By directing that a sentence be added thereto, the court was merely using a convenient way of setting forth with perfect clarity that which it had found was already included in the judgment by implication. A court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to construe its judgments, Adams v. Adams, 85 Nev. 50, 450 P.2d 146 (1969); and indeed construction is often necessary, as here, incident to enforcement of an equity decree. The court's action in construing its judgment was essential for guidance of all the parties in complying with the judgment and for later enforcement if the defendants, once informed of the meaning of the October 19 judgment, should fail to comply.
A district court of the state has inherent power to construe its judgments and decrees for the purpose of removing any ambiguity. Grenz v. Grenz, 78 Nev. 394, 374 P.2d 891 (1962); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 52 Nev. 26, 280 P. 95 (1929). This power does not, however, extend to judgments and decrees which, as here, are not ambiguous. Adams v. Adams, 85 Nev. 50, 450 P.2d 146 (1969). Having determined that NRS 125.150(4) is inapplicable to lump sum alimony awards, it becomes apparent that the judgment and decree in this case was not ambiguous and therefore, the district court need not have given further definition to its ruling.
Appellant's principal contention is that, because the late Horace R. Skinner made no demand upon her to execute, pursuant to the provisions of the Property Settlement Agreement, an assignment of her interest in the joint account, upon his death on June 27, 1966, all property rights in the shares of stock and other securities credited to the account passed to her by right of survivorship. What has apparently escaped the attention of appellant is that, upon entry on May 9, 1960, of the Nevada divorce decree, such property rights in joint tenancy as then obtained were dissolved. Adams v. Adams, 85 Nev. 50, 450 P.2d 146 (1969). See and compare: Benson v. United States, 442 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir., 1971) and Sebold v. Sebold, U.S.App.D.C. (No. 23,014, decided February 12, 1971).
The order of the lower court is affirmed in all respects except as to the suspension of child support, and as to that it is remanded to the district court so that adequate findings of fact may be made by the trial court on the question of what effect the suspension of child support payments would have on the present comfort and future well-being of the minor child. Cf. Adams v. Adams, 85 Nev. 50, 464 P.2d 458 (1969); Pease v. Taylor, 86 Nev. 195, 467 P.2d 109 (1970). COLLINS, C.J., ZENOFF, MOWBRAY, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.