Finality, for purposes of appeal, has been determined in this Court by looking at the practical ramifications of the order in question. Adoption of G.M., 398 A.2d 642 (Pa. 1979). A presentment is a recommendation by a Grand Jury that charges be brought. It is a summary of what the Grand Jury heard during its tenure and what it concludes should happen with the information it assembled.
It is axiomatic that an appeal will lie only from a final order unless otherwise permitted by statute or rule. Adoption of G.M., 484 Pa. 24, 398 A.2d 642 (1979); Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 72, 394 A.2d 542 (1978); T.C.R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372 A.2d 721 (1977); Piltzer v. Independence Federal Savings and Loan Association, 456 Pa. 402, 319 A.2d 677 (1974); Caplan v. Keystone Weaving Mill, 431 Pa. 407, 246 A.2d 384 (1968); Stadler v. Mt. Oliver Borough, supra; Coleman v. Huffman, 348 Pa. 580, 36 A.2d 724 (1944); Paul v. Smith, 343 Pa. 63, 21 A.2d 919 (1941). See also Pa.R.A.P. 311, 312 and 341(a).
Thus, the Order appealed from is not final and not properly subject to review at this time. See Adoption of G. M., 484 Pa. 24, 398 A.2d 642 (1979). Accordingly, the appeal is quashed, appellants to pay costs.
"We recognize that the proper approach in deciding whether an order is a final and[,] hence[,] an appealable one is to apply practical considerations after examining the ramifications of the order." Adoption of M., 398 A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. 1979) (citation omitted). We "must look beyond the technical effects of the [trial court] adjudication to its practical ramifications."
Foflygen v. R. Zemel, M.D. (PC), 420 Pa. Super. 18, 28, 615 A.2d 1345, 1350 (1992), allocatur denied, 535 Pa. 619, 629 A.2d 1380 (1993). See also: Jenkins v. Hospital of Medical College ofPennsylvania, 535 Pa. 252, 259, 634 A.2d 1099, 1102 (1993); Adoption of G.M., 484 Pa. 24, 27, 398 A.2d 642, 643 (1979); Appeal of Gannon, 428 Pa. Super. 349, 360, 631 A.2d 176, 181 (1993). "A final order is one which ends the litigation or, alternatively, disposes of the entire case."
A bifurcated decree in divorce had been entered on November 22, 1989, but the distribution of marital property was deferred. It is clear that an appeal will lie only from a final order unless an appeal is otherwise permitted by statute or rule of court. See: Adoption of G.M., 484 Pa. 24, 27, 398 A.2d 642, 643 (1979); Blackman v. Katz, 390 Pa. Super. 257, 261, 568 A.2d 642, 644 (1990); Katz v. Katz, 356 Pa. Super. 461, 465, 514 A.2d 1374, 1376 (1986), allocatur denied, 515 Pa. 581, 527 A.2d 542 (1987). A final order is one which ends the litigation or, alternatively, disposes of the entire case.
In fact, a final decree in divorce had not been entered at the time of the appeal. Unless otherwise permitted by statute or rule, an appeal will lie only from a final order. Adoption of G.M., 484 Pa. 24, 27, 398 A.2d 642, 644 (1979); Beasley v. Beasley, 348 Pa. Super. 124, 126, 501 A.2d 679 (1985). A final order has been defined as one which ends the litigation or disposes of the entire case.
An order is final if it terminates litigation or disposes of the entire case. Adoption of G.M., 484 Pa. 24, 27, 398 A.2d 642, 644 (1979); T.C.R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 337, 372 A.2d 721, 724 (1977). An order is interlocutory and not final if it does not effectively put a litigant "out of court."
Because such a determination is a final order, it is appealable to the same extent as other final orders. SeeAdoption of G.M., 484 Pa. 24, 398 A.2d 642 (1979); Feingold v.Bell of Pennsylvania, 477 Pa. 1, 383 A.2d 791 (1977); T.C.R.Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372 A.2d 721 (1977).
See Giannini v. Foy, supra. And see Adoption ofG.M., 484 Pa. 24, 398 A.2d 642 (1979); Bell v. BeneficialConsumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975). Ordinarily, an order which terminates litigation or disposes of the entire case is final, and an order is interlocutory and not final unless it effectively puts the litigant "out of court."