Opinion
C/A 8:20-4296-MGL-PJG
04-14-2021
Alton Adams, Plaintiff, v. County of Lexington; Jay Koon, Sheriff of Lexington County; Doe No. 1, Publisher employee for Lexington Sheriff's Department; J.K. Burbage, Deputy, DOE, No. 2 employee for Lexington Sheriff Dept. Who Raffield talked to; County of Saluda; CPT Kelly, of Saluda County Jail; John C Perry, Sheriff of Saluda County; Supervisor Horn, Sheriff's Dept.; Supervisor Doe, for Cpl. Michael Raffield who appeared and presented evidence at preliminary hearing; Doe Victim's Advocate, for Saluda County Sheriff's Dept.; CPL Michael Raffield, Sheriff's Dept.; Janice Ergle, Major and Administrator for Saluda County Jail; CPL Clark, Sheriff's Deputy; Sgt Vahun, Saluda County Jail; Ray Deloach, Jailer for Saluda County Jail, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Alton Adams, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. By order dated February 3, 2021, the court identified deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that would subject the pleading to summary dismissal and provided Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct those deficiencies. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 1, 2021. (ECF No. 14.) Having reviewed the Amended Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that some of the deficiencies identified in the court's previous order have not been cured, and therefore, some defendants should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process.
In a contemporaneous order, the court authorized the issuance and service of process against Defendants Michael Raffield, CPL Clark, Doe No. 1, Jay Koon, and John C. Perry.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff claims that an employee of the Lexington County Sheriff's Department falsely reported to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (“SLED”) that Plaintiff had an armed robbery conviction, which in December 2018 caused the Saluda County Sheriff's Department to indict Plaintiff for possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a violent offense after Plaintiff was arrested in a domestic violence incident. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 14 at 6-7, 20.) In fact, Plaintiff was previously charged with armed robbery, but the charge was dismissed. (Id. at 7.) For instance, a SLED or NCIC report on Plaintiff's name would have revealed that though it listed an armed robbery conviction for Plaintiff, it did not include a conviction date. (Id. at 8.) Despite this, the Saluda County Sheriff's Department continued to prosecute Plaintiff for possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a violent offense. (Id. at 9.) As a result, Defendants Michael Raffield of the Lexington County Sheriff's Department and Corporal Clark of the Saluda County Sheriff's Department prosecuted Plaintiff's firearm charge without confirming that Plaintiff actually had an armed robbery conviction. Plaintiff also alleges that a victim's witness advocate (identified as “Doe Victim's Advocate”) testified in court that Plaintiff had an armed robbery conviction. While Plaintiff was ultimately convicted of assault and battery arising from the December 2018 incident, Plaintiff's indictment of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a violent offense was dismissed by the trial court in a preliminary hearing. (Id. at 11.)
Plaintiff claims that while he was detained prior to trial at the Saluda County Detention Center, he sent requests to detention center staff to contact the trial judge, requesting that he be cleared of the false accusation that he had an armed robbery conviction, but detention center officers Roy Deloach and Captain Kelly responded to the request by telling Plaintiff to contact his defense attorney. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff also sent a Freedom of Information Act request to Major Janice Ergle to obtain proof that he did not have an armed robbery conviction, but Ergle refused to provide Plaintiff with that information. (Id. at 13-14.) Plaintiff alleges he asked Sergeant Vahun to look at his SLED report, and Vahun told Plaintiff that the report showed an armed robbery charge but no conviction. (Id. at 16.) Thus, Plaintiff claims the Saluda County Detention Center officers interfered with his access to the courts. (Id. at 15.)
Plaintiff was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for his assault and battery conviction. Upon entering the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Plaintiff was given a higher security classification because of the purported armed robbery conviction. (Id. at 17.) In May 2019, Plaintiff was twice assaulted by his roommate. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff claims that as a result of the false publication that he was convicted of armed robbery, Plaintiff was subjected to harsher prison conditions, including inadequate medical care, fewer amenities, and violence. (Id. at 19.)
Plaintiff brings this action for damages and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. Plaintiff lists causes of action for unreasonable search and seizure and unreasonable prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, excessive bail in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and lack of access to the courts and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff also lists tort causes of action for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, fraud on the court, and malicious prosecution. (Id. at 5.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
In the court's February 3 order identifying the deficiencies in Plaintiff original Complaint that subjected the pleading to summary dismissal, the court first noted that the Complaint violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8 because it did not identify which causes of action corresponded to which defendants. Therefore, the Complaint failed to provide the defendants with notice as to which causes of action they would have to defend. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint suffers from the same deficiency. Plaintiff lists at least twelve causes of action and sixteen defendants, but Plaintiff does not explain which causes of action correspond to which defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is generally subject to summary dismissal for failing to provide notice to the defendants as to which causes of action Plaintiff asserts against them. See North Carolina v. McGuirt, 114 Fed.Appx. 555, 558 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8 where “the complaint . . . does not permit the defendants to figure out what legally sufficient claim the plaintiffs are making and against whom they are making it”); see also Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2018).
However, in light of the court's duty to liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants, the court construes it to purport to assert: (1) claims of malicious prosecution pursuant to § 1983 and malicious prosecution and defamation under state law against Defendants Raffield and Clark; (2) a state law claim of defamation against Defendant Doe No. 1; and (3) defamation and malicious prosecution pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act against Defendants Koon and Perry. As noted above, the court authorized the issuance and service of process as to these defendants in a contemporaneous order. The court concludes that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be summarily dismissed as to the remaining defendants for Plaintiff's failure to comply with federal pleading requirements under Rule 8, and for the additional reasons set forth below.
As to Defendants Deloach, Kelly, Vahun, and Ergle, Plaintiff claims that these defendants declined to help Petitioner gather evidence that he did not have an armed robbery conviction. Even liberally construing the pleading, the court is unable to identify a legal cause of action that could plausibly arise from Plaintiff's allegation. As to Defendants Burbage, Doe (No. 2), Supervisor Doe, Horn, and Perry, Plaintiff provides no allegations against them in the Amended Complaint. Similarly, as to the Defendants Lexington County and Saluda County, Plaintiff provides no facts that would plausibly show how they were involved in the incidents that give rise to Plaintiff's claims. Therefore, as to Defendants Deloach, Kelly, Vahun, Ergle, Burbage, Doe (No. 2), Supervisor Doe, Horn, Lexington County, and Saluda County, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against them. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
As to Defendant Doe Victim's Advocate, Plaintiff claims that she testified in court that Plaintiff had an armed robbery conviction. Assuming such an allegation plausibly gives rise to a legal cause of action, witnesses have absolute immunity from lawsuits seeking damages for statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding. See generally Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367 (2012); Day v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 907 F.3d 766, 771 (4th Cir. 2018). Therefore, Defendant Doe Victim's Advocate is immune from any claim Plaintiff seeks to raise against her arising out of his or her testimony in Plaintiff's criminal case.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that Defendants Deloach, Kelly, Vahun, Ergle, Burbage, Doe (No. 2), Supervisor Doe, Horn, Lexington County, Saluda County, and Doe Victim's Advocate be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
To the extent Plaintiff's claims against Doe Victim's Advocate arises out of his or her testimony in Plaintiff's case, Doe Victim's Advocate's should be dismissed with prejudice because he or she is immune from suit. See Smith v. Swanson, C/A No. 9:18-251-RMG, 2018 WL 1225110, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2018) (stating that dismissal based on absolute immunity, including witness immunity, is with prejudice) (citing Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 1999)); see, e.g., Brown v. Daniel, 230 F.3d 1351 at *4-5 (4th Cir. 2000) (Table).
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).