Opinion
C. A. 8:20-cv-03735-TMC-JDA
11-05-2020
Jerome Addison, Plaintiff, v. Bryan Stirling, Willie Weldon, Mae Brown, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Jerome Addison (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action purportedly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff is a state inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is currently incarcerated at the Ridgeland Correctional Institution. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff files this action requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. [Doc. 2.] However, Plaintiff is subject to the three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-71 (1996) (“PLRA”). Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, it is recommended that the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be denied and that the Complaint be dismissed unless Plaintiff timely pays the full filing fee.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint against the above-named Defendants. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id. at 4.] According to Plaintiff, Defendants were aware or should have been aware of certain statutory duties, but they knowingly and intentionally violated their duties. [Id.] After Plaintiff was committed to the custody of SCDC in September 1997, SCDC failed to provide him with a method to appeal a due process violation by failing to promulgate regulations in violation of his due process rights. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff believes that Defendant Mae Brown, the head of classification, was possibly related to the alleged victim in his underlying criminal case. [Id. at 6.] For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he has endured pain and suffering, emotional distress, and humiliation, and he has been denied medical and psychological treatment. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks the “promulgation of departmental policy, ” $1 million in actual damages for the loss of his liberty and property, $23 million in punitive damages for false imprisonment, and the expungement of his record. [Id.]
DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. [Doc. 2.] However, Plaintiff is subject to the three-strikes rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The PLRA requires this Court to engage in a preliminary screening of any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify “cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion [thereof, that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Further, the PLRA limits the ability of prisoners to file civil actions without prepayment of filing fees in what has become known as the three-strikes rule. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203-04 (2007). The three-strikes rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Thus, “[w]hen a prisoner has previously filed at least three actions or appeals that were dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the [PLRA's] ‘three strikes' provision requires that the prisoner demonstrate imminent danger of serious physical injury in order to proceed without prepayment of fees.” McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 393-94 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)), abrogated on other grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721 (2020).
In Lomax, the Supreme Court abrogated the holding of McLean that a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim does not constitute a strike. Lomax, 140 S.Ct. at 1724 (holding that a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim qualifies as a strike under Section 1915(g)).
The PLRA's three-strikes rule was enacted to bar prisoners, such as Plaintiff, who have filed prior frivolous litigation or meritless prisoner suits in a federal court from pursuing certain types of federal civil litigation without prepayment of the filing fee. Lomax, 140 S.Ct. at 1726. To avoid application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a prisoner may prepay the filing fee in full. Nevertheless, all civil lawsuits brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity, officer, or employee are subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, even those lawsuits where the full filing fee is paid at the time of filing. See Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 407 (4th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff is a “frequent filer” who has filed more than thirty cases in this Court, including the instant action. At least three of Plaintiff's prior cases can be deemed a strike under the PLRA in accordance with the standard set forth in Lomax. See 140 S.Ct. at 1725, 1727 (“A dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim counts as a strike, whether or not with prejudice.”).
See case numbers 89-1363, 90-2031, 90-2693, 91-1369, 91-2300, 96-1278, 963007, 00-1178, 00-1446, 00-2149, 00-2557, 02-0124, 02-2271, 02-2714, 05-0501, 051373, 05-1565, 05-3479, 06-3308, 06-3403, 07-1977, 08-3649, 08-3717, 09-1907, 092896, 10-2992, 11-2705, 11-2936, 13-2943, 15-4581, 18-2782.
In addition to the three cases noted herein, the undersigned concludes that several of Plaintiff's other cases also qualify as a strike under the PLRA in light of Lomax. See, e.g., No. 2:09-cv-2896 (dismissal based on Heck and immunity of the defendants); No. 2:09-cv-1907 (dismissal based on Heck); No. 2:08-cv-3649 (dismissal based on Heck and immunity of the defendants).
First Dismissal
On January 26, 2016, the district judge adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge that Plaintiff's action at case number 8:15-cv-4581 be summarily dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Addison v. McFadden, No. 8:15-cv-4581 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2016), Doc. 19; see also Dewitt v. Adduci, No. 3:02-cv-0942-24BC, 2002 WL 32332077, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2002) (“a dismissal under Heck constitutes a ‘strike' under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and (g)”), aff'd, 62 Fed.Appx. 532 (4th Cir. 2003).
Second Dismissal
On April 6, 2005, the district judge adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge that Plaintiff's action at case number 2:05-cv-0501 be summarily dismissed without prejudice based on the immunity of the defendant. Addison v. South Carolina, No. 2:05-cv-0501 (D.S.C. Apr. 6, 2005), Doc. 6; see also Bailey v. Kitchen, No. 3:08-cv-141-HMH-JRM, 2009 WL 102534, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2009) (noting that, where defendants were entitled to immunity, the plaintiff's complaint was “patently frivolous and should be dismissed as a matter of law and count as a strike pursuant to the provisions of the PLRA”).
Third Dismissal
On May 23, 2000, the district judge adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge that Plaintiff's action at case number 2:00-cv-1178 be summarily dismissed without prejudice based on the immunity of the defendant. See Addison v. Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office, No. 2:00-cv-1178-RSC-JFA (D.S.C. May 23, 2000), Doc. 6.
Each of the dismissals noted above constitutes a strike under the standard set forth in Lomax. In light of Plaintiff's three strikes, he cannot proceed with the instant Complaint under the in forma pauperis statute unless his claims satisfy the exception for imminent physical harm provided by the three-strikes rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Torres v. O'Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 246 (4th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff's claims do not satisfy the § 1915(g) standard of “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” In order to invoke the “imminent danger” exception of § 1915(g), an “inmate must make ‘specific fact allegations of ongoing serious injury, or of a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.'” Johnson v. Warner, 200 Fed.Appx. 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003)). Additionally, allegations that are remote, speculative, or hypothetical do not rise to the level of “imminent danger.” See Welch v. Selsky, No. 9:06-cv-00812-LEK-DEP, 2008 WL 238553, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2008) (“The imminent danger an inmate faces, moreover, must be real, and not merely speculative or hypothetical.”); Riches v. Harrelson, No. 6:08-cv-0685-MBS, 2008 WL 1744603, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 10, 2008).
Plaintiff does not allege, and nothing in the record suggests, that he is in any imminent danger. The alleged misconduct for which Plaintiff seeks relief relates only to past misconduct and the allegations in the Complaint simply do not allege any imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Bryan v. McCall, No. 5:15-cv-871, 2016 WL 529574, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2016). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis should be denied.
Plaintiff still may seek to litigate the claims in his Complaint, of course, if he pays the full filing fee. Effective May 1, 2013, the filing fee (set by the Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States) for a non-habeas civil action is four hundred dollars ($400). As a result, Plaintiff must pay the full filing fee of four hundred dollars ($400). If Plaintiff timely pays the filing fee, the claims in his Complaint will then be subject to review by the undersigned to determine if service of process should be authorized.
Effective May 1, 2013, the Judicial Conference added an administrative fee of $50 to the filing fee of $350. The $50 administrative fee is not applicable to in forma pauperis cases.
Even if Plaintiff pays the filing fee, all civil lawsuits brought by pro se filers are subject to screening. As such, if Plaintiff timely pays the filing fee, his Complaint will still be subject to review by the undersigned to determine if service of process should be authorized. Moreover, as filed, Plaintiff's Complaint in this action would be subject to summary dismissal for the same reasons as the prior dismissals.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 2] be DENIED. It is further recommended that Plaintiff be given twenty-one (21) days from the date the United States District Judge rules on this Report and Recommendation to pay the filing fee of four hundred dollars ($400) and that the Clerk of Court withhold entry of judgment until such time for payment expires. If Plaintiff timely pays the filing fee, this action should be sent to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for further initial review.
If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the specified time period, it is further recommended that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice under the three strikes rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that the Clerk of Court enter the required final judgment at the close of the twenty-one day period permitted for payment of the filing fee.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).