Addison v. Grillot Land Marine, L.L.C.

Full title: LEON ADDISON v. GRILLOT LAND MARINE, L.L.C., ET AL

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Jun 7, 2002

Civil Action No. 02-01251 Section "N" (E.D. La. Jun. 7, 2002)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 02-01251 Section "N"

June 7, 2002

ORDER AND REASONS

KURT D. ENGELHARDT, District Judge

Before the Court is a Motion to Remand and Rule to Show Cause, filed by plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Leon Addison, commenced this action in state court by filing a petition against Grillot Land Marine, L.L.C. ("GLM"), Wayne McMorris, and XYZ Insurance Company, alleging that GLM fired him because of his race in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute section 23:332. Plaintiff, who is black, alleges that GLM fired him without cause after he reported being threatened with a gun and racial epithets by McMorris, a white employee. GLM removed the matter to this Court on grounds that plaintiffs state court petition asserts a claim arising under federal law.

II. LAW AND ARGUMENT

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 459 (2001). Courts "must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Id. Thus, where federal jurisdiction is invoked by removal, it is the defendant who "bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper." Manguno v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). The burden is a heavy one. Sid Richardson Carbon Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Resources, Ltd, 99 F.3d 746, 751 (5th Cir. 1996). Because it raises federalism concerns, removal jurisdiction is "strictly construe[d]." Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5^th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 503 U.S. 131 (1992). Any ambiguities in the state court petition "are construed against removal," Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723, and all "doubts regarding whether removal jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against federal jurisdiction." Acuna v. Brown Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5^th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000).

"[W]hether a defendant can remove a case based on the existence of a federal question" is governed by the "well-pleaded complaint rule." Terrebonne Homecare, Inc. v. SMA Health Plan, Inc., 271 F.3d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 2001). Under this rule, the plaintiff is "the master of her complaint," and the determination of whether "'a cause of action presents a federal question depends upon the allegations of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint.'" Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5^th Cir. 1995)). "If, on its face, the plaintiffs complaint raises no issue of federal law, federal question jurisdiction is lacking." Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2000). "When a plaintiff has a choice between federal and state law claims, she may proceed in state court 'on the exclusive basis of state law, thus defeating the defendants opportunity to remove.'" Medina, 238 F.3d at 680 (quoting Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 366).

Here, plaintiff argues that he is not asserting a federal cause of action, and, indeed, his petition invokes only state law. Paragraph number one of the petition states expressly: "[T]his cause of action is based on La.R.S. 23:332 and 23:303," the Louisiana anti-discrimination statute. Pet. at ¶ 1. The state-law basis for the claim is reiterated at paragraph seventeen ("GLM has discriminated against Leon Addison, in contravention of La.R.S. 23:332 . . .") and in the prayer, which seeks "attorney fees pursuant to La.R.S. 23:303." The petition makes no reference to any federal law, statute, or regulation.

GLM's argument for removal jurisdiction rests on a single sentence contained in paragraph fifteen of the petition:

15.

Your petitioner filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that GML had terminated his employment as a result of racial discrimination. GML alleged in said investigation that your petitioner was terminated because his co-workers did not wish to work with him. The EEOC determined that the cause of said termination was racially motivated. Unable to arrange a settlement between your petitioner and GLM, the EEOC issued a "Right to Sue" letter. Your petitioner files this petition pursuant to this "Right to Sue" authorization by the EEOC.

Pet. at ¶ 15. GLM argues that the italicized sentence should be read as asserting a federal claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1991.¹ If construed heavily in favor of removal ( i.e., ignoring that plaintiff very plainly and repeatedly spelled out the state statutes he relied upon, but did not refer to a single federal statute or regulation, or even to federal law generally), the sentence perhaps could be read as seeking a federal remedy. However, when the petition is construed against removal, as it must be,² it does not present a federal question or federal claim on its face.³ Consequently, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter, and it must be remanded.

1 GLM rightly does not argue that plaintiffs claim was rendered irrevocably federal merely merely by virtue of his pursuing and exhausting administrative remedies with the EEOC. See, e.g., Pendergraph v. Crown Honda-Volvo, LLC, 104 F. Supp.2d 586, 588-89 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (By filing charges with EEOC and obtaining right-to-sue letter, plaintiff did not forfeit his right to pursue exclusively state and local remedies "despite the availability of federal ones.").

2 See Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723 (ambiguities in the state court petition "are construed against removal"); Willy, 855 F.2d at 1164 (removal jurisdiction is "strictly construe[d]"); Acuna, 200 F.3d at 339 ("doubts regarding whether removal jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against federal jurisdiction").

3 Citing Peters v. Union Pac. R. Co., 80 F.3d 257 (8^th Cir. 1996), GLM argues that a plaintiffs characterization of his claim as one based in state law is not dispositive. However, this "artful pleading" exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule applies only in those extraordinary cases where "the only remedy available to plaintiff is federal, because of preemption or otherwise." Carpenter, 44 F.3d 362, 366 (quoting 14A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 3722 (2d ed 1985)). It applied in Peters because the Federal Railroad Safety Act expressly preempted state law on the matter in issue. It does not apply where, as here, the plaintiff has a "viable state law claim." Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 367.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion to Remand is GRANTED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Fortieth Judicial District Court, for the Parish of St. John the Baptist, State of Louisiana. Plaintiffs request for fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 is denied.