Opinion
Civil Case No. 3:04-CV-0037-JTC.
October 25, 2005
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 37]. Plaintiffs bring this suit for discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. After reviewing the parties' briefs and the evidence in the record, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Background
Except where indicated, the facts in the Background section are taken from the undisputed evidence in the record. The Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-movant.
Plaintiffs David Chitwood and Greg Agan endeavored to convert their three-bedroom/two-bathroom house into a "personal care home" ("PCH") for mentally disabled women. Because the land was not zoned for that use, on September 18, 2001, they applied for a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") for the limited purpose of operating a PCH on the property for four residents and one staff member.
The CUP was initially denied due to the size of Plaintiffs' lot and concerns regarding the distance between the property and the local day center, where residents would go regularly. Subsequently, Plaintiffs contacted David Basil, the Carroll County attorney, who represented to them that both issues would be "dead" if the property size was cut to its current size before the zoning ordinance was established. Plaintiffs confirmed that this was the case. As such, according to Basil, the reasons given for initially denying the application were non-issues, and the CUP would more likely be approved.
Eventually, on March 5, 2002, the application came before the Carroll County Board of Commissioners ("Board") for reconsideration. At the meeting, although the topic of the septic system came up, it was only with regard to the distance between it and the well. No discussion occurred regarding a problem with the septic capacity. In fact, in response to Defendant's question regarding the distance between the septic system and the well, Plaintiffs represented generally that they had met all of the Department of Health's requirements. This question seemed to satisfy the Board and no further discussion of the septic system occurred. Several more questions were asked by the Board, such as handicap accessibility of the home and whether the residents would have cars at the home. Finally, a Commissioner expressed his disagreement with two strangers sharing a bedroom, and moved to deny the application. His motion was successful, the CUP being denied 4-3.
The substantial delay resulted from a misunderstanding between the parties, whereby Defendant insisted upon classifying Plaintiffs' business as a nursing home instead of a PCH. The misunderstanding was resolved, in part, by the Georgia Department of Human Resources's issuance to Plaintiffs of a provisional permit to operate a PCH and the communication of same to Defendant.
Approximately two months later, on April 30, 2002, Plaintiffs received a letter from Basil implying that the reason for the denial of the CUP was the capacity of the septic system. It stated:
A HUD investigator, see infra, also stated in the Investigative Summary Report that, in response to the fair housing complaint, Defendant cited environmental concerns, specifically septic tank capacity, as one of its reasons for denying the CUP.
As you know, the application for conditional use permit you submitted to Carroll County contained an on-site sewage management system permit reflecting approval for two persons for the system. You stated in your application that the plan for the group home is for four residents and a 24-hour staff person.
The letter went on to state that since the March 5 denial of the permit, he had received notification from the Health Department that the septic system, in fact, met its requirements for four residents, but not four residents plus the staff member.
Although it is unclear how acquired, the record reflects that Plaintiffs currently have a CUP for three residents and one 24-hour staff member.
However, as stated above, there was no discussion of septic capacity at the March 5 hearing. Indeed, Plaintiffs aver that Basil's April 30 letter was the first time Defendant had ever mentioned an alleged problem with the septic capacity. The County does not require a copy of the septic report with a CUP application. In addition, An investigator from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in response to Plaintiffs' fair housing complaint, determined in approving previous CUPs, Defendant did not require applicants to have documentation regarding their water system or capacity.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact are present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The movant carries the initial burden and must show the court that there is "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (1986). "Only when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Clark v. Coats Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The nonmovant is then required "to go beyond the pleadings" and to present competent evidence in the form of affidavits, depositions, admissions and the like, designating "`specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" supporting the nonmovant's case is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). Resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court must determine "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Id.
III. Analysis
A. Standing
Defendant challenges Plaintiffs' standing to assert claims on behalf of the intended residents of the Personal Care Home. To establish standing, Plaintiffs must "demonstrate that [they have] suffered `injury in fact,' that the injury is `fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision." Nat'l Alliance for the Mentally Ill v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of St. Johns County, 376 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997)).
First, Defendant challenges Plaintiffs' standing to request injunctive relief by arguing that a favorable decision rendered by this Court would not redress the injury in question. It claims that even were this Court to issue Plaintiffs' the CUP they request, they would not be able to operate a PCH because: (i) their septic system would not comply with the Health Department's regulations; and (ii) because federal funding is frozen. The first argument fails because the evidence indicates that, as a "reasonable accommodation," a different standard could be applied, such as a residential standard, which would change the number of persons for which the septic system is rated. The second argument fails, even if federal funding is frozen, because Defendant has failed to show that private funding for the PCH is not available. Accordingly, Defendant's challenge on this point is without merit.
Second, Defendant challenges Plaintiffs' standing to bring claims under the FHAA and the ADA. In this regard, Defendant concedes that "harm to economic interests presents a cognizable injury for purposes of standing." Alabama Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Norton, 338 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2003). They allege, however, that Plaintiffs "have not produced evidence showing that the economic injuries are sufficiently concrete and imminent to confer standing." See id. at 1253. The Court finds this argument to be without merit. Plaintiffs currently have a CUP which allows for three residents and one staff member. They seek a permit which would allow four residents and one staff member. A rudimentary calculation shows that the latter would result in an approximate 33% increase in revenue. This is a "distinct and palpable" injury sufficient to confer standing. Accordingly, Defendant's challenge on this point fails.
B. Plaintiffs' Claims under the FHAA and ADA
Under the FHAA, it is unlawful "[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of — (A) that buyer or renter, (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that buyer or renter." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). Discrimination includes, but is not limited to, "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Similarly, under the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In this respect, "[a] public entity may not administer a licensing or certification program in a manner that subjects qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability, nor may a public entity establish requirements for the programs or activities of licensees or certified entities that subject qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability. . . ." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6).
As shown above, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs' CUP application was denied on the basis of the intended residents' handicaps. Certainly, Defendant has failed to show "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (1986). Though not the only conclusion possible, given the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could conclude, inter alia, that the after-stated reason for denying the application — i.e., insufficient septic capacity — was pretextual for a discriminatory action, especially in view of the discussion contemporaneous with the motion to deny the permit. As such, Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be denied.
IV. Conclusion
Because there exist genuine issues of material fact as to Plaintiffs' discrimination claims under the statutes, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 37] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.