Indeed, several other courts around the country have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 789 F.Supp.2d 883 (M.D. Tenn. 2011); McKinley v. United States, No. 5:15-CV-101, 2015 WL 5842626, at *11-13 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2015); Blau v. United States, No. 8:12-cv-2669-T-26AEP, 2013 WL 704762, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2013); Abila v. United States, No. 2:09-CV-01345-KJD-LRL, 2011 WL 3444166, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 2011). Applying Washington's statute of repose to Bennett's FTCA claim would necessarily narrow the waiver Congress intended when it expressly stated the time limitations for FTCA claims.

However, Plaintiff argues this court should follow the reasoning of district court decisions finding that the FTCA preempts the application of state statutes of repose. See Blau v. United States, No. 8:12-cv-2669-T-26AEP, 2013 WL 704762 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2013) (applying field preemption to find that state statutes of repose are preempted by the FTCA); Mamea v. United States, No. 08-00563 LEK-RLP, 2011 WL 4371712, at 12-13 (D. Haw.Sept. 16, 2011) (applying the doctrine of field preemption to find that the FTCA preempted state statutes of repose); Abila v. United States, No. 2:09-CV-01345-KJD-LRL, 2011 WL 3444166, at 2-3 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 2011) (relying on Circuit precedent, stating courts must "look to federal law for the limitations of time" and holding a statute of repose is a limitation on time that is preempted). Bagley argues Congress intended to occupy the field of both statutes of limitation and statutes of repose by setting out a comprehensive scheme governing the time frame in which an FTCA claim must be filed.

A review of precedent on this issue reflects that a growing number of courts have reached the same conclusion as we do today. See Blau v. United States, 2013 WL 704762, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2013) (holding FTCA pre-empts state statute of repose to the extent it would bar a properly-filed administrative claim); Mamea v. United States, 2011 WL 4371712, at *13 (D. Haw. Sept. 16, 2011) (holding FTCA pre-empts state limitation period whether it "is or is not a statute of repose"); Abila v. United States, 2011 WL 3444166, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 2011) (concluding that "[f]ederal law determines the limitations of time within which the action must be brought" and that therefore plaintiff's claim, which complied with FTCA time limits, was not barred by statute of repose); Jones v. United States, 789 F. Supp. 2d 883, 892 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) ("A claimant's claim is extinguished only if the claimant fails to meet the deadlines in § 2401(b), and a state's statute of repose has no effect on the federal claim."); Zander v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 2d 880, 886 (D. Md. 2011) ("The FTCA's statute of limitations . . . allows the plaintiff to file his claim at any time if the administrative agency fails to act on the claim within six months of filing the claim, while the Maryland statute of repose extinguishes the plaintiff's claim in this case, presenting a clear conflict.") In contrast, the cases cited by the Government provide little support for its position.

The Court acknowledges that Poindexter did not address statutes of repose, but at least one other district court within the Ninth Circuit has recently applied Poindexter and ruled that § 2401(b) preempts state statutes of repose. See Abila v. United States, No. 2:09-CV-01345-KJD-LRL, 2011 WL 3444166, at *4-5 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 2011). The court in Abila stated that it was aware of only two district court cases where the parties raised the issue whether § 2401(b) preempted state statutes of repose, and both of those cases concluded that preemption applied.