Further, Taggart relied on cases which found no quasi-judicial immunity where probation officers failed to monitor compliance with conditions of probation or allowed the probationer to violate such conditions. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 211-12 (discussing A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (1988) and Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984)). Thus, under Taggart, monitoring compliance with probation conditions is not protected by quasi-judicial immunity.
Ray, at 374-75. In Acevedo v. Pima Cy. Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984), a child molester was granted probation subject to the condition that he was not to have any contact whatsoever with children. His probation officers subsequently allowed him to live on premises where children resided, and to obtain employment in a program bringing him into contact with children.
Just as police officers are not granted absolute immunity when they apply for arrest warrants, probation officers generally are not immune in performing their enforcement duties. SeeGant, supra; Acevedov. Pima County Adult Prob. Dep't, 690 P.2d 38 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that supervision of probationers is an administrative task, unconnected with the performance of a judicial function). Dorsey's placement of Fredrico was administrative.
) In addition, Taggart cited several cases where no quasi-judicial immunity was found when probation officers failed to monitor compliance with conditions of probation or allowed the probationer to violate such conditions. A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (1988) (cited in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 211-12); Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984) (cited in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 212-13); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in Harris v. State, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992) (cited in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 220). Our approval of Sterling is of particular note here, because the court in Sterling held that a duty exists to protect others from harm posed by dangerous probationers, including investigation and reporting of probation violations for the purpose of seeking revocation.
Since oral argument the parties have directed us to two cases. See Acevedo v. Prima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38 (1984) (discussing immunity of probation officers); Orzechowski v. State, ___ R.I. ___, 485 A.2d 545 (1984) (discussing distinction between public and special duty). Our review of these cases reveals that neither is helpful in the resolution of the issue before the Court.
Other courts have found the same duty on the part of probation and parole officers. E.g., Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985); Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (Ariz. 1984); Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 99 Nev. 93, 658 P.2d 422 (1983); State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1971); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968). Likewise, we hold that the duty delineated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965) exists in Idaho.
Just as police officers are not granted absolute immunity when they apply for arrest warrants, probation officers generally are not immune in performing their enforcement duties. SeeGant, supra; Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob.Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38 (1984) (holding that supervision of probationers is an administrative task, unconnected with the performance of a judicial function). Dorsey's placement of Fredrico was administrative.
Whether judicial immunity exists is a question of law for the court. See Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dept., 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38 (1984); Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 613, 688 P.2d 617, 621 (1984). Petitioners properly raised the doctrine in their motion for summary judgment, so it is squarely before us.
Any claim to immunity which the Commonwealth might have asserted ceased when Tierney failed to aid in the enforcement of the conditions of Darragh's probation. See Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319 (1984). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judge's determination that the Commonwealth is liable under G.L.c. 258, § 2, for the negligent acts of Tierney.
¶48 Judicial immunity protects a judge or a court official "who perform[s] [a] function[ ] intimately related to, or which amount[s] to an integral part of the judicial process" from civil liability for damages resulting from his or her judicial acts. Acevedo by Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dep't , 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (1984) (citations and quotations omitted); In re Aubuchon , 233 Ariz. 62, 70, ¶ 38, 309 P.3d 886, 894 (2013) ("[J]udges [are] absolutely immune from a civil damages lawsuit based on their judicial acts."). But merely because an act occurs in a court or is taken by a judge, does not make it a "judicial act."