Opinion
08 Civ. 5996 (VM).
March 31, 2010
DECISION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Twana Adams, Josephine Cruz, Michael Ebewo, Joanne Hart, Julianne Polito, Thomasina Robinson and Brandi Dawn Scheiner (collectively, "Plaintiffs") brought this action against various New York State ("State Defendants") and New York City ("City Defendants") education agencies and officials (collectively, "Defendants") alleging in their Second Amended Complaint: (1) violations of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech by Defendants' retaliating against them for speaking out against City school system programs and policies designed to terminate employment of teachers performing below acceptable standards; (2) deprivations of due process of law by instituting disciplinary hearings against Plaintiffs that allegedly were not fair and impartial, and by employing, to conduct these proceedings, hearing officers not properly trained or supervised; (3) unlawful discrimination under federal law by creating a hostile work environment through confining Plaintiffs in Temporary Reassignment Centers ("TRCs") during the pendency of their disciplinary proceedings; and (4) breach of the collective bargaining agreement between the New York City Department of Education ("DOE") and the United Federation of Teachers ("UFT"). City Defendants move for dismissal of the second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and State Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).
By Order dated February 23, 2010, Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck, to whom this matter had been referred for supervision of pretrial proceedings, issued a thorough and well-reasoned Report and Recommendation (the "Report"), a copy of which is attached and incorporated herein, recommending that Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and for judgment on the pleadings be granted. The Report also recommends that Plaintiffs not be granted leave to file a third amended complaint.
Plaintiffs did not file timely objections to the Report. The initial deadline to do so was set to expire on March 12, 2010. By letter dated March 1, 2010, Plaintiffs requested an enlargement of time and the Court, by memo-endorsed Order dated March 2, 2010, granted an extension until March 31, 2010. By letter dated March 30, 2010, Plaintiffs requested a further extension until April 7, 2010. Finding an insufficient showing of cause for Plaintiffs' not meeting the prior deadlines, the Court denied this request.
For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts the recommendations of the Report in their entirety.
In a related matter, by memo-endorsed Order dated November 16, 2009, Magistrate Judge Peck recommended denial of Plaintiffs' request for an extension of time to file a third amended complaint. In view of the Court's ruling dismissing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court denies Plaintiffs' application for further amendment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court evaluating a magistrate judge's report may adopt those portions of the report to which no "specific, written objection" is made, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings and conclusions set forth in those sections are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985);Greene v. WCI Holding Corp., 956 F. Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). "Where a party makes a `specific written objection . . . after being served with a copy of the [magistrate judge's] recommended disposition,' however, the district court is required to make a de novo determination regarding those parts of the report." Cespedes v. Coughlin, 956 F. Supp. 454, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The Court is not required to review any portion of a magistrate judge's report that is not the subject of an objection. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149. A district judge may accept, set aside, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge as to such matters. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
Having conducted a full review of the factual record in this litigation, including the pleadings, and the parties' respective papers submitted in connection with the underlying motions and in this proceeding, as well as the Report and applicable legal authorities, the Court concludes that the findings, reasoning, and legal support for the recommendations made in the Report are warranted. The Report carefully details factual allegations specific to each Plaintiff, including the charges and disciplinary actions and claimed injuries relating to them, as well as the deficiencies in the pleadings that warrant dismissal under the plausibility standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomblv, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007). The Court finds that this recitation accurately reflects the factual record of this litigation and that the pleadings and Plaintiffs' legal theories are deficient under applicable law.
Applying the Twombly/Iqbal standard, the Court finds that no plausible grounds exist to support Plaintiffs' claims against the State Defendants. An action against the State Department of Education, whether the relief sought is characterized as monetary or equitable, is barred by the doctrine sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.See Jacobs v. Mostow, 271 F. App'x 85, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Dube v. State Univ. of New York, 900 F.2d 587, 594-95 (2d Cir. 1990)), and cases cited in the Report at 41-42. Insofar as Plaintiffs' underlying claims are based on actions taken by State officers acting in their official capacity and seek recovery of money damages rather than injunctive relief, the lawsuit is considered an action against the State and is also precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. See Dunn v. Carrier, 137 F. App'x 387, 389 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985)), and cases cited in the Report at 42. The general reference in the complaint to "just and equitable relief," unaccompanied by a specific request for injunction or any other particular equitable remedy, is not sufficient to cure this defect.
The Court has further reviewed the substance of Plaintiffs' allegations against the State Defendants and finds them meritless on other grounds. As pointed out in the Report, there are no sufficient allegations that the State Defendants were Plaintiffs' employers, or confined them to the TRCs or were parties to Plaintiffs' collective bargaining agreement, or retaliated against Plaintiffs' for complaining about City Defendants' programs and policies. Thus, Plaintiffs' claims against the State Defendants on the theories of hostile work environment, retaliation and breach of contract are insufficient. Plaintiffs' due process claims against the State Defendants are similarly meritless for the additional reasons stated in the Report, which, as stated below, the Court adopts as the Court's ruling on this issue.
As regards Plaintiffs' claims against the City Defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to make a sufficient demonstration of plausible grounds supporting their allegations. Their First Amendment retaliation claims are deficient because in each case the incidents upon which Plaintiffs base their pleadings concerned personal grievances expressed as employees generally relating to their official duties, work schedules, working conditions, or employer administrative policies and internal operations, rather than to any matters of public concern raised by Plaintiffs as private citizens. See Weintraub v. Board of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs' claims under § 3020 of the New York State Education Law ("§ 3020") alleging denial of due process rights similarly fail because pursuant to State Education Law § 3020(4) the procedure set forth in § 3020-a may be modified by collective bargaining agreement, as was the case here pursuant to the contract between DOE and the UFT.
Plaintiffs' hostile work environment claims must be dismissed because, except for the case of plaintiff Josephine Cruz ("Cruz"), the various actions are either time-barred or not reasonably related to the charges Plaintiffs filed with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the New York State Division of Human Rights. With regard to Cruz, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint fail to sufficiently allege that any of the discriminatory actions underlying her claims — being subjected to the physical conditions prevailing in the TRCs — were taken by Defendants because of the disability Cruz asserts pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, or under any other protected status.
Accordingly, in all other respects, and for substantially the reasons set forth in the Report the Court adopts the Report's factual and legal analyses and determinations, as well as its substantive recommendations, in their entirety as the Court's ruling on Defendant's underlying motions.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck dated February 23, 2010 (Docket No. 95) is adopted in its entirety, and the motions (Docket Nos. 149 and 155) of defendants to dismiss the complaint and for judgment on the pleadings are GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Memo-endorsed Order of Magistrate Judge Peck dated November 16, 2009 (Docket No. 175) recommending denial of Plaintiffs' request for an extension of time to file a third amended complaint is adopted in its entirety and the objections of plaintiffs (Docket No. 179) are DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to withdraw any pending motions and to close this case.