Opinion
No. 3-399 / 02-1428
Filed October 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forWebster County, Kurt L. Wilke, Judge.
AGCO Corporation appeals from an order refusing to confirm an arbitration award in its favor. AFFIRMED.
Joseph G. Bertroche, Sr. and Francis P. Hurley of Bertroche Law Offices, Des Moines, for appellant.
Vanesa Blanchfield and Mark S. Brownlee of Kersten Brownlee Hendricks L.L.P., Fort Dodge, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
AGCO Corporation appeals the district court's denial of its application for confirmation of an arbitration award.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
AGCO, a manufacturer of agricultural parts and equipment, entered into a sales and service agreement with Gene Anderson, of Anderson Implements, for Anderson to operate as a retail dealer of AGCO products. During the life of the agreement, Anderson failed to make payments totaling $31,554.51 for products delivered by AGCO. Pursuant to an individual guaranty executed by Anderson, all claims arising out of the guaranty were to be resolved by arbitration. One provision of the guaranty provided:
An arbitration proceeding must be instituted within thirteen months after the date (a) the last payment was received by the instituting party with respect to any dispute for the collection of debts; or (b) the incident giving rise to the dispute occurred. Failure to institute an arbitration proceeding within such period will constitute an absolute bar to the institution of any proceeding with respect to such dispute and a waiver thereof.
On January 19, 2001, AGCO filed for arbitration to recover under the terms of the guaranty. The arbitrator awarded AGCO $31,554.51 plus incidental costs, and AGCO proceeded to file an application for confirmation in the Webster County District Court. The district court subsequently denied AGCO's application for confirmation on grounds that the arbitration request was untimely filed.
AGCO now appeals the district court's denial of its application for confirmation of the arbitration award. Specifically, AGCO first argues the district court was without authority to decide the issue of timeliness because that decision was for the arbitrator; and second, AGCO believes that Anderson waived his right to present the timeliness issue. In response, Anderson urges the court to find that AGCO failed to preserve error on these issues.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court's denial of confirmation of an arbitration award for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4; $99 Down Payment, Inc. v. Garard, 592 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Iowa 1999).
III. Error Preservation
It is a fundamental rule of appellate practice that questions not presented to and passed on by the trial court cannot be raised or reviewed on appeal. Cole v. City of Osceola, 179 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Iowa 1970). The theory under which a case was submitted in the trial court will be the theory upon which the appeal is based. Davidson v. Van Lengen, 266 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Iowa 1978).
During the pretrial conference AGCO's attorney, Mr. Francis Hurley, agreed that the issue before the court was the timeliness of the arbitration action, and even stated that he had the burden of proof.
THE COURT: Gentlemen, would you agree the sole issue I will have to make today will be a determination whether the arbitration was timely or untimely? Is that correct?
MR. BROWNLEE: With one small exception, your Honor. If you decide it was timely and that it deserves judgment status as requested, then I think you can revisit the issue of attorney fees. I think it's inherent in the Court's power to do that. But you don't get there if you find it's untimely.
THE COURT: What about that, Mr. Hurley?
MR. HURLEY: Your Honor, the statute also seems clear if indeed you find the award was timely, because of the resistance of the Defendant you can hear evidence to ensure that the award is not outrageous. But you must give presumption to the award.
THE COURT: Right, okay. Ready to proceed?
MR. BROWNLEE: We are.
THE COURT: Well now, who has the burden as far as whether arbitration was timely or untimely in this case? Does the Plaintiff or Defendant?
MR. HURLEY: I believe it is me, your Honor.
This exchange, along with the activities of the trial itself, clearly shows that AGCO failed to preserve error on the issues now appealed.
IV. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
AGCO argues that the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the timeliness of the arbitration, and because a lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, the issue is therefore preserved. While it is true that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, we find the court had proper jurisdiction in this case.
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the court's power to hear and decide cases of a general class to which the matter or proceedings belong, not merely the specific case before the court. Smith v. Smith, 646 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 2002). Further, subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by either constitutional or statutory power, and Iowa Code chapter 679A (2001) gives district courts jurisdiction over arbitration awards.
The arbitration clause in this case merely imposed a condition precedent on AGCO and Anderson before they could turn to the district court. See Heck v. George A. Hormel Co., 260 N.W.2d 421, 422-23 (Iowa 1977). "We are unwilling to hold that parties may by contract deprive courts of jurisdiction which the law reposes in them. Jurisdiction is the power to decide cases of a general class." Id. (citations omitted). The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the timeliness of the arbitration award and therefore, we affirm the decision.