Opinion
No. 2:19-cv-258
2021-11-04
A.B., BY AND THROUGH his Parents and Next Friends, K.B. and R.B., Plaintiffs, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
Justin Gilbert, Gilbert Law, Chattanooga, TN, Mitchell David Sickon, Erin Hankins Diaz, Disability Rights Michigan, Lansing, MI, for Plaintiffs. Elizabeth R. Husa, Precious Synott Boone, Travis Mark Comstock, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.
Justin Gilbert, Gilbert Law, Chattanooga, TN, Mitchell David Sickon, Erin Hankins Diaz, Disability Rights Michigan, Lansing, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Elizabeth R. Husa, Precious Synott Boone, Travis Mark Comstock, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Paul L. Maloney, United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 13). For the reasons to be explained, the motion will be denied.
I.
In November 2015, A.B. enrolled in school in the rural village of Ontonagon, Michigan. A.B. has an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) providing him special education due to his disabilities: Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct, Unspecified Neurodevelopment Disorder, Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, ADHD, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Unspecified Mood Disorder, and Unspecified Anxiety Disorder (see ECF No. 12 at PageID.129). On his second day of enrollment, the Ontonagon Area School District (the "District") placed A.B. on a shortened, four-hour school day. By December 2015, the District shortened A.B.’s school day to one hour for three to five days per week.
After enduring one year of shortened school days, A.B. filed an administrative complaint with Defendant Michigan Department of Education (MDE) against the District pursuant to 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 153 and Michigan Administrative Rules for Special Education (MARSE) R 340.1851. He alleged that the shortened school-day schedule and lack of positive behavior supports deprived him of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires school districts to provide a FAPE to all qualified persons with disabilities within the jurisdiction of the school district. See 29 U.S.C. § 794.
In December 2016, the MDE found the District out of compliance and that it had denied A.B. a FAPE. As a remedy, the MDE required the District to provide thirty hours of specialized academic instruction and 15 hours of behavior instruction to A.B.; seek consent for a Functional Behavior Assessment b a qualified behavioral specialist, to be followed by a Behavioral Intervention Plan; and develop, review, and revise A.B.’s IEP. The MDE also ordered the District to work with the Intermediate School District (ISD) to revise the District's written procedures related to providing a FAPE; revising a student's IEP; disciplinary removals from instruction; and implementing special education. The MDE ordered the District to revise these provisions by April 1, 2017. The MDE then closed A.B.’s matter on November 28, 2017, even though A.B. contends that the District continued to retain him on reduced instructional days for the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school years.
Throughout the 2016-2017 school year, A.B.’s behavioral problems escalated. In January 2017, a state juvenile court granted a delinquency petition filed by the local prosecutor based on A.B.’s assault and battery of a teacher in November 2016 (see ECF No. 13-1 at PageID.168). The petition was later amended to include similar charges from assaults in December 2017.
A.B.’s behavior continued to escalate. In January 2018, the District held an IEP meeting and placed A.B. on a 45-day alternative placement at the county courthouse due to the severity of his behavior. The District believed that A.B.’s behavior did not allow for him to be at school for longer periods of time or participate in the general educational setting. His educational time was then reduced from six hours per week to four hours per week.
A.B. then filed a second complaint with the MDE in April 2018. This complaint targeted the MDE, not the District. It alleged that the MDE violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415, because it failed to supervise and monitor the District, failed to correct the District's noncompliance, and allowed the District to continue denying A.B. a full school-day and a FAPE. In June 2018, the MDE found itself in violation of the IDEA because the District's "documentation was not provided to the [Office of Special Education] in a timely manner" (ECF No. 13-1 at PageID.170). The remedy was that the MDE must ensure timely submission of documentation by the District. The MDE then closed the matter in August 2018 without fully addressing the substance of A.B.’s complaint.
On September 4, 2018, the District again reduced A.B.’s school hours to between two and three hours per day. Because A.B.’s previous two state-level administrative complaints had not succeeded in providing A.B. with a full school day, A.B. sought assistance from the Michigan Attorney General Office. At the end of September 2018, through the Attorney General, the MDE pledged that it would have a representative visit the District, review A.B.’s documents, observe A.B., review the ISD services, meet with staff, and create an action plan. State Complaint Coordinator Marcia O'Brien was assigned to visit the District. She provided a reintegration plan outlining how to effectively reintegrate A.B. into school. The plan noted how the District may need financial assistance from the MDE to provide proper support to A.B. However, the MDE did not issue a formal corrective action because, lacking a filed state complaint, it had no authority to compel any particular action.
In November 2018, A.B. was involved in a behavioral incident where he refused to exit a school bus, resulting in police involvement and a "threat assessment" (ECF No 12 at PageID.138). The District held a "manifestation determination" on December 11, 2018, where it concluded that A.B.’s behavior during the school bus incident was a manifestation of his disability.
The same day, the District advised A.B.’s parents that he could not come back to school and that he would instead have to be educated at the local police station. A.B. continued to have behavioral problems at the police station and in January 2019, the local police station was rejected as a placement.
The District then proposed placing A.B. at Teaching Family Homes, a child-care institution that typically serves children who are wards of the State due to delinquency or abuse and neglect. A.B.’s family disagreed with that placement because the facility is two hours away from their home. The superintendent of the District asserted that A.B. needed to be placed elsewhere because the District did not have the resources, staff, or expertise to help A.B.
On February 21, 2019, A.B. filed a due process complaint pursuant to the IDEA against the District, the ISD, and the MDE. The MDE sought and obtained dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The state ALJ decided that "An [ALJ] order requiring MDE to hire or allocate staff and setting forth how that staff will do their job is outside the realm of an Administrative Law Judge's authority under IDEA and instead falls within the scope of equitable powers granted to a court of competent jurisdiction" (ECF No. 13-5 at PageID.336). After its dismissal from the state administrative proceedings, the MDE did not intervene or involve itself in A.B.’s grievances.
On August 16, 2019, A.B. reached a settlement with the District and ISD before the administrative proceedings were complete, which the ALJ approved and adopted. He then filed this case in federal court, naming only the MDE as a defendant. A.B. alleges violations of the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA. The MDE has moved to dismiss all counts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
II.
When challenged by a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. E.E.O.C. v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School , 597 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2010), rev'd on other grounds , 565 U.S. 171, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may take the form of a facial challenge, which tests the sufficiency of the pleading, or a factual challenge, which contests the factual predicate for jurisdiction. See RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n , 549 F.2d 884, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1977) ). In a facial attack, the court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint, similar to the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States , 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). In a factual attack, the allegations in the complaint are not afforded a presumption of truthfulness and the district court weighs competing evidence to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id.
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing how the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must include more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A defendant bringing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a cognizable claim has been pled in the complaint. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc. , 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must provide sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and the "claim to relief must be plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano , 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). If plaintiffs do not "nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all factual allegations, but need not accept any legal conclusions. Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform , 648 F.3d at 369. The Sixth Circuit has noted that courts "may no longer accept conclusory legal allegations that do not include specific facts necessary to establish the cause of action." New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc. , 650 F.3d 1046, 1050 (6th Cir. 2011). However, "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations"; rather, "it must assert sufficient facts to provide the defendant with ‘fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Rhodes v. R&L Carriers, Inc. , 491 F. App'x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
III.
A. Motion to Dismiss IDEA Claim for Failure to Exhaust
The IDEA contains a strict exhaustion requirement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l ). Before a person can seek relief for a violation of the IDEA from a federal court, that person must first completely exhaust his or her administrative remedies through the due-process complaint procedure. See id. The exhaustion requirement not only applies to people seeking relief under the IDEA, but also to people seeking relief under a different federal law for a claim regarding the denial of a FAPE. See Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., et al. , 3 F.4th 236, 240-43 (6th Cir. 2021) ("Parents must first ‘exhaust[ ]’ the IDEA's administrative procedures ‘to the extent as would be required had the action been brought under [the IDEA].’ ").
Many courts have held that if the student settles the due process claim before it is fully adjudicated on the merits by an ALJ, the student did not exhaust his administrative remedies; thus, he would be barred from bringing a lawsuit alleging denial of a FAPE in federal court. See, e.g. , Perez , 3 F.4th at 236 ; A.F. v. Espanola Pub. Schs. , 801 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2015) ; Albright v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist. , 926 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2019) ; Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist. , 877 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2017).
Here, the MDE argues that A.B. has not exhausted his administrative remedies because he reached a settlement agreement with the District and ISD before fully adjudicating the merits of the claim. While it is true that a voluntary settlement is fatal to IDEA claims subsequently brought in federal court, that argument is without merit in the present matter because A.B. did not settle with the MDE. Rather, A.B. settled with the District and ISD after the MDE had been dismissed from the administrative proceedings upon its request. Therefore, if A.B. had brought his IDEA claims against the District and ISD in federal court, the complaint would have to be dismissed for failure to exhaust. See Paul G. v. Monterey Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. , No. 16-cv-05582, 2018 WL 2763302 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2018) ("Although [the plaintiff] made the difficult decision to settle with the District rather than proceed with a full [administrative] hearing, that decision cannot obviate the [IDEA's] exhaustion requirement."). But because A.B. is bringing his claims against a party he did not reach a settlement agreement with, the mere fact that A.B. reached a settlement agreement during the administrative proceedings does not bar his current federal claims.
The MDE further argues that because it was dismissed from the ALJ proceedings, A.B. did not exhaust his administrative remedies with the MDE. For this contention, the MDE relies on an out-of-circuit district court case: S.B. v. Cal. Dep't of Educ. , 327 F. Supp. 3d 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2018). In this case, S.B. filed a due process complaint under the IDEA with the California Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), naming the relevant local school districts, the California Department of Education (CDE), and the State of California, among other parties. Id. at 1231. The OAH dismissed the CDE from the proceedings because the claims against the CDE were outside the scope of the OAH's jurisdiction. Id. Subsequently, S.B. settled with the local school districts. Id. S.B. then filed a federal complaint against the CDE and the other dismissed parties under the IDEA. Id. at 1231-32. The court held that S.B. failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because the federal claims against the CDE were "factually and legally intertwined with the IDEA claims against the [local school districts]," with whom S.B. had settled. Id. at 1250. The court further stated:
Dismissal by [an ALJ] alone cannot constitute exhaustion because it does not achieve any of the goals of the appeals procedures. It is the continued litigation of the FAPE issues in the IDEA claim at the administrative level, culminating in a hearing and decision, which constitutes the exhaustion of any overlapping FAPE-based RA and ADA claims. Congress could not have intended exhaustion of non-IDEA claims under IDEA's appeals procedures to mean mechanically presenting the claims to the agency only to be dismissed – that would be empty and meaningless, accomplishing nothing exhaustion is meant to achieve.
Id. at 1248, n.8. Thus, in S.B. , the CDE's dismissal from the administrative proceedings was not enough to meet the IDEA's exhaustion requirement.
The MDE also relies on two additional district court level out-of-circuit, unpublished cases in support of this argument. The Court declines to adopt the reasoning of those cases. See S.A.S. v. Hibbing Pub. Schs., et al. , No. 04-3204, 2005 WL 1593011 (D. Minn. July 1, 2005) ; Paul G. v. Monterey Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. , No. 16-cv-05582, 2018 WL 2763302 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2018).
The Sixth Circuit has not ruled on cases with similar facts, but one district court has ruled that dismissal during administrative proceedings constitutes exhaustion for purposes of the IDEA. See S.P v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 329 F. Supp. 3d 584, 593 (E.D. Tenn. 2018) ("TDOE also filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint arguing the administrative hearing officer lacked jurisdiction ... TDOE's motion to dismiss for lack of administrative jurisdiction was heard on substance and granted. Thus, plaintiffs did exhaust their administrative remedies, and TDOE's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is denied.").
The Court notes that it held the MDE's motion to dismiss in abeyance pending the Sixth Circuit's resolution of Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, et al. , No. 1:18-cv-1134, 2019 WL 6907138 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2019). After a review of the Sixth Circuit decision, the Court finds that Perez is distinguishable from this case. In Perez , the student brought a due process claim under IDEA against Sturgis Public Schools and the Sturgis Public Schools Board of Education. Before the ALJ heard the merits of the case, the parties settled the IDEA claim. He then brought an ADA and Michigan law claim against the same parties in federal court based on the same facts from the administrative proceedings. Perez is distinguishable because the student sued the same parties in the administrative proceeding and in federal court—the parties that he had already reached a settlement agreement with. In A.B.’s case, he reached a settlement with the District and ISD, but then sued the MDE in federal court. Perez thus does not give this Court affirmative guidance for A.B.’s case. See Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs. , 3 F.4th 236 (6th Cir. 2021).
While the Court acknowledges the MDE's argument that dismissal does not achieve the intention of exhaustion—that is, the litigation of an IDEA claim culminating in a hearing and decision on the merits—in the present matter, A.B. has done everything in his power to exhaust his remedies as to the MDE. Over A.B.’s objection, the ALJ dismissed the MDE as a party during the due process proceedings upon a motion from the MDE. Now, the MDE once again seeks dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because A.B. failed to exhaust his remedies as to the MDE. If the Court accepted the MDE's failure to exhaust argument, it would be impossible for a plaintiff to bring an IDEA claim against the MDE.
Moreover, the ALJ appeared to recognize that while he did not have jurisdiction over the MDE, federal courts do: "An [ALJ] order requiring MDE to hire or allocate staff and setting forth how that staff will do their job is outside the realm of an Administrative Law Judge's authority under IDEA and instead falls within the scope of equitable powers granted to a court of competent jurisdiction" (ECF No. 13-5 at PageID.336). Because the MDE succeeded in convincing the ALJ that the administrative court lacked jurisdiction, it must accept that the federal court now has jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Court holds that A.B. did exhaust his remedies as to the MDE, despite its dismissal in the administrative proceedings by the ALJ. Thus, the MDE's motion to dismiss the IDEA claim on the basis of failure to exhaust will be denied.
B. Motion to Dismiss Section 504 and ADA Claim
The MDE next moves to dismiss A.B.’s Section 504 and ADA claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for two reasons: (1) lack of standing and (2) insufficient facts pled.
The MDE first argues that A.B.’s parents lack standing because they are merely associated with a person with a disability, and that mere association "is insufficient to invoke standing to pursue a claim for alleged discrimination against his/her child" (ECF No. 13-1 at PageID.193). However, the MDE fails to recognize that A.B. is a minor, and courts have long recognized that parents may commence lawsuits on behalf of their minor children. See Vandiver v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 925 F.2d 927, 930 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the parents no longer had standing to sue on behalf of their child after he reached age eighteen). This argument is rejected because A.B.’s parents have standing to sue on his behalf as a minor child.
A.B. was born on July 30, 2009 (see ECF No. 12 at PageID.128), which means that he was only ten years old at the time his parents filed their first amended complaint.
The MDE next argues that the Section 504 and ADA claim should be dismissed because the complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to support this claim. To survive this motion to dismiss, A.B. must allege facts showing bad faith or gross misjudgment by the MDE to support the necessary element of discrimination under a Section 504 claim. The Sixth Circuit has held:
In order to establish a violation under section 504, a disabled individual must establish that he was subjected to prohibited discrimination, which means he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service because of a disability ... To prove discrimination in the education context, courts have held that something more than a simple failure to provide a free appropriate public education must be shown.
N.L. v. Knox Cty. Schs. , 315 F.3d 688, 695 (6th Cir. 2003). That "something more" is bad faith or gross misjudgment. See Monahan v. Nebraska , 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982) ("We think ... that either bad faith or gross misjudgment should be shown before a § 504 violation can be made out, at least in the context of education of handicapped children."). In other words, to prove that a defendant's failure to provide a child with a FAPE was discriminatory, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment. See Campbell v. Bd. of Educ. of Centerline Sch. Dist. , 58 F. App'x 162, 167 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Monahan , 687 F.2d at 1171 ) ("[T]he Rehabilitation Act further requires that the [plaintiffs] must ultimately prove that the defendant's failure to provide [the student] with a ‘free appropriate public education’ was discriminatory. Surmounting that evidentiary hurdle requires that ‘either bad faith or gross misjudgment must be shown before a § 504 violation can be made out, at least in the context of education of handicapped children.’ ").
The MDE argues that A.B. failed to allege any facts supporting a showing of bad faith or gross misjudgment, and it even goes as far as asserting that, in his amended complaint, A.B. admits "by implication" that the MDE fully investigated each complaint and issued corrective actions and that the MDE invested significant costs and time into a good faith review of the alleged ongoing violations (ECF No. 13-1 at PageID.198). Although A.B. alleges that the MDE conducted investigations into his complaints, he also asserts that the MDE prematurely closed all of the matters and purposely took a "hands off" approach to A.B.’s grievances (ECF No. 12 at PageID.140). And in his response to the MDE's motion to dismiss, A.B. lists seven different statements in the complaint where he alleges "a pattern of knowing failures by MDE" (ECF No. 16 at PageID.432-33).
Whether these "knowing failures" constitute bad faith or gross misjudgment is a question of fact, and it is not appropriate to resolve such a question in a motion to dismiss. D.R. v. Michigan Department of Education , No. 16-13694, 2017 WL 4348818, *9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2017) held:
Defendants are correct that a mere failure to provide the FAPE as required by the IDEA is insufficient to support a § 504 or Title II ADA claim. However, Plaintiffs have challenged MDE's professional judgment in oversight of the FCS, and the allocation of necessary resources, and asserted that this has caused discriminatory effects. Whether this judgment rises to the level of gross misjudgment, to qualify as discriminatory, is a question of fact that needs to be developed and brought before a trier of fact to determine. Therefore, as a threshold matter, Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim under § 504 and the ADA.
A.B. has alleged similar facts that the court analyzed in D.R. His theory of liability is that the MDE failed to provide proper oversight and financial assistance in resolving his alleged denial of a FAPE, and that the MDE took a deliberate "hands off" approach in handling the matter. As in D.R. , whether the MDE's actions amount to gross misjudgment to qualify as discriminatory is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine. The MDE's motion to dismiss A.B.’s Section 504 and ADA claim will be denied.
See also Doe v. Ohio , No. 2:91-cv-464, 2012 WL 12985973, *10 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 16, 2012) (finding that the following facts were sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim: the defendants’ alleged failure to "(1) fully fund the special education weights (despite recommendations from the State Board of Education); (2) fund the required student-to-teacher and student-to-aide ratios; (3) factor in the costs of related services and inflation; (4) account for additional services added under the IDEA amendments; and (5) provide sufficient funds for preschool education units").
C. Motion to Dismiss MMSEA and MARSE Claim
The MDE next moves to dismiss Count III, A.B.’s MMSEA and MARSE claim on a theory that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. In his response, A.B. appears to concede that he would not have a claim under MARSE because it outlines the specific requirements regarding how special education is to be implemented in Michigan and it does not provide a separate cause of action. Rather, "the IDEA incorporates the standards of the MMSEA and MARSE" (ECF No. 16 at PageID.436).
A.B. further concedes that "state law cannot provide a separate basis for relief via a pendent state claim ... [and] [t]he Eleventh Amendment typically bars supplemental jurisdiction over state claims" (ECF No. 16 at PageID.436, n.6). However, although A.B. lists the state law allegations as a separate "count" he does not intend for the allegations to be a separate basis of relief. Instead, the facts listed under Count III were intended to supplement the IDEA allegations in Count I (see id. ).
The Court will accept A.B.’s assertion that Count III is not intended to be a separate basis for relief. Rather, the Court will construe the allegations under the Count III heading to supplement the IDEA allegations. Thus, the MDE's motion to dismiss Count III is denied.
D. Motion to Dismiss IDEA Claim Based on Statute of Limitations
As an alternative argument to its motion to dismiss A.B.’s IDEA claim on the basis of exhaustion, the MDE also argues that the IDEA claim should be dismissed because the claim is barred by the IDEA's statute of limitations. The MDE argues that the IDEA has a two-year statute of limitations, which would bar any allegation of a violation of the IDEA that occurred prior to December 19, 2017, because A.B. filed his first complaint on December 19, 2019. In support of this argument, the MDE cites Subsection(f)(3)(C) of the IDEA:
A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) (emphasis added).
The MDE is incorrect that a two-year statute of limitations is applicable to the present matter because the cited provision applies to the commencement of administrative due-process procedures, not the commencement of the federal action following the administrative due-process procedures. The IDEA is silent as to the statute of limitations regarding bringing an action under the IDEA in federal court. See § 1415(i)(2)(A).
Because the IDEA does not have an explicit statute of limitations dictating when a party can file a federal claim under IDEA, the Court must look to the applicable state law. See Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 266, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) ("When Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so."). And because neither party has suggested what the applicable "local time limitation" is in this case, the Court is not inclined to dismiss this count on an unidentified statute of limitations. Thus, the motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations is denied.
E. Motion to Dismiss Request for Money Damages
Finally, the MDE requests dismissal of "Plaintiffs’ request for general money damages under the IDEA" (ECF No. 13-1 at PageID.201). However, the MDE also notes that A.B.’s amended complaint does not delineate whether such relief is sought under the IDEA or under the Section 504 and ADA claim. Thus, the MDE's argument supporting dismissal of A.B.’s request for monetary damages is premised on the assertion that A.B. is making the request under the IDEA, and that money damages may not be awarded under the IDEA. See Long v. Dawson Springs Indep. Sch. Dist. , 197 F. App'x 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2006) ("No monetary damages may be awarded to the plaintiff in this case under the IDEA.").
However, in A.B.’s response, he agrees that money damages are not proper under the IDEA, but that he is requesting money damages under his Section 504 and ADA claim. See R.K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Scott Cty. , 637 F. App'x 922, 925 (6th Cir. 2016) (outlining what a plaintiff must do to receive money damages under the ADA and Section 504 in an education case context). Because money damages are proper under Section 504 and the ADA, the Court will also deny the MDE's motion to dismiss A.B.’s request for money damages.
IV.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint withstands Defendant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13) is DENIED in its entirety.