Opinion
No. 04-22-00216-CV
12-14-2022
2008 LEXUS GX470, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Jansen Rome, 20614 Stone Oak Pkwy., #2121, San Antonio, TX 78258, Sean Foxx, 427 Gulf St., San Antonio, TX 78202. APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Andrew Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, 101 W. Nueva St., San Antonio, TX 78205.
APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Jansen Rome, 20614 Stone Oak Pkwy., #2121, San Antonio, TX 78258, Sean Foxx, 427 Gulf St., San Antonio, TX 78202.
APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Andrew Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, 101 W. Nueva St., San Antonio, TX 78205.
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice, Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Following a hearing, the magistrate court determined the rightful owner of a 2008 Lexus GX470 was Jansen Rome. Appellant, Sean Foxx, appeals the decision. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On December 7, 2021, a San Antonio Police Officer took possession of a black, 2008 Lexus GX470. Two parties were listed as having an interest in the vehicle: Jansen Rome and Sean Foxx. A hearing regarding ownership of the vehicle was later conducted at which Rome and a police detective testified. Rome testified he purchased the vehicle from Uptown Cars in 2018, has owned the vehicle ever since, and is still making payments on his auto loan and for insurance on the car. He stated he never offered to sell the vehicle to anyone and never allowed Foxx to drive, possess, or own the vehicle. He said the vehicle was stolen from his home and the police recovered it after it was involved in another crime. He had been without the vehicle for about four months. San Antonio Police Detective Edward Beatty testified he took over the case after the initial detective retired and was familiar with the former detective's notes. Beatty said he searched a database accessible only to law enforcement personnel and determined Rome was the current owner of the vehicle. He stated the underlying criminal investigation into Foxx by the police department was for the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Because Foxx's attorney was not present at the hearing, Foxx requested and was granted a continuance. On March 15, 2022, the hearing resumed. Foxx's attorney was present but Foxx was not. With no additional testimony or evidence, the court awarded the vehicle to Rome. Foxx appealed pro se.
DISCUSSION
Foxx's brief, which he filed pro se, is at best difficult to understand. His brief consists of several grievances and no citations to the record; therefore, it has been challenging to discern his legal issues on appeal. However, in the interest of justice, we will liberally construe his brief and attempt to address his appellate complaints, which, from what we can determine, pertain to: (1) sufficiency of the evidence, (2) his underlying criminal case, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require that a brief "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Accordingly, to the extent Foxx has attempted to raise issues in his brief other than those addressed in this opinion, we hold those issues have been waived as inadequately briefed, and we overrule them.
On July 5, 2022, this court issued an order requiring Foxx to file a rewritten brief because his original brief lacked a list of the parties and counsel, a table of contents, a statement of the case, a statement of the issues presented, a statement of facts supported by record references, a summary of the argument, an argument with citations to authorities and to the record, a prayer, and an appendix. On July 13, 2022, Foxx filed another noncomplying brief. On July 15, 2022, this court issued an order noting deficiencies in the brief. However, we did not strike the brief, but cautioned Foxx that "the submission panel may determine [he] has waived one or more issues due to inadequate briefing if the noted deficiencies are not corrected prior to submission."
On appeal, Foxx asserts the vehicle was legally sold to him and he did not intentionally or knowingly operate someone else's vehicle. We construe this as an argument that the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that Rome is the rightful owner of the vehicle is factually insufficient. In his brief, Foxx contends he met with a guy to purchase the Lexus, he checked the vehicle's VIN number on a website and it did not show as stolen, he paid cash for the vehicle, and he was told he would receive title at a later date. According to Foxx, he was arrested twenty-one days later and, during the arrest, he told the police officer he legally purchased the car. None of Foxx's contentions in his brief are supported by citations to the clerk's record or reporters’ records on appeal.
"Chapter 47 [of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure] provides a procedure by which a person claiming an interest in stolen property, which is in the custody of a governmental authority, may seek to obtain possession of the property." Kennedy v. State , 450 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). When, as here, "a criminal action is pending, jurisdiction to dispose of the property lies with the trial court under article 47.02." Id. at 576 ; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02 (governing restoration of property when trial is pending). Pursuant to article 47.02, a magistrate "may hold a hearing to determine the right to possession of the property." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02(b). "If it is proved to the satisfaction of the magistrate that any person is a true owner of the property alleged to have been stolen, and the property is under the control of a peace officer, the magistrate may, by written order, direct the property to be restored to that person." Id. A proceeding to restore property under article 47.02 is considered a civil case because it concerns the disposition of property. See A. Benjamini, Inc. v. Dickson , 2 S.W.3d 611, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) ; Four B's Inc. v. State , 902 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied).
In reviewing a trial court's findings regarding the disposition of property, we conduct a sufficiency review. Dickson , 2 S.W.3d at 612. In a nonjury trial, where, as here, no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed or requested, the judgment of the trial court implies all necessary findings of fact to support its judgment. See Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine , 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). When the implied findings of fact are supported by the evidence, we must uphold the judgment on any theory of law applicable to the case. Dickson , 2 S.W.3d at 613. We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court's challenged findings of fact by applying the same standards that we use in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jury findings. See Catalina v. Blasdel , 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).
During the March 10th hearing, Rome and Beatty testified about Rome's ownership of the vehicle. Foxx, who was present at the hearing, did not present any evidence in support of his case or any controverting evidence. However, because his attorney was not present, Foxx was granted a continuance until March 15th. Foxx did not appear at the March 15th hearing and his attorney offered no evidence. Because no evidence was offered to dispute Rome's ownership of the vehicle, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Rome was the "true owner of the property." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02(b).
Foxx next appears to raise complaints regarding his underlying criminal case by asserting the prosecutor is "being malicious, vindictive, and discriminatory"; he has "legal documents" that show he did not have a "criminal mindstate"; and the indictment was defective. Foxx's criminal case is not before this court; therefore, any complaints related to that case are not properly the subject of this appeal. Finally, Foxx alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. As stated above, this is a civil case because it is a proceeding to restore property. "[W]ith the exception of parental termination cases, the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel does not extend to civil cases." Hadeler v. Hadeler , No. 04-06-00459-CV, 2007 WL 1825855, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 27, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).
CONCLUSION
We overrule Foxx's issues on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.