Appellants' assertion that a criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should apply here must be rejected in light of these decisions. A case that is quite close to this one on its facts, although it involves a different forfeiture statute, is $345.00 in United States Currency v. District of Columbia, 544 A.2d 680 (D.C. 1988). The statute at issue in that case, D.C. Code § 33-552 (1988), provides for the forfeiture of money and other property used or intended for use in drug transactions.
Sections 33-552 (c) (d)(2)(C). Those proceedings, which we have termed "civil and remedial" in nature, $345.00 in United States Currency v. District of Columbia, 544 A.2d 680, 682 (D.C. 1988), begin once "a proper showing of probable cause for the seizure [has been] made." Section 33-552 (d)(3)(A).
The D.C. Bar Counsel's opinion, therefore, has no preclusive effect here. Cf. $345.00 in United States Currency v. Dist. of Columbia, 544 A.2d 680, 682 n. 6 (D.C. 1988) ("[G]iven the difference in the burdens of proof in a criminal and civil proceeding, collateral estoppel does not bar" a civil action after an acquittal in a criminal trial."). Hickey also challenges Scott's allegation that he violated D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5, which governs the reasonableness of attorney's fees.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals follows the same approach. See $345.00 in U.S. Currency v. District of Columbia, 544 A.2d 680, 682 n. 6 (D.C. 1988); Ringgold v. District of Columbia Dept. of Emplymt. Servs., 531 A.2d 241, 243 n. 3 (D.C. 1987); Evans v. United States, 417 A.2d 963, 964 n. 4 (D.C. 1980). This court is required to apply the collateral estoppel law of the District of Columbia, as the judgment at issue was entered by a court of the District of Columbia.
We adopt the two-part analysis prescribed in Ward to determine whether the BTA offenses with which Purcell was charged were civil or criminal. See $345.00 in United States Currency v. District of Columbia, 544 A.2d 680, 682 (D.C. 1988) ("apply[ing] the analysis set forth in . . . Ward"). If the BTA offenses were civil rather than criminal, then jeopardy did not attach in the BTA proceedings, and the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the instant prosecution for negligent homicide. The term "BTA offenses' as used in this opinion refers to violations of the traffic regulations (Title 18 of the DCMR), such as those with which Purcell was charged.