Opinion
C. A. 9:23-cv-02695-BHH-MHC
10-31-2023
Olatunji Adejola, Plaintiff, v. AMIkids Beaufort, Inc., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, Olatunji Adejola, initiated this action in this Court, alleging various claims arising out of his former employment with Defendant, AMIkids Beaufort, Inc. ECF No. 1. Before the Court is Defendant's partial Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike, ECF No. 8 (“Motion”), filed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its Motion, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for violation of the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 12 at 1. Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff's demand for a jury trial on the grounds that Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a trial by jury by executing a “Waiver of Jury Trial” agreement. Id. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. 9, and Defendant filed a Reply, ECF No. 10. The Motion is ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C. This Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be denied.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Accepting the truth of the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, see E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011), the facts, for purposes of ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, are as follows.
Plaintiff began working as a teacher for Defendant in June 2019 and was efficient and effective in his work. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11. On April 4, 2022, while working for Defendant, Plaintiff took a group of students to Dorm 1, a residential building on Defendant's campus, so that they could use the restroom. Id. at ¶ 12. While Plaintiff was waiting on the students to use the restroom, one student began yelling at Plaintiff and then threw a table and a chair, hitting Plaintiff in the back. Id. Plaintiff immediately called for help and notified Defendant's Executive Director, Matthew Kingdom, of the incident and that he was injured, initiating a workers' compensation claim. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff began seeking medical treatment for his injuries and was out of work from April 5, 2022, to April 11, 2022. Id. at ¶ 14. Immediately upon his return, Mr. Kingdom began retaliating against Plaintiff, issuing two baseless write-ups between April and June. Id. Plaintiff suffers from anxiety, which was exacerbated by the unjustified harsh treatment by Mr. Kingdom. Id. at ¶ 15. Between April and June of 2022, Plaintiff repeatedly asked Mr. Kingdom for time off because of his anxiety, but every request was denied. Id.
On or about June 20, 2022, Defendant unexpectedly sent Plaintiff home, accusing him of being clocked out during an unauthorized time. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff was instructed not to return until he heard from Defendant. Id. On or about June 24, 2022, Plaintiff received a letter from Mr. Kingdom stating that Plaintiff was terminated because of “multiple no call/no shows.” Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff immediately informed Mr. Kingdom of the falsity of those allegations. Id. As a result, on or about July 5, 2022, Plaintiff received a second letter admitting that the June 24, 2022 letter was an error, but that he was still being terminated “for violating procedure.” Id. at ¶ 18.
Plaintiff asserts that the stated reasons for his termination are pretextual and that he was truly terminated in retaliation for instituting a workers' compensation claim and applying for Family and Medical Leave Act leave. Id. at ¶ 19.
At the time of Plaintiff's termination, he had accrued 148 hours of paid time off (“PTO”), which Plaintiff is still owed. Id. at ¶ 120. Plaintiff emailed numerous requests to Mr. Kingdom and Community and Cultural Relations representative Angie, but Defendant has failed and continues to fail to pay Plaintiff for his PTO. Id.
DISCUSSION
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges four causes of action: (1) retaliatory discharge, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-80, for instituting a workers' compensation claim; (2) interference with his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”); (3) retaliation in violation of the FMLA; and (4) violation of the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act (“SCPWA”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also demands a trial by jury. Id.
Defendant moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for dismissal of the SCPWA claim. ECF No. 8 at 1. Defendant also moves, pursuant to Rule 12(f), to strike Plaintiff's jury demand. Id.
I. Motion to Dismiss
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Legal Standard
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.” Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F.Supp.3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014); see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”). Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant will have “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he facts alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court is required to evaluate the complaint in its entirety, accept the allegations in the pleading as true, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d at 440, 448. Moreover, the court must evaluate “the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.” Id. at 448. The court may consider a document not attached to the complaint, so long as the document “was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint,” and there is no authenticity challenge. Id. (quoting Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999)). “A complaint should not be dismissed as long as it provides sufficient detail about the claim to show that the plaintiff has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.” Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 791 F.3d 500, 511 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action is a claim for violation of the SCPWA. ECF No. 1 at 4. He alleges that Defendant wrongfully withheld payment for his accrued but unused PTO, which he alleges constitutes “wages” under the SCPWA. Id. at ¶ 38. He alleges that at the time of his termination, he had accrued 148 hours of PTO, for which he is owed payment. Id. at ¶ 20.
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant does not argue that these allegations fail to state a plausible claim for relief un the SCPWA. Indeed, Defendant acknowledges that “Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that he did not receive payment he was entitled to for his accrued but unused PTO and, therefore, he is now entitled to payment for his unused PTO, plus interest.” ECF No. 81 at 3 (citing ECF No. 1 at 4.) Nonetheless, Defendant argues that the Court should conclude, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff was not entitled to payment for his unused PTO. Id. In support of its argument, Defendant points to language contained in a Team Member Reference Guide (Handbook), a document attached to Defendant's Motion. Id. at 4; See ECF No. 8-3. Although the Handbook is neither mentioned nor cited in the Complaint, Defendant contends that the Handbook and Plaintiff's Acknowledgment of the Handbook (also attached to the Motion) are integral to the Complaint, such that the Court should consider the documents at the motion to dismiss stage. ECF No. 8-1 at n.1; ECF No. 8-4.
Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that the Handbook is an extraneous document that cannot be properly considered on a 12(b)(6) motion. ECF No. 9 at 4. Plaintiff also contends that he should be “afforded an opportunity to review the document in its entirety, question witness[es] about the same and seek other documents (including possibly additional or superseding policies or handbooks) before this Court could be presented with an adequate factual basis to properly determine the issue.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff maintains that because no discovery has occurred in this case, “any argument related to the validity, enforceability or even existence of such a handbook cannot be considered by the Court at this time.” Id.
A court's evaluation of a motion to dismiss generally is limited to a review of the allegations of the complaint itself and any documents attached or incorporated into the complaint. Goines v. Valley Community Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016). “Considering extrinsic documents during the pleading stage improperly converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,” and this conversion “‘is not appropriate when the parties have not had an opportunity to conduct reasonable discovery.'” Defs. of Wildlife v. Boyles, 608 F.Supp.3d 336, 344 (D.S.C. 2022) (quoting Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Intern., Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606-07 (4th Cir. 2015)); see Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d at 448; Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 12(d), and 56. However, the Fourth Circuit has recognized an exception to this extrinsic document rule. Defs. of Wildlife, 608 F.Supp.3d at 344. Courts “may consider a document submitted by the movant that was not attached to or expressly incorporated in a complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document's authenticity.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166.
“A document is integral to a complaint if the claims turn on or are otherwise based on statements contained in the document.” Defs. of Wildlife, 608 F.Supp.3d at 344 (citing Goines, 822 F.3d at 166). “Limited quotation from or reference to documents that may constitute relevant evidence in a case is not enough to incorporate those documents, wholesale, into the complaint.” Id. (quoting Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004)). In deciding whether to treat a document as integral to a complaint, the court should consider whether the plaintiff disputes that the document proffered by the moving defendant is integral to the complaint. Id.; see Goines, 822 F.3d 159 at 166 (“[B]ecause [plaintiff] does not argue otherwise, we will assume without deciding that the [extrinsic document] was integral to the complaint.”).
“Examples of extrinsic documents found integral to the complaint by courts in this district include a contract that gave rise to a breach of contract claim, an internal audit report whose nondisclosure was a basis for a False Claims Act claim, and an agreement letter that was the basis for alleging a defendant was a party in interest in an ERISA prohibited transaction claim.” Defs. of Wildlife, 608 F.Supp.3d at 345 (internal citations omitted) (collecting cases). “These examples suggest that for an extrinsic document to be integral to a complaint the document must either give rise to a claim or be the basis of an element of a claim.” Id.
The SCPWA defines “wages” as “all amounts at which labor rendered is recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the amount and includes vacation, holiday, and sick leave payments which are due to an employee under any employer policy or employment contract.” S.C. Code Ann. § 4110-10. Defendant argues that pursuant to the definition of “wages” in the SCPWA, the court must look to an employer policy or employment contract to determine whether accrued but unused PTO is considered “wages.” ECF No. 8-1 at 3-4 (citing Anselmo v. W. Paces Hotel Grp., LLC, No. CA 9:09-2466-MBS, 2011 WL 1049195, at *10 (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2011) for the proposition that the SCPWA “does not create an independent right to wages for accrued PTO” but instead “creates a right to be paid wages due based upon an employment contract”). Thus, Defendant appears to argue that Plaintiff's SCPWA claim turns on or is otherwise based on statements contained in the Handbook, such that the Handbook is integral to the Complaint.
Plaintiff, however, appears to challenge the authenticity of this Handbook or, at least, that this was the operative Handbook in place at the time of his termination. See ECF No. 9 at 4 (arguing that Plaintiff should be afforded discovery to seek other documents (including additional or superseding policies or handbooks) and questioning the validity and enforceability of the Handbook). Plaintiff alleges that he was owed payment for his accrued PTO at the time of his termination, but he does not allege the specific source of the policy giving rise to this alleged wage. Moreover, he disputes that the specific Handbook produced by Defendant is integral to his claim. Thus, the undersigned cannot conclude, based on the information currently before the Court, that the Handbook contains the policies giving rise to Plaintiff's SCPWA claim or is otherwise integral to Plaintiff's Complaint. See Defs. of Wildlife, 608 F.Supp.3d at 345.
Upon review of the Complaint and the parties' arguments, the undersigned declines to consider the Handbook and Acknowledgment for purposes of evaluating Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and declines to convert the motion into one for summary judgment. “The role of the Court when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to test the legal feasibility of the Complaint without weighing evidence that might be offered to support or contradict it.” Smith v. Harr, No. CV 2:21-03989-RMG, 2022 WL 1229019, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (declining to consider documents attached to motion to dismiss). Plaintiff did not reference or explicitly rely upon the Handbook in his Complaint, and he disputes that the specific Handbook produced by Defendant is integral to his claim. See Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d at 448; Defs. of Wildlife, 608 F.Supp.3d at 345. Accordingly, the undersigned will consider the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based only on the four corners of the Complaint.
As stated above, Defendant does not argue that the factual allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to state a plausible claim under the SCPWA. Nor does Defendant challenge the sufficiency of any other claim in the Complaint. Because Defendant does not make any additional arguments in support of its 12(b)(6) motion, the undersigned recommends that the partial Motion to Dismiss be denied.
II. Motion to Strike
A. Rule 12(f) Legal Standard
Rule 12(f) provides that “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P 12(f). Immaterial matter “is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief, and ‘impertinent' material consists of statements that do not pertain to, and are not necessary to resolve, the disputed issues.” CTH 1 Caregiver v. Owens, No. CA 8:11-2215-TMC, 2012 WL 2572044, at *5 (D.S.C. July 2, 2012) (citations omitted). Scandalous matter “includes allegations that cast a cruelly derogatory light on a party to other persons.” Id. “When reviewing a motion to strike, ‘the court must view the pleading under attack in a light most favorable to the pleader.'” Piontek v. Serv. Ctrs. Corp., Civil No. PJM 10-1202, 2010 WL 4449419, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2010) (quoting Clark v. Milam, 152 F.R.D. 66, 71 (S.D. W.Va. 1993)).
Although the decision of whether to grant a motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is within the sound discretion of the court, the Fourth Circuit views Rule 12(f) motions with disfavor “because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.” Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court generally should deny a Rule 12(f) motion “unless the challenged allegations have no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy and may cause some form of significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the action.” Crownover v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., No. 218CV02577RMGMGB, 2019 WL 13259287, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2019) (citation omitted).
B. Analysis
In its Motion, Defendant requests that the Court strike Plaintiff's demand for a jury trial. ECF No. 8-1 at 5-7. Defendant contends that “Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily executed a jury waiver as a condition of his employment with Defendant,” Id. at 6, and it attaches a copy of a “WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL” that appears to have been signed by Plaintiff on June 11, 2019, ECF No. 8-2. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-80 is a claim in equity to be tried without a jury. ECF No. 8-1 at 7 (citing Johnson v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 417 S.E.2d 527, 529 (S.C. 1992); Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 406 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1991); and Hinton v. Designer Ensembles, Inc., 540 S.E.2d 94, 95 (S.C. 2000)). Defendant thus contends that the Court should enforce the waiver of Plaintiff's right to a jury trial and strike the demand for trial by jury. Id.
In Response, Plaintiff argues that his request for a jury trial is neither “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.” ECF No. 9 at 5. Plaintiff further argues that his “request for a jury trial has a clear relationship and connection to the claims he has alleged and thus does not give rise to circumstances wherein a Court would or should grant a Motion to Strike.” Id. Plaintiff contends that Defendant carries the burden of showing that the jury trial waiver was both “voluntary and informed,” but Plaintiff argues that the waiver was not voluntary but rather an unconscionable contract of adhesion. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff also argues that he was required to sign this document but “received absolutely nothing in exchange for his agreement,” such that the waiver is unenforceable. Id. at 6. Finally, while Plaintiff agrees that he “is not necessarily entitled to a jury trial for [his claim under S.C. Code Ann. §41-1-80] alone,” he notes that his Complaint also contains claims under the FMLA and SCPWA, “which have no comparable bar.” Id. at 7.
Upon review, the undersigned concludes that the Motion to Strike should be denied at this time. “A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is not a mechanism for deciding disputed issues of law or fact, especially where, as here, there has been no discovery, and the factual issues on which the motion to strike largely depends are disputed.” Riemer v. Chase Bank, N.A., 275 F.R.D. 492, 494 (N.D. Ill. 2011); see E.E.O.C. v. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 CIV. 655 LTS MHD, 2011 WL 3163443, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011) (“Even when the defense presents a purely legal question, the courts are very reluctant to determine disputed or substantial issues of law on a motion to strike; these questions quite properly are viewed as determinable only after discovery and a hearing on the merits.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff disputes the enforceability of the jury waiver, there has been no discovery taken in this case, and there currently is insufficient information before the Court to determine whether the jury demand should be struck. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Strike be denied, without prejudice and with leave to refile after the completion of discovery.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's partial Motion to Dismiss and to Strike, ECF No. 8, be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).