Opinion
Record No. 2478-93-3
Decided: January 24, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY, B. A. Davis, III, Judge
Timothy W. Allen for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Coleman and Senior Judge Hodges
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Appellant, Gary Thomas Adams, was convicted of failure to immediately stop at the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving personal injury and of failure to report the accident to law enforcement authorities in violation of Code Sec. 46.2-894. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the conviction.
At trial the following facts were adduced from the evidence. William Witcher was driving a tractor trailer eastbound on a road in Franklin County at 11:00 p.m. when he met an oncoming pickup truck that was approaching him head-on in his lane of traffic. Despite Witcher's attempts to avoid the oncoming vehicle, the two vehicles collided. Witcher's vehicle jackknifed, went off of the road, over an embankment, and came to rest so that the truck was not visible from the road. Witcher suffered a cut on his head and a leg injury from the incident.
Witcher was getting out of the truck when he heard someone on the road say "[a] tractor trailer hit us and they didn't stop; it just kept going." Witcher yelled up the embankment, "You are just a damn liar. You hit me, and here I am." Passersby, who were on the road, heard Witcher's cries from below and helped him climb the embankment to the road. Witcher never saw the occupants of the pickup truck.
Samuel Walker, one of the three occupants of the pickup truck, testified that appellant was driving the pickup truck, that after the collision, they "looked down the road" and did not see the tractor trailer, that they thought the vehicle sideswiped the pickup truck and continued down the road, and that none of the occupants heard Witcher yell from down the embankment.
The three occupants of the pickup truck walked away from the scene of the accident, leaving the pickup truck. They never looked around for anyone else or searched for a vehicle. They went to a nearby residence and were there about an hour before the police arrived. Walker told the state trooper that the men left the scene of the accident because appellant did not have a driver's license.
The trooper testified that, although he could not see the tractor trailer from the road, tire pressure marks were found which "led from near where the pickup was across the road off onto the grassy shoulder and then the land was plowed up like this all the way down to the tractor and trailer." The trooper did not find any notes left by the pickup truck occupants. None of the pickup truck occupants reported the accident.
"On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987).
Code Sec. 46.2-894 provides, in pertinent part:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident in which a person is . . . injured or in which an attended vehicle . . . is damaged shall immediately stop as close to the scene of the accident as possible without obstructing traffic and report his name, address, driver's license number, and vehicle registration number forthwith to the State Police or local law-enforcement agency, to the person struck and injured if such person appears to be capable of understanding and retaining the information, or to the driver . . . of the vehicle collided with . . . . The driver shall also render reasonable assistance to any person injured in such accident . . . .
In Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 220, 38 S.E.2d 328, 329 (1946), the Court stated that [t]he duty imposed upon the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident is not passive. It requires positive, affirmative action; — that is, to stop and give the aid and information specified. . . .
Knowledge necessarily is an essential element of the crime. . . . If an injury is inflicted under such circumstances as would ordinarily superinduce the belief in a reasonable person that injury would flow, or had flowed, from the accident or collision, then it is the duty of the operator to stop his vehicle.
Appellant cites Herchenbach as authority for his argument that he could not give aid or information to Witcher because, when he could not see Witcher's vehicle over the embankment, appellant believed that Witcher had left the scene of the accident. However, Herchenbach is distinguishable from appellant's case in that the driver in Herchenbach did not know he had run over the victim. In the instant case, appellant "possessed actual knowledge of the occurrence of the accident." Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 811, 407 S.E.2d 674, 679 (1991). Therefore, "positive, affirmative action" was required.
In Kil, we held that the Commonwealth must prove that appellant "possessed actual knowledge of the occurrence of the accident, and such knowledge of injury which would be attributed to a reasonable person under the circumstances of the case." Id. It is undisputed that appellant had actual knowledge that he had collided with a "big truck." Witcher and Walker testified concerning the severity of the accident. Furthermore, one could reasonably infer from the evidence that appellant and his passengers could hear Witcher down the embankment since, not only could Witcher hear voices from the road down the embankment, but passersby who helped Witcher up to the road heard him yelling from down the embankment.
Lastly, the trooper observed tire marks running from the pickup truck to the area at which the tractor trailer went over the embankment. Had appellant, Walker, and the other occupant taken reasonable steps to examine the area, they would have seen the tire marks and would have seen that the tractor trailer ran off of the road.
The second paragraph of § 46.2-894 requires where, because of injuries sustained in the accident, the driver is prevented from complying with the first paragraph of the statute, "the driver shall, as soon as reasonably possible, make the required report to the State Police or local law-enforcement agency and make a reasonable effort to locate the person struck, or the driver or some other occupant of the vehicle collided with . . . and report to such person . . . [the required information]. (Emphasis added.)
The identification requirement [of the statute] is intended to facilitate accident investigation and to preserve public order. The assistance requirement advances public safety. . . . The statute proclaims "the clear legislative intent . . . that every [driver] involved in a motor vehicle accident stop at the scene of the accident to exchange information and render reasonable assistance to any person injured . . . ."
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 769, 771, 418 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1992) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 109, 115, 379 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1989)).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence established that appellant failed to investigate. Although the record does not indicate how long the three men remained at the scene of the accident, the trial court could reasonably have inferred from Walker's testimony that the trio left the scene quickly and without investigating whether anyone was injured in the accident.
Moreover, there was no evidence that appellant reported, or intended to report, the accident to the law enforcement authorities despite the fact that two of the three men received minor injuries. Further, appellant left no note on his vehicle revealing his name, address, and other pertinent information. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant violated Code Sec. 46.2-894. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Appellant asserts that he had twenty-four hours from the time of the accident to report the incident to a law enforcement agency. Appellant cites to §§ 46.2-895, -896, and -897 as authority for this argument, but the sections do not apply to the instant case. These statutes apply to either accidents involving persons accompanying a driver, or damage to unattended property.
Affirmed.