Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department

68 Citing cases

  1. Gelatt v. County of Broome, N.Y.

    811 F. Supp. 61 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)   Cited 11 times
    Interpreting Acevedo to hold "that if the official performed a function at the direction of a judge, then there should be absolute immunity . . . [but only qualified immunity] [i]f the function performed is not at the behest or direction of the court"

    It may well be as the Supreme Court of Arizona sitting en banc found, that absolute judicial immunity, as it applies to nonjudicial officials, is in effect a derivative immunity, taken from the role of the official. Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 321-22, 690 P.2d 38, 40-41 (Ariz. 1984). The court reasoned that if the official performed a function at the direction of a judge, then there should be absolute immunity afforded to that official in so far as that function is concerned. If the function performed is not at the behest or direction of the court, then the official would be entitled to only qualified immunity.

  2. Taggart v. State

    118 Wn. 2d 195 (Wash. 1992)   Cited 217 times
    Discussing A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234, 521 N.E.2d 1017 and Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631

    Ray, at 374-75. In Acevedo v. Pima Cy. Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38, 44 A.L.R.4th 631 (1984), a child molester was granted probation subject to the condition that he was not to have any contact whatsoever with children. His probation officers subsequently allowed him to live on premises where children resided, and to obtain employment in a program bringing him into contact with children.

  3. Burk v. State

    215 Ariz. 6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 9 times

    ¶ 7 The doctrine of judicial immunity states that judges are absolutely immune from damages lawsuits for their judicial acts, "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction or are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 322, 690 P.2d 38, 40, 41 (1984). The primary purpose of the doctrine is to assure that judges will perform their functions independently and without fear of personal consequences.

  4. Davis v. Spier

    No. CV-08-00050-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2008)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that probation officer who allegedly submitted probation revocation petition on the basis of conduct that probation officer should have known could not have been committed by the plaintiff and requested that court authorize plaintiff's arrest prior to probation revocation hearing was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because his conduct was more akin to that of police officer than that of prosecutor deciding whether to initiate proceedings, citing, inter alia, Swift

    It has provided judicial immunity to judges acting in their judicial capacities. Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dept., 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (1984) (citing Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982)). Relying on federal authorities, it has also provided absolute immunity to court officials "who perform functions `intimately related to', or which amount to `an integral part of the judicial process.'"

  5. Lavit v. Superior Court

    173 Ariz. 96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that psychologist initially chosen by the parties without court involvement was entitled to judicial immunity

    Whether judicial immunity exists is a question of law for the court. See Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dept., 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38 (1984); Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 613, 688 P.2d 617, 621 (1984). Petitioners properly raised the doctrine in their motion for summary judgment, so it is squarely before us.

  6. Garibay v. Johnson

    545 P.3d 468 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Judicial immunity is a common-law doctrine that exists "to assure that judges will exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences." Acevedo v. Pima Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep’t, 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (1984). "Whether judicial immunity exists is a legal question for the court."

  7. Adams v. State

    185 Ariz. 440 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that an adoption caseworker's investigative and supervisory conduct undertaken outside the judicial context was not absolutely immune

    Id. The supreme court again considered immunity issues in Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 690 P.2d 38 (1984), in which the plaintiffs alleged that probation officers had negligently supervised a probationer who had molested the plaintiffs' children. The court noted that "immunity is granted to those who perform functions `intimately related to,' . . . or which amount to `an integral part of the judicial process.'"

  8. Gibson v. Theut

    246 Ariz. 297 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019)

    ¶16 Judicial immunity protects judges and select court officials who perform functions intimately related or integral to the judicial process when acting in their official capacities. Acevedo by Acevedo v. Pima Cty. Adult Probation Dep't , 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38 (1984) ; see also Ashelman v. Pope , 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). The express purpose of judicial immunity is to protect "principled and fearless decision-making" by the judiciary.

  9. DeSilva v. Baker

    208 Ariz. 597 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 17 times

    ¶ 17 Our supreme court has held that judicial immunity may be extended beyond judges to those whose functions are intimately related to the judicial process. Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dep't., 142 Ariz. 319, 321, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (1984). In Acevedo, the issue was whether probation officers were immune for negligent supervision of probationers.

  10. Sterling v. Bloom

    111 Idaho 211 (Idaho 1986)   Cited 76 times
    Adopting planning/operational test

    Other courts have found the same duty on the part of probation and parole officers. E.g., Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985); Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department, 690 P.2d 38, 40 (Ariz. 1984); Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 99 Nev. 93, 658 P.2d 422 (1983); State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1971); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968). Likewise, we hold that the duty delineated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965) exists in Idaho.