Aguilera v. Corkill

15 Citing cases

  1. Doran Law Office v. StoneHouse Rentals, Inc.

    Case No. 2:14-2046-JAR-GLR (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 2018)

    Although Kansas statutes draw a distinction between judicial sales and execution sales, the district court's "equity powers" outlined in K.S.A. 60-2415(b) apply to both.Aguilera v. Corkhill, 439 P.2d 93, 96-97 (Kan. 1968) (quoting Lambert Lumber Co. v. Petrie, 683 P.2d 518, 519 (Kan. 1963)). Cent. Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Weber, 408 P.3d 494, *3 (Table) (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017) (citing Aguilera, 439 P.2d at 96).

  2. First Nat'l Bank v. Wetzel

    42 Kan. App. 2 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 6 times

    A sale of property on foreclosure is a judicial sale as distinguished from an execution sale. Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 36, 439 P.2d 93 (1968). A purchaser at a judicial sale receives what is generally regarded as a quitclaim deed, and takes "`all the right, title, and interest of the parties to the proceedings in and to the property conveyed to him, and no more, except that the sale may operate under some circumstances to cut off outstanding equities.

  3. In re Adoption of Hobson

    8 Kan. App. 2 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    "        See also Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, Syl. p 4, 439 P.2d 93 (1968). Having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the adoption, petitioner is estopped to assert the court did not have jurisdiction.

  4. Hill v. Whitlock Oil Services, Inc.

    450 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1971)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that all clauses are mandatory when they are phrased in the conjunctive

    The district court held that it had not because under Kansas law a sale of property on foreclosure is a judicial sale as distinguished from an execution sale. See Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 439 P.2d 93, 96, and National Reserve Life Insurance Company v. Kemp, 184 Kan. 648, 339 P.2d 368, 374. The court reasoned that without an execution there was no seizure or levy.

  5. Kansass&sMissouri Ry.s&sTerminal Co. v. Beal, Inc.

    338 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Kan. 1972)

    The Court believes the facts and circumstances here strongly dictated the choice of decision on the sound basis of apparent conduct of the parties. The Court finds this legal basis to be buttressed by the late Kansas case of Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 439 P.2d 93, and the following cases from other jurisdictions: Mobley v. Harkins, 14 Wash.2d 276, 128 P.2d 289, 143 A.L.R. 88 (1942); White v. Coates, 17 Wash.2d 686, 137 P.2d 113 (1943); Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Kesner, 296 Ill.App. 187, 16 N.E.2d 175 (1938); Hotel Burnet & Co. v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 72 Ohio App. 453, 52 N.E.2d 754 (1943); Zouboukos v. Costas, 232 Miss. 860, 100 So.2d 781 (1958).          The intention of the parties as to the effect of these various agreements also is clearly shown by their actions. Lease payments under the November 28, 1961 agreement have been continued since the grant under the 1963 warranty deed.

  6. McGinty v. Hoosier

    291 Kan. 224 (Kan. 2010)   Cited 9 times
    Finding adequate notice under K.S.A. 60-1003 when owners were served with a partition cross-petition and had an opportunity to file an answer

    " Moreover, a sheriff's deed is construed with the judicial proceedings of which it forms a part, and it "conveys no greater title than is authorized by the judicial proceedings." Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 36, 439 P.2d 93 (1968). Here, the judicial proceedings authorized the sale of the entire tract, without mineral reservation.

  7. State ex Rel. Graeber v. Marion County Landfill, Inc.

    276 Kan. 328 (Kan. 2003)   Cited 20 times

    However, MSW, by entering its appearance, subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the court for any and all actions regarding this case. See Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 38, 439 P.2d 93 (1968) ("A party is not permitted to invoke the jurisdiction and power of a court for the purpose of securing important rights from an adversary through its judgment, and then, after obtaining the benefits sought, to repudiate or question the validity of that jurisdiction on the ground the court was without jurisdiction."). During the hearing on the KDHE's motion for summary judgment as to the County, MCLI's attorney admitted that MCLI was primarily responsible for closure and postclosure of the landfill and that if judgment was entered in favor of the KDHE against the County, MCLI must indemnify the County.

  8. Trujillo v. CS Cattle Co.

    109 N.M. 705 (N.M. 1990)   Cited 14 times
    Reversing trial court's conclusion that contract clause was ambiguous

    Estoppel by deed binds the parties to a deed, as well as their heirs and assigns, to its representations. Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 439 P.2d 93 (1968). CS conveyed by deed certain acreage to appellants' predecessor in interest, including appurtenant water rights, and "to guard against a shortage of irrigation water," CS agreed not to sell water when the water level fell below 20,000 acre feet.

  9. Mountain Iron Supply Co. v. Jones

    441 P.2d 795 (Kan. 1968)   Cited 8 times

    First, the debt which the defendants guaranteed had a balance of only $16,000 plus interest, and the $45,000 indebtedness which the plaintiff seeks to add was not one which was due to the original or primary creditor as was the situation in the Mid-Continent Supply Co. and Spire cases. Here the plaintiff sought to gain an advantage that the original creditor did not have by purchasing the indebtedness and adding it to its own to take advantage of the defendants' endorsement. The second fallacy brings into consideration the doctrine of merger. It is a general rule in Kansas that when the purchaser of encumbered land also purchases the encumbrance and holds as owner and mortgagee, the matter of merger is usually one of choice and not one of compulsion. ( New v. Smith, 94 Kan. 6, 145 P. 880; and see the discussion of merger in Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 38, 439 P.2d 93. Also, see an annotation at 29 A.L.R. 702, that the rules for merger of estates as applied to mortgages are the same for real and personal property.) If the doctrine of merger does not apply, the plaintiff cannot add its indebtedness to the one it purchased from the bank in order to claim that the defendants are not entitled to subrogation because the entire debt has not been paid. If, on the other hand, the doctrine of merger does apply, then the first mortgage is merged into the plaintiff's title and the defendants' guarantee is extinguished.

  10. Stewart v. Stewart

    342 P.3d 1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 1 times
    Holding personal service on nonresident father was not valid personal service under Kansas long-arm statute where he was in the state for a hearing on his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

    [Citations omitted.]” Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 38, 439 P.2d 93 (1968).But here, Tim moved to dismiss Kara's petition for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–212, and he asserted lack of personal jurisdiction in his answer to Kara's petition. Thereafter he filed his counterclaim seeking custody of the children.