Cal. Ass'n of Private Postsecondary Schs. v. DeVos, 344 F.Supp.3d 158, 167 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22). Indeed, “a showing that irreparable injury is ‘likely' is the sine qua non for obtaining a preliminary injunction-it is what justifies the extraordinary remedy of granting relief before the parties have had the opportunity fully to develop the evidence and fully to present their respective cases.” Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-cv-768 (RDM), 2016 WL 471274, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016). Therefore, “[a] movant's failure to show any irreparable harm is therefore grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.”
Hargrove v. AARP, 205 F.Supp.3d 96, 119 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Coleman-Adebayo v. Leavitt, 326 F.Supp.2d 132, 137 (D.D.C. 2004)). Although the D.C. Circuit has not yet weighed in on the question, see Haynes v. DC Water & Sewer Auth., 924 F.3d 519, 526-27 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2019), “‘[m]ost district court decisions in this circuit have concluded that this rule did not survive Morgan.'” Clark v. Johnson, 206 F.Supp.3d 645, 657 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-768, 2016 WL 471274, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016)). “[F]ollowing Morgan
; Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-768, 2016 WL 471274, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016) (“[W]here a party seeking a preliminary injunction fails to make the required showing of irreparable injury, the matter is settled, and the Court must deny the motion.”).
"[A] handful of decisions," however, "have continued to apply the 'reasonably related' rule." Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-cv-768, 2016 WL 471274, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016). The D.C. Circuit, for its part, has thrice declined to decide whether its pre-Morgan regime retains any vitality.
Cal. Ass'n of Priv. Postsecondary Schs. v. DeVos, 344 F.Supp.3d 158, 167 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-cv-768, 2016 WL 471274, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016)).
As this Court has previously observed, a showing that the movant will likely suffer an irreparable injury “is the sine qua non for obtaining a preliminary injunction-it is what justifies the extraordinary remedy of granting relief before the parties have had the opportunity fully to develop the evidence and fully to present their respective cases.” Calif. Ass'n of Priv. Postsecondary Schs. v. DeVos, 344 F.Supp.3d 158, 167 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-cv-768, 2016 WL 471274, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016)). “To demonstrate irreparable injury, a plaintiff must show that it will suffer harm that is ‘more than simply irretrievable; it must also be serious in terms of its effect on the plaintiff.'” Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. v. FDA, 587 F.Supp.2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dept. of Energy, 514 F.Supp. 1019, 1026 (D.D.C. 1981)).
As this Court has previously observed, a showing that the movant will likely suffer an irreparable injury “is the sine qua non for obtaining a preliminary injunction-it is what justifies the extraordinary remedy of granting relief before the parties have had the opportunity fully to develop the evidence and fully to present their respective cases.” Calif. Ass’n of Priv. Postsecondary Schs. v. DeVos, 344 F.Supp. 3d 158, 167 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-cv-768, 2016 WL 471274, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016)). “To demonstrate irreparable injury, a plaintiff must show that it will suffer harm that is ‘more than simply irretrievable; it must also be serious in terms of its effect on the plaintiff.’” Hi–Tech Pharmacal Co. v. FDA, 587 F.Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dept. of Energy, 514 F.Supp. 1019, 1026 (D.D.C. 1981)).
"[A] showing that irreparable injury is 'likely' is the sine qua non for obtaining a preliminary injunction—it is what justifies the extraordinary remedy of granting relief before the parties have had the opportunity fully to develop the evidence and fully to present their respective cases." Jubilant DraxImage Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, No. 19-cv-1494, 2020 WL 5816247, at *12 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2020) (quoting Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-cv-768, 2016 WL 471274, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016)). "A movant's failure to show any irreparable harm is therefore grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief."
It is well-settled, however, that demonstrating a likelihood of irreparable injury is a prerequisite for obtaining injunctive relief. "[A] showing that irreparable injury is 'likely' is the sine qua non for obtaining a preliminary injunction—it is what justifies the extraordinary remedy of granting relief before the parties have had the opportunity fully to develop the evidence and fully to present their respective cases." Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-cv-768, 2016 WL 471274, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016); see also Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("A movant's failure to show any irreparable harm is therefore grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief."); Tex. Children's Hosp. v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 224, 241-42 (D.D.C. 2014); Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 296 (D.D.C. 2005), aff'd, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006). III.
"[A] showing that irreparable injury is ‘likely’ is the sine qua non for obtaining a preliminary injunction—it is what justifies the extraordinary remedy of granting relief before the parties have had the opportunity fully to develop the evidence and fully to present their respective cases." Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors , No. 14-768 (RDM), 2016 WL 471274, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016) ; see alsoChaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("A movant's failure to show any irreparable harm is therefore grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief."); Tex. Children's Hosp. v. Burwell , 76 F. Supp. 3d 224, 241–42 (D.D.C. 2014) ; Trudeau v. FTC , 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 296–97 (D.D.C. 2005), aff'd , 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006). MediNatura alleges that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in three ways.