Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department

68 Citing cases

  1. Hertog v. City of Seattle

    138 Wn. 2d 265 (Wash. 1999)   Cited 317 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Recognizing a duty of city probation counselors and county pretrial release counselors

    Further, Taggart relied on cases which found no quasi-judicial immunity where probation officers failed to monitor compliance with conditions of probation or allowed the probationer to violate such conditions. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 211-12 (discussing A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (1988) and Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984)). Thus, under Taggart, monitoring compliance with probation conditions is not protected by quasi-judicial immunity.

  2. Taggart v. State

    118 Wn. 2d 195 (Wash. 1992)   Cited 218 times
    Discussing A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 and Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631

    Ray, at 374-75. In Acevedo v. Pima Cy. Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984), a child molester was granted probation subject to the condition that he was not to have any contact whatsoever with children. His probation officers subsequently allowed him to live on premises where children resided, and to obtain employment in a program bringing him into contact with children.

  3. Faile v. S.C. Dept. of Juvenile Justice

    350 S.C. 315 (S.C. 2002)   Cited 104 times
    Holding that S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-70(c) requires that "only the entity employing the employee whose act gives rise to the claim may be sued"

    Just as police officers are not granted absolute immunity when they apply for arrest warrants, probation officers generally are not immune in performing their enforcement duties. SeeGant, supra; Acevedov. Pima County Adult Prob. Dep't, 690 P.2d 38 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that supervision of probationers is an administrative task, unconnected with the performance of a judicial function). Dorsey's placement of Fredrico was administrative.

  4. Bishop v. Miche

    137 Wn. 2d 518 (Wash. 1999)   Cited 95 times
    Holding that the existence of a special protective relationship turns on not custodial control but the relationship between the actor and the third party

    ) In addition, Taggart cited several cases where no quasi-judicial immunity was found when probation officers failed to monitor compliance with conditions of probation or allowed the probationer to violate such conditions. A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (1988) (cited in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 211-12); Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984) (cited in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 212-13); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in Harris v. State, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992) (cited in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 220). Our approval of Sterling is of particular note here, because the court in Sterling held that a duty exists to protect others from harm posed by dangerous probationers, including investigation and reporting of probation violations for the purpose of seeking revocation.

  5. Lamb v. Hopkins

    303 Md. 236 (Md. 1985)   Cited 86 times
    Holding that probation officers do not "take charge" of probationers so as to give rise to a duty to exercise due care in controlling the probationers because of the lack of a custodial relationship and the relative freedom the probationers have in conducting their day-to-day affairs

    Since oral argument the parties have directed us to two cases. See Acevedo v. Prima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38 (1984) (discussing immunity of probation officers); Orzechowski v. State, ___ R.I. ___, 485 A.2d 545 (1984) (discussing distinction between public and special duty). Our review of these cases reveals that neither is helpful in the resolution of the issue before the Court.

  6. Sterling v. Bloom

    111 Idaho 211 (Idaho 1986)   Cited 76 times
    Adopting planning/operational test

    Other courts have found the same duty on the part of probation and parole officers. E.g., Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985); Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (Ariz. 1984); Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 99 Nev. 93, 658 P.2d 422 (1983); State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1971); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968). Likewise, we hold that the duty delineated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965) exists in Idaho.

  7. Proctor v. Dept. of Health

    368 S.C. 279 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 59 times
    Stating appellate courts will not disturb a trial court's decision to grant a new trial nisi additur unless the trial court's findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions reached are controlled by an error of law

    Just as police officers are not granted absolute immunity when they apply for arrest warrants, probation officers generally are not immune in performing their enforcement duties. SeeGant, supra; Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob.Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38 (1984) (holding that supervision of probationers is an administrative task, unconnected with the performance of a judicial function). Dorsey's placement of Fredrico was administrative.

  8. Lavit v. Superior Court

    173 Ariz. 96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that psychologist initially chosen by the parties without court involvement was entitled to judicial immunity

    Whether judicial immunity exists is a question of law for the court. See Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dept., 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38 (1984); Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 613, 688 P.2d 617, 621 (1984). Petitioners properly raised the doctrine in their motion for summary judgment, so it is squarely before us.

  9. A.L. v. Commonwealth

    402 Mass. 234 (Mass. 1988)   Cited 43 times
    Holding that Commonwealth was liable under Tort Claims Act for negligent acts of defendant probation officer

    Any claim to immunity which the Commonwealth might have asserted ceased when Tierney failed to aid in the enforcement of the conditions of Darragh's probation. See Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319 (1984). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judge's determination that the Commonwealth is liable under G.L.c. 258, § 2, for the negligent acts of Tierney.

  10. Goldman v. Sahl

    248 Ariz. 512 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 32 times
    In Goldman v. Sahl, 462 P.3d 1017 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2020), the court considered whether defendant's filing of a claim with the Arizona Bar constituted “process” under Arizona law.

    ¶48 Judicial immunity protects a judge or a court official "who perform[s] [a] function[ ] intimately related to, or which amount[s] to an integral part of the judicial process" from civil liability for damages resulting from his or her judicial acts. Acevedo by Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dep't , 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (1984) (citations and quotations omitted); In re Aubuchon , 233 Ariz. 62, 70, ¶ 38, 309 P.3d 886, 894 (2013) ("[J]udges [are] absolutely immune from a civil damages lawsuit based on their judicial acts."). But merely because an act occurs in a court or is taken by a judge, does not make it a "judicial act."