Opinion
J-A13004-15 No. 1537 WDA 2014
08-04-2015
ANNETTE ADAM Appellant v. TERRY W. LENT Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered August 27, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 2184 of 2013, G.D.
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.
Appellant, Annette Adam, appeals from the order entered August 27, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County. We reverse.
This matter reaches this Court from a business relationship gone awry. In 2006, Adam and Lent created a business known as Tri-County Mechanical. There was no written agreement between the two regarding the enterprise. In 2013, their relationship disintegrated, leading Adam to file a complaint for the dissolution of the enterprise.
The parties eventually reached a settlement. On July 11, 2014, the trial court entered a consent order. The consent order memorialized the settlement agreement reached by the parties. Specifically, Lent would take over the company, including all the business debt, in exchange for Adam returning company equipment and records relating to the business.
The parties later filed cross-motions for contempt of the consent order. Amidst the hearing to address the contempt motions, the trial court found that a dispute over the return of company equipment and records showed the parties were unwilling to adhere to the consent order. The trial court concluded that the parties had not originally reached a meeting of minds and entered, sua sponte, an order rescinding the consent order. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Adam maintains that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rescind the consent order. We agree.
The resolution of this appeal presents a pure question of law. "[O]our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Domtar Paper Co., 113 A.3d 1230, 1234 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted).
Pennsylvania law provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry ... if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505.
The trial court filed the consent order on July 11, 2014. Within 30 days of the filing of the order, Section 5505 provided the trial court with "broad discretion" to modify or rescind the order. Verholek v. Verholek , 741 A.2d 792, 799 (Pa. Super. 1999). Here, the thirtieth day was August 11, 2014. The trial court rescinded the consent order on August 27, 2014—47 days after its entry, which is well outside of the 30-day period provided in Section 5505.
August 10, the actual thirtieth day, was a Sunday. See Pa.R.C.P. 106(b).
After the expiration of 30 days, the trial court loses its broad discretion to modify or rescind an order. See id. There are only a few narrow exceptions to Section 5505. After the 30-day period has run, a court may exercise its discretion to vacate or "modify an order only upon a showing of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record or some other evidence of 'extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.'" ISN Bank v. Rajaratnam , 83 A.3d 170, 172 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Verholek , 741 A.2d at 799). "After the initial thirty-day period, a trial court may modify an order only to correct a clerical error or other formal error which is clear on the face of the record and which does not require an exercise of discretion." Id., at 172-173 (citation omitted).
Here, neither party in the court below made any argument concerning fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the existence of a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record. The trial court made no such explicit findings either. This makes sense, as these three exceptions obviously have no application here. Nor was the trial court acting to correct a clerical error or other formal error.
Rather, the trial court found that there was no mutual assent to form a contract, which led it to rescind the consent order. The only exception left is that of extraordinary cause, a term that, at first blush, sounds rather broad. It is not.
"'Extraordinary cause' is limited in nature." Manufactures and Traders Trust Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology , SC , 108 A.3d 913, 919 (Pa. Super. 2015). It only "refers to an oversight or action on the part of the court or the judicial process which operates to deny the losing party knowledge of the entry of final judgment so that the commencement of the running of the appeal time is not known to the losing party." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, absolutely nothing on the part of the trial court or the judicial process operated to deny any party of knowledge of the filing of the consent order. The docket entries plainly indicate that the lower court prothonotary provided notice to the parties the day the trial court filed the consent order. See id. ("[E]xtraordinary cause does not exist where a party has notice of the entry of a final order."). And neither party claims they did not have notice of the order. Thus, the extraordinary cause exception is plainly inapplicable.
As the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rescind the consent order, we reverse the order entered on August 27, 2014; it is a legal nullity. We remand with instructions to enforce the consent order.
Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/4/2015