A.F. v. R.P.B.

6 Citing cases

  1. Rolison v. Rolison

    144 So. 3d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that section 61.13001 did not apply where the mother moved to Georgia before the father filed for dissolution of marriage

    We note that this court's plain reading of section 61.13001 is in accordance with the interpretation of at least two other districts. See Essex v. Davis, 116 So.3d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); A.F. v. R.P.B., 100 So.3d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). In Essex, the Fourth District addressed the relocation statute in the context of a paternity proceeding.

  2. Hernandez v. Hernandez

    335 So. 3d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)

    See id . (defining "[r]elocation"); Clark v. Meizlik , 289 So. 3d 983, 985 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (recognizing that section 61.13001(1)(e) authorizes "a petition to relocate" only if "a parent or individual with whom a child resides" seeks to "move fifty miles or more away from their current residence"); Essex v. Davis , 116 So. 3d 445, 447-48 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ( section 61.13001 does not apply to relocation of child's residence without an accompanying request to change the primary residence of the parent or custodian with whom child lives); Rolison v. Rolison , 144 So. 3d 610, 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ("[T]he plain language of the relocation statute applies only where a parent's principal place of residence changes[.]"); A.F. v. R.P.B. , 100 So. 3d 71, 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (relocation statute had no applicability where father was "not changing his own residence," but rather was "seeking to change the child's principal residence"). The father's alternative count to modify the existing time-sharing arrangement was heard by a general magistrate who found that the evidence supported a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances justifying modification of the time-sharing arrangement.

  3. Duryea v. Bono

    326 So. 3d 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)

    Because there was a pending action to establish timesharing, the Mother could seek the court's permission to relocate from her then residence. Cf. A.F. v. R.P.B. , 100 So. 3d 71, 71-72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that section 61.13001 did not apply because the father was already living in a different state when the parties filed competing petitions for parental responsibility and timesharing); Rolison v. Rolison , 144 So. 3d 610, 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (concluding that section 61.13001 did not apply when the mother was living in Georgia when the father filed for dissolution of the marriage). There is no language in either the December 9, 2014, general magistrate report and recommendation or in the February 5, 2015, trial court order indicating that the ruling allowing the Mother to relocate was temporary.

  4. Duryea v. Bono

    Case No. 2D19-225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2021)

    Because there was a pending action to establish timesharing, the Mother could seek the court's permission to relocate from her then residence. Cf. A.F. v. R.P.B., 100 So. 3d 71, 71-72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that section 61.13001 did not apply because the father was already living in a different state when the parties filed competing petitions for parental responsibility and time-sharing); Rolison v. Rolison, 144 So. 3d 610, 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (concluding that section 61.13001 did not apply when the mother was living in Georgia when the father filed for dissolution of the marriage). There is no language in either the December 9, 2014, general magistrate report and recommendation or in the February 5, 2015, trial court order approving such indicating that the ruling allowing the Mother to relocate was temporary.

  5. Bates v. Bates

    103 So. 3d 836 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012)   Cited 6 times

    In their briefs, the parties have cited and quoted the current version of § 61.13001, which became effective on October 1, 2009, and which specifically provides in § 61.13001(11)(a) 1. that “[t]his section ... applies [t]o orders entered before October 1, 2009, if the existing order defining custody, primary residence, the parenting plan, time-sharing, or access to or with the child does not expressly govern the relocation of the child.” See A.F. v. R.P.B., 100 So.3d 71 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011) (holding that current version of § 61.13001 applied in action initiated by petition regarding relocation filed on November 10, 2009). See also note 5, infra.

  6. Essex v. Davis

    116 So. 3d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    The question we must address on appeal is whether the evidence before the trial court supported the inference that the mother relocated her residence (and the child's) to Louisiana after signing the partial temporary timesharing agreement. In A.F. v. R.P.B., 100 So.3d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), the mother and father moved with their child from Florida to Pennsylvania. Six months later, the mother moved back to Florida with the child. Both parties petitioned the trial court for majority time-sharing.