MEMORANDUM

GREGORY SLEET, District Judge

The plaintiff Edward Adams ("Adams"), an inmate housed at the Plummer Community Corrections Center, Wilmington, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 2.) He appears pro se and has been granted permission to proceed without prepayment of fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (D.I. 4.) The court now proceeds to review and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.

I. BACKGROUND

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Adams v. Biden in forma pauperis,28 U.S.C. § 191528 U.S.C. § 1915A28 U.S.C. § 19151915ANeitzke v. Williams490 U.S. 319325Pittman v. Moore980 F.2d 994995see also Banks v. Gillie, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5413McGill v. Juanita Kraft Postal Service,2003 WL 21355439

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions. Courteau v. United States, 287 Fed. Appx. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, however, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 1965 (citations omitted). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted).

Adams is required to make a "showing" rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). "[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only 'fair notice,' but also the 'grounds' on which the claim rests." Id. (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3). Therefore, "'stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element." Id. at 235 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Id. at 234. Because Adams proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Repetitious Litigation

"Repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or malicious." McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks and alteration omitted); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993) (a complaint is malicious when it "duplicates allegations of another []federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff). The instant suit is clearly repetitious of Adams' prior suit, Civ. No. 08-295-GMS. The instant suit and the prior suit are virtually identical causes of action and complain of the same actions or inactions of the defendants. The main difference is that in the current complaint, Adams lists two, rather than four defendants, and omits mention of the Attorneys General of the State of Delaware. Because the present suit is repetitious of Civ. No. 08-295-GMS, the court will dismiss the complaint as malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).

B. Res Judicata

In the alternative, the court finds that the case is barred by res judicata or claim preclusion. Under the doctrine of res judicata (referred to now as claim preclusion), a judgment in a prior suit involving the same parties, or parties in privity with them, bars a subsequent suit on the same cause of action. Fairbank's Capital Corp. v. Milligan, 234 Fed. Appx. 21 (3d Cir. 2007). "Res judicata acts as a bar to relitigation of an adjudicated claim between parties and those in privity with them." Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999)). "The rationale is that if the adjudication of an action is binding on parties in privity with the parties formally named in the litigation, then any claims against parties in privity should be brought in the same action lest the door be kept open for subsequent relitigation of the same claims." Id. at 392.

Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, refers to the preclusive effect of a judgment on the merits of an issue that was previously litigated or that could have been litigated. Fairbank's Capital Corp. v. Milligan, 234 Fed. Appx. 21 (3d Cir. 2007). Issue preclusion occurs "[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.'" Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc., 458 F.3d at 249 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982)). There are four requirements for the application of collateral estoppel: (1) the identical issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the previous determination was necessary to the decision; and (4) the party being precluded from relitigating the issue was fully represented in the prior action." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Adams newest complaint is clearly based upon the same transactions and occurrences at the center of his previous complaint: the failure of the State of Delaware to pursue prosecution against an individual who allegedly stabbed him. His recent legal claims do not differ in any significant way from his prior claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons the court finds that the allegations in the complaint are malicious or, in the alternative, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The complaint will be dismissed. An appropriate order will be entered.

ORDER

At Wilmington this 13^th day of Feb, 2009 for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum issued this date,

IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed as malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1) or, in the alternative, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.