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Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Commission

Court of Appeals of Colorado, First Division
Aug 25, 1970
474 P.2d 242 (Colo. App. 1970)

Opinion

         Aug. 25, 1970.

         Editorial Note:

         This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.

         Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent, Industrial Commission of Colorado.

         Tilly & Graves, Ronald O. Sylling, Denver, for petitioners.

         Margaret Bates Ellison and Richard T. Goold, Denver, for respondent, Ruth F. Shelby.


         DWYER, Judge.

         This case involves a review of a decision of the Industrial Commission in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

         On March 20, 1969, Ruth F. Shelby, the claimant, filed a claim for compensation alleging that she was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with St. Joseph Hospital on July 23, 1967.

         Following a hearing on the claim, the referee for the Commission found that the claimant sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment and ordered compensation and medical benefits paid. On review, the Commission approved, affirmed, and adopted the order of the referee. In their petition for review, St. Joseph Hospital, the employer, and Aetna Casualty Insurance Company, the insuror, contend that the Commission was without jurisdiction to enter the order because the claim was not filed within one year after the injury.

          The statute upon which petitioners rely is C.R.S. 1963, 81--13--5(2), which provides in part as follows:

'The right to compensation and benefits, as provided by this chapter, shall be barred unless within one year after the injury, or after death resulting therefrom, a notice claiming compensation shall be filed with the commission. * * *'

         The critical date involved in this one year statute of limitation is not the date of the accident, but the date of the injury. The time for filing a notice claiming compensation begins to run when the claimant, as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, and seriousness, and probable compensable character of his injury. City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194; Industrial Commission v. Canfield, Colo., 469 P.2d 737.

         The evidence presented at the hearing before the referee is summarized as follows: On July 23, 1967, the claimant sustained an injury to her right hand at her place of employment when a box of oranges slipped. The box struck her on the palm of her hand. Claimant was immediately examined by an intern, who suggested that she soak her hand in warm water. In the latter part of July, 1967, claimant mentioned to another physician, who was treating her for other problems, that she was having difficulty with her hand. He injected the area with cortisone. The tenderness and swelling progressed, and the claimant was referred to an orthopedic surgeon who examined her on December 23, 1968, and diagnosed the condition as tenosing tenosynovitis. The surgeon performed a tendon sheath release operation on December 31, 1968. A second operation was performed by a different surgeon on February 24, 1969.

         The claimant had worked continuously from the date of the accident until the operation on December 31, 1968. She returned to work January 15, 1969, and was discharged February 11, 1969, for reasons not related to the accident.

          The referee found that the claimant should have been aware of the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of her injury on December 31, 1968, and that her claim for compensation filed March 20, 1969, was timely.

         The insuror argues that claimant should have been aware of the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of her injury at the time of the accident or at the time she was treated with cortisone in July of 1967. The date of the 'injury' was a question of fact which has been determined by the Commission. The Commission's finding on this issue is supported by the evidence and is conclusive on review.

'The weight and sufficiency of the evidence, and the inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom, are matters solely within the prerogative of the Industrial Commission.' Crandall v. Watson-Wilson Transportation System, Inc., Colo., 467 P.2d 48; accord, Hamilton v. Industrial Commission, 132 Colo. 408, 289 P.2d 639; Industrial Commission v. Valdez, 101 Colo. 482, 74 P.2d 710.

         The order is affirmed.

         DUFFORD and PIERCE, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Commission

Court of Appeals of Colorado, First Division
Aug 25, 1970
474 P.2d 242 (Colo. App. 1970)
Case details for

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Commission

Case Details

Full title:Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Commission

Court:Court of Appeals of Colorado, First Division

Date published: Aug 25, 1970

Citations

474 P.2d 242 (Colo. App. 1970)

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