Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Citing to ABD Monroe, Inc. v. Monroe Twp., 2008 WL 58876 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2008), the Borough argues that in order to show that other developers are similarly situated, Southersby is obligated to produce evidence that they are “prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” Presuming that the relevant comparators include the size of the developments, including the number of lots, the topography, the infrastructure required and whether there are existing access roads, the Borough concludes that Southersby is unable to meet its burden.

Under New Jersey law, to satisfy the pleading requirements for a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must allege, “(1) a contract between the parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3) damages flowing therefrom; and (4) that the party stating the claim performed its own contractual obligations.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). “A contract need not be [] reduced to a single writing, or any writing at all, to form the basis of a breach of contract claim.” ABD Monroe, Inc. v. Monroe Twp., Civ. A. No. 04-1412, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 242, at *36 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2008); see also McBarron v. Kipling Woods, LLC, 838 A.2d 490, 491 ( N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2004) (stating “parties may orally, by informal memorandum, or by both agree upon all the essential terms of a contract and effectively bind themselves thereon, if that is their intention, even though they contemplate the execution later of a formal document to memorialize their undertaking”). Rather, an oral contract may be formed “as long as the parties agreed to do something that they previously did not have an obligation to do.”

Indeed, the Third Circuit has stated that Rule 11 requires an attorney to "Stop, Think, Investigate and Research" before filing papers either to initiate a suit or to conduct the litigation. Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987); see ABD Monroe, Inc. v. Monroe Twp., Civil Action No. 04-1412 (WHW), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 242, at *45 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2008). Under Rule 11,

In their brief supporting their motion for summary judgment, Defendants cited District of New Jersey case law for the proposition that “[i]n order to succeed on a class of one equal protection claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it was treated differently than someone who is prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” ABD Monroe, Inc. v. Monroe Twp., CIV. 04–1412(WHW), 2008 WL 58876, *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2008) (citing cases from Seventh and Second Circuits). A 2012 Western District of Pennsylvania case emphasized however that the similarly-situated test in the Third Circuit does not require identical comparators: “The law in the Third Circuit does not require [a plaintiff] to show that the [comparators] are identical in all relevant respects but only that they are alike.”

A plaintiff must "demonstrate that it was treated differently than someone who is prima facie identical in all relevant respects." ABD Monroe, Inc. v. Monroe Twp., Civ. No. 04-1412, 2008 WL 58876, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2008) (citing Purze v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that "class-of-one plaintiffs must show an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves"). As such, a plaintiff asserting a class-of-one equal protection claim in the context of a traditional zoning dispute ultimately bears a heavy burden to prevail.

"A contract need not be [] reduced to a single writing, or any writing at all, to form the basis of a breach of contract claim." ABD Monroe, Inc. v. Monroe Twp., No. 04-1412, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 242, at *36 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2008). "A contract need not be expressed in writing as long as the parties agreed to do something that they previously did not have an obligation to do."

In order to succeed on a Section 1983 claim for violation of substantive due process in the context of a land use dispute, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) deprivation of that interest by local officials' behavior that "shocks the conscience."United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2003); ABD Monroe, Inc. v. Monroe Twp., Civ. A. No. 04-1412, 2008 WL 58876, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2008). "[U]nless the locality's decision was `truly irrational,' no substantive due process violation occurs."