, approved independent schools, or the public that the adequate safeguards requirement may be enforced to exclude independent schools from tuition benefits” (Doc. 77-1 at 3, ¶ 9), although it will ENFORCE the parties' Stipulation that Defendant French refrain from such activities.
4. A permanent injunction prohibiting certain speech by a government official to a wide array of entities and individuals including “the public” is not warranted for the following reasons:
a. The parties' stipulation contains no evidence that Defendant French has provided guidance advocating in favor of “adequate safeguards” post-Carson, nor is there any likelihood, much less a substantial likelihood, that he would do so. See Knox v. Salinas, 193 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d) and 52(a) to prohibit the issuance of a permanent injunction without “special findings of fact and conclusions of law” supporting “the ground or basis for the trial court's decision”) (citations omitted). There is also no evidence of irreparable harm if a permanent injunction is not issued with regard to this speech. See Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1985) (describing irreparable harm as “[p]erhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. Corp., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983)).
b. A federal court may enjoin a state or local public official in the performance of his or her duties only in rare circumstances. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 62 (1974) (recognizing the “well-established rule that the Government be granted the widest latitude in handling its own internal affairs”). As the Second Circuit has observed:
“[T]he court's discretion to frame equitable relief is limited by considerations of federalism,” and in crafting a permanent injunction, “[f]ederal courts must take care to exercise a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions.” Schwartz v. Dolan, 86 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (“It is for the courts to remedy past or imminent official interference with [constitutional rights]; it is for the political branches of the State and Federal Governments to manage [public institutions] in such fashion that official interference with [constitutional rights] will not occur.”).
Knox, 193 F.3d at 129-30.
c. The proposed permanent injunction prohibiting certain speech by Defendant French would arguably constitute a prior restraint on speech which is authorized only in narrow circumstances not present here. See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (“Any prior restraint on expression comes . . . with a ‘heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity.”); Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”); Metro. Opera Ass 'n v. Loc. 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l Union, 239 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he First Amendment strongly disfavors injunctions that impose a prior restraint on speech.”).
SO ORDERED.