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noting "fees awarded usually range from $125 to $150 an hour" and finding "[b]ased on the court's own knowledge of rates in the Topeka market, [counsel]'s fees will be permitted at the rate of $150 per hour, which is at the high end of rates in this community"
Summary of this case from Godinet v. Management and Training Corp.Opinion
Case No. 99-4159-SAC
April 24, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on defendant's motion for entry of judgment (Dk. 119). This court previously entered judgment in favor of the defendant on its summary judgment motion, (Dk. 116), but did not address therein the imposition of sanctions against plaintiff's counsel, which the magistrate judge had previously awarded in an undetermined amount. Defendant has now supplemented the record as to the total amount of sanctions contemplated by the magistrate in his earlier order, and seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $5,096.27 against plaintiff's counsel. No response to the motion has been filed.
The court notes that plaintiff's counsel withdrew on November 28, 2000, approximately one month prior to the court's decision on defendant's summary judgment motion. The court additionally notes that plaintiff's motion for review of the magistrate's orders regarding sanctions (Dk. 101) was heard and denied prior to the date on which plaintiff's counsel withdrew. Dk. 114.
Defendant does not address this court's jurisdiction to enter an order imposing a post-judgment award of sanctions, but the court nonetheless finds that such jurisdiction exists. See Cooter Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 394-98 (1990). Given the fact that the motion is unopposed, the defendant's motion will be granted in part.
Defendant seeks $2,455.87 for costs related to plaintiff's deposition. It is uncontested that the magistrate ordered the plaintiff's counsel to reimburse the defendant's counsel for 100% of the costs associated with the court reporter's attendance at plaintiff's deposition and the cost of the original transcript of the same. (Dk. 98, p. 4). It is further undisputed that such costs total $2,455.87. Accordingly, this portion of defendant's motion will be granted.
However, defendant seeks an additional $2,640.40 as the amount of attorneys' fees and costs associated with briefing and filing defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's expert and his report. Although the magistrate did order plaintiff's attorney to reimburse defense counsel for the fees and costs associated with this motion, (Dk. 96), no amount of attorneys' fees was ever submitted to the magistrate and no determination of its reasonableness has yet been made, or could have been made on the record before defendant filed the instant motion. This court therefore undertakes this task, finding the analysis used in civil rights case applicable to this portion of the sanctions.
In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the district court first calculates the "lodestar" figure, that is, the product of multiplying reasonable hours by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434(1983). This "lodestar amount" is "the centerpiece of attorney's fee awards." Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989). The lodestar figure "is the presumptively reasonable fee." Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1493 (10th Cir. 1994). The lodestar amount is then adjusted upwardly or downwardly to reflect other factors, such as those listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), when necessary.
"The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area." Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
Defendant's affidavit and brief show that it considers the relevant market to be the Kansas City, Missouri area. Defendant assumes that the rates of attorneys in the Topeka legal community are substantially similar to those in the Kansas City area, but shows no support for such an assumption. A court is to look "to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community" in calculating a reasonable fee. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). The relevant community is the area in which the litigation occurs. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983). The relevant community here is Topeka, not Kansas City, Missouri.
Defendant's counsel seek an hourly rate of $195.00 for Ms. Horn's work, but have not attached affidavits from others familiar with the hourly billing rates of attorneys with comparable skill and experience in civil rights litigation who practice in the Topeka area, or otherwise established that such attorneys bill $195.00 per hour. The burden is with the applicant "to produce satisfactory evidence — in addition to the attorney's own affidavits — that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11.
Where, as here, a district court does not have before it adequate evidence of prevailing market rates, the court may, in its discretion, use other relevant factors including its own knowledge to establish the rate. Case v.Unified School Dist. No. 233, Johnson County, Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 1257 (10th Cir. 1998); See Lucero, 815 F.2d at 1385. The court can take judicial notice of the prevailing rate of fees in this community, see e.g., Ware v. Sullivan, 1991 WL 42293 (D.Kan. Mar. 6, 1991); Franz v. Lytle, 854 F. Supp. 753 (D.Kan. 1994), and will do so here.
The court is unaware of any case in this state in which attorney's fees have been granted at the rate of $195.00 in a comparable case. Fees awarded usually range from $125 to $150 per hour. See e.g., Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 866 F. Supp. 500 (D.Kan. 1994); Franz, 854 F. Supp. 753($125.00 an hour awarded in a § 1983 case arising from Wichita — court took judicial notice that the hourly rates in Topeka were much less); Woods v. Shawnee Gardens, 1993 WL 545220 (D.Kan. 12/1/93) (a Title VII action in Kansas City in which the court stated $150.00 was too high for a Title VII case); Dutton v. Johnson County Bd. of County Com'rs, 1995 WL 337588 (D.Kan. May 26, 1995) (No. 93-2184-JWL) ($150.00 an hour awarded in a case brought in Kansas City). Based upon the court's own knowledge of rates in the Topeka market, Ms. Horn's fees will be permitted at the rate of $150 per hour, which is at the high end of rates in this community. Mr. Yancey's requested rate of $125 per hour is reasonable.
The court must additionally decide the number of hours that were reasonably expended on the motion. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The burden is on the prevailing party to show that the claimed hours are reasonable. Blum, 465 U.S. at 897.
[This inquiry is] controlled by the overriding consideration of whether the attorney's hours were "necessary" under the circumstances. "The prevailing party must make a `good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1510 ( quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933). A district court should approach this reasonableness inquiry "much as a senior partner in a private law firm would review the reports of subordinate attorneys when billing clients. . . ." Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983). However, "[t]he record ought to assure us that the district court did not `eyeball' the fee request and cut it down by an arbitrary percentage. . . . " People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted).
Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998).
The court has reviewed all of the hours for which the defendant's counsel seeks reimbursement, and finds them to be sufficiently specific, and adequately supported by contemporaneous time records. The court does not find any of the requested hours to be excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Accordingly, the court finds that defendant's counsel is entitled to fees for all hours for which reimbursement is sought.
The "lodestar" figure for Ms. Horn's attorney's fees is thus $600 (150.00 per hour x 4 hours), instead of the requested $780. The other fees and expenses are approved as requested. Neither party has suggested that other factors, such as those listed in Johnson, should alter this amount, and the court finds that the lodestar amount needs no adjustment. Accordingly, defendant's motion for attorney's fees will be granted in the amount of $2,460.40, an amount less than originally sought by defendant's counsel.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT defendant's motion for entry of judgment (Dk. 119) is granted in the amount of $4,916.27.