Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department

10 Citing cases

  1. Taggart v. State

    118 Wn. 2d 195 (Wash. 1992)   Cited 218 times
    Discussing A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 and Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631

    Ray, at 374-75. In Acevedo v. Pima Cy. Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984), a child molester was granted probation subject to the condition that he was not to have any contact whatsoever with children. His probation officers subsequently allowed him to live on premises where children resided, and to obtain employment in a program bringing him into contact with children.

  2. Gibson v. Theut

    246 Ariz. 297 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019)

    ยถ16 Judicial immunity protects judges and select court officials who perform functions intimately related or integral to the judicial process when acting in their official capacities. Acevedo by Acevedo v. Pima Cty. Adult Probation Dep't , 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38 (1984) ; see also Ashelman v. Pope , 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). The express purpose of judicial immunity is to protect "principled and fearless decision-making" by the judiciary.

  3. Sterling v. Bloom

    111 Idaho 211 (Idaho 1986)   Cited 76 times
    Adopting planning/operational test

    Other courts have found the same duty on the part of probation and parole officers. E.g., Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985); Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (Ariz. 1984); Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 99 Nev. 93, 658 P.2d 422 (1983); State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1971); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968). Likewise, we hold that the duty delineated in Restatement (Second) of Torts ยง 319 (1965) exists in Idaho.

  4. Marion v. Maricopa County Adult Probation Department

    2:09-cv-00178 JWS (D. Ariz. Aug. 26, 2009)

    In Hamblin, the trial court initially dismissed plaintiff's claim against the Probation Department on the ground of absolute judicial immunity. The court of appeals reversed that decision, "holding that the alleged failure to supervise [by the Probation Department] was not covered by immunity from civil liability, citing Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department, 142 Ariz. 319, 322, 690 P.2d 38, 41 (1984)." In Acevedo, the supreme court held that while "[t]hose officers, employees, and agents who assist the court in the judicial process are also entitled to absolute immunity," "the activities of a probation officer will often not be connected with the performance of a judicial function, and as a consequence not be entitled to immunity."

  5. Johnson v. Brady

    No. CV-14-01875-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2015)   Cited 2 times

    Judges acting in their judicial capacity are protected from civil lawsuits by absolute immunity under both federal and Arizona law. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Acevedo v. Pima Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep't, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (Ariz. 1984). "[Judicial] immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances.

  6. Saint-Guillen v. U.S.

    657 F. Supp. 2d 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that where a complaint does not allege any misconduct regarding defendant's hiring, retention, and training practices, such practices are discretionary

    The Supreme Court of Arizona, in addressing this specific situation, held that "[a]ny possible claim to immunity ceased when the [probation] officers ignored the specific direction of the court." Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dept., 690 P.2d 38, 41 (Ariz. 1984). Furthermore, as in Scotto, the error that resulted in defendant's failure to supervise Littlejohn "occurred before the initiation of [probation-violation] proceedings."

  7. State, Dept. of Corrections v. Cowles

    151 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2006)   Cited 18 times
    Finding that state agencies had duty to warn residents of small community of parolee's dangerous propensities, particularly victims, as one was foreseeable and others were in zone of danger

    See Neakok, 721 P.2d at 1134 (noting that parole officer's actions in supervising offenders are ministerial in nature).See, e.g., Acevedo by Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 41 (1984) (holding that probation officers who allowed defendant to have contact with minors in violation of court order could not assert sovereign immunity); A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (1988) ("A probation officer's duty to make reasonable efforts to ascertain whether a probationer has complied with the terms of his or her probation is not a discretionary function."); Taggart v. State, 118 Wash.2d 195, 822 P.2d 243, 252 (1992) (holding that discretionary function immunity does not shield parole supervision decisions). However, seeking out possible parole violations of which the parole officer has no notice involves planning decisions that are entitled to discretionary function immunity.

  8. Hertog v. City of Seattle

    138 Wn. 2d 265 (Wash. 1999)   Cited 317 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Recognizing a duty of city probation counselors and county pretrial release counselors

    Further, Taggart relied on cases which found no quasi-judicial immunity where probation officers failed to monitor compliance with conditions of probation or allowed the probationer to violate such conditions. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 211-12 (discussing A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (1988) and Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984)). Thus, under Taggart, monitoring compliance with probation conditions is not protected by quasi-judicial immunity.

  9. Bishop v. Miche

    137 Wn. 2d 518 (Wash. 1999)   Cited 95 times
    Holding that the existence of a special protective relationship turns on not custodial control but the relationship between the actor and the third party

    ) In addition, Taggart cited several cases where no quasi-judicial immunity was found when probation officers failed to monitor compliance with conditions of probation or allowed the probationer to violate such conditions. A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (1988) (cited in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 211-12); Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984) (cited in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 212-13); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in Harris v. State, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992) (cited in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 220). Our approval of Sterling is of particular note here, because the court in Sterling held that a duty exists to protect others from harm posed by dangerous probationers, including investigation and reporting of probation violations for the purpose of seeking revocation.

  10. A.L. v. Commonwealth

    402 Mass. 234 (Mass. 1988)   Cited 43 times
    Holding that Commonwealth was liable under Tort Claims Act for negligent acts of defendant probation officer

    Any claim to immunity which the Commonwealth might have asserted ceased when Tierney failed to aid in the enforcement of the conditions of Darragh's probation. See Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319 (1984). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judge's determination that the Commonwealth is liable under G.L.c. 258, ยง 2, for the negligent acts of Tierney.