Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-CV-5085
November 26, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before this Court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 11, 13, 19, 20 21). For the reasons set forth below, upon consideration of Defendants' Motions, Plaintiffs' Responses (Docs. 23 27), and Defendants' Replies (Docs. 24, 25 26), this Court will grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss all counts of the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiffs allege that prior to 1878, Magaretta Lewis ("Lewis") funded the construction of a church on 19th Titan Streets ("Church") which she conveyed to St. Peter's Episcopal Church in trust for the religious benefit of the community. St. Peter's Mot. to Dis. at 7. Plaintiffs claim that Lewis executed a will which provided that upon her death, a Trust would be established to fund religious programs in the community around the Church. Id. The trust was funded by an endowment of $80,000, which was to be used to staff and maintain the Church. Id. St. Peter's was appointed trustee of the church property and was the successor to the monetary trust. Id. Over time, the racial and ethnic composition of the community changed from Dutch English settlers to African American and/or Italian Americans. Id.
The Trust was established to memorialize Lewis' parents by providing religious improvement and maintenance to the community at 19 and Titan streets. First Union Mot. to Dis. at 5.
According to the Plaintiffs, during or before 1945, the Church was sold to the Plaintiff 19th Street Baptist Church, and the terms of the Trust were altered. Id. The Plaintiffs allege that St. Peter's and the Episcopal Diocese of Pennsylvania began to "invade the principal of the [Lewis] Trust, contrary to the Testator's/Grantor's direction; put the Church itself up for the sale [to the Plaintiffs]; and diverted all income and principal from both Trusts to other purposes . . ." Id. at 7-8. First Union National Bank became the successor trustee of both trusts after 1945, following the sale of the Church and changes to the monetary trusts. Id. at 8 n. 2.
The Plaintiffs allege that because they are members of the community surrounding the Church, notice of the diversion of the Lewis Trust funds and the sale of the Church in Orphans' Court was required. They also allege that the Defendants intentionally failed to notify the Plaintiffs because they were African-American and/or Italian-Americans. According to the Plaintiffs, if they had been notified about the sale, the Orphans' Court could have imposed conditions on the sale to insure perpetuation of the Trust purpose, i.e. to provide service to the community as a memorial to Lewis' parents. Id. at 8-9. The Plaintiffs allege the Defendants' wrongful action amounts to over one hundred million dollars in losses to the Plaintiffs because they are beneficiaries of the trust. Id. at 9.
The Plaintiffs allege that notice was required because they were the intended beneficiaries of the Trust. St. Peter's Mot. to Dis. at 8.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action began on March 11, 1999, when the Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against the Defendants, St. Peter's Episcopal Church ("St. Peter's"), First Union National Bank ("First Union"), and the Episcopal Diocese of Pennsylvania ("Episcopal Diocese"); this action will be called the State Court Action. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants violated their rights under federal law, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1971, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 8, 1999, the Defendants filed preliminary objections to the Plaintiffs' complaint.On April 26, 1999, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, in which they alleged four causes of action against the Defendants. On October 6, 1999, the Plaintiffs filed a praecipe to voluntarily discontinue the State Court Action. On October 12 and 14, 1999, Defendants filed motions to strike off Plaintiffs' voluntary discontinuance of the State Court Action. The Plaintiffs then filed their complaint in federal court on October 15, 1999. The Plaintiffs' federal complaint sets forth the same four claims filed in the State Court Action. However, the federal complaint adds an additional Count, which alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2) and (3), ". . . to deprive Plaintiffs of the perpetuation of their testimony, and therefore impeding the due course of justice, intending to deprive Plaintiffs of their liberty and property without the right to procedural due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Pls' Fed. Compl. at ¶ 45. The District Court stayed the proceedings and placed the matter in civil suspense until the resolution of the State Court Action.
Count I alleged violations of the Plaintiffs' rights under federal law, including the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the trust's assets were diverted from the community based on the community's change in ethnic character. Count n alleged that the Plaintiffs were illegally denied notice of the proceedings to divert the trust's assets. Count IE requests the Court order a resulting trust for the Plaintiffs. Count IV alleges that under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Defendants' actions have denied the Plaintiffs the right to own property and contract equally with whites, i.e. the assets of the Lewis Trust.
The Plaintiffs dismissed their complaint because there was a "`. . . need for urgent relief, and the Court's indication that no urgency exists . . ." compelled the Plaintiffs to withdraw this claim and file elsewhere. St. Peter's Mot. to Dis. at 5.
On November 15, 1999, the state court granted Defendants motions to strike off the Plaintiffs' voluntary discontinuance and sustained Defendants preliminary objections. Plaintiffs' action was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety.
The state court reasoned that the Plaintiffs' conduct ran contrary to the intent of Pa. R.C.P. 229. Rule 229(c) of the Pa. R.C.P. allow a court to "strike off a discontinuance in order to protect the rights of any party from unreasonable inconvenience, vexation, harassment, expense or prejudice." Under Pennsylvania law, "`once jurisdiction of a competent court attached, discontinuance of the action ought not be permitted over objection of the adversary if the only reason for discontinuing is the plaintiffs desire to institute an action for the same cause in another forum.'" Brown v. T.W. Phillips Gas Oil Co., 74 A.2d 105, 108 (Pa. 1950).
The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County held that the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under federal law because none of the Defendants could be considered state actors. In addition, the State Court held that the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under state law because they lacked standing to bring the state law claims.
LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction involving a facial attack upon the allegations in the pleadings, the Third Circuit has instructed the district courts to apply the standard for dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Avellino v. Herron, 991 F. Supp. 722, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Pinewood Estates of Michigan v. Barnegat Twp. Leveling Bd., 898 F.2d 347, 349 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1990)). This Court must "accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and reasonable inferences drawn from them. Dismissal . . . is limited to those instances where it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved." Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990).DISCUSSION
I. Counts I-IV Barred by Res Judicata
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims; therefore, the claims must be dismissed. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine rests on the proposition that the federal district courts "possess no power whatsoever to sit in direct review of State Court decisions." Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970). Rooker-Feldman mandates that any review of a state court claim must necessarily be left to state appellate courts and ultimately to the United States Supreme Court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416. Focus v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996) described the applicable doctrine as follows:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is named after two Supreme Court decisions, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that "federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state's highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are `inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a judicial proceeding.'" We have also concluded that "Rooker-Feldman does not bar individual constitutional claims by persons not parties to earlier state court litigation. . . ."
When a plaintiff seeks to litigate a claim in a federal court, the existence of a state court judgment in another case bars the federal proceeding under Rooker-Feldman only when entertaining the federal court claim would be the equivalent of an appellate review of that order. For that reason, Rooker-Feldman applies only when in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render that judgment ineffectual.Id. at 840. "If a litigant resorts to a state court and suffers an adverse judgment, a lower court must respect that judgment unless and until it is overturned. The litigants only remedy is by way of appeal through the state court system and by way of petition to the Supreme Court of the United States thereafter." E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1997).
There are three reasons behind the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) state courts must determine constitutional issues and ought to be given the opportunity to interpret statutes in a way rendering them constitutional (Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484); (2) the Supreme Court is available to review all state court action (In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 240 (3d Cir. 2002)); and (3) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is designed to protect judicial resources (Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)).
Under Pennsylvania law, the:
Application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence of four elements. They are: (1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made. City of Pittsburgh v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 559 A.2d 896, 901 (1989).
A judgment is considered final for the purposes of res judicata unless or until it is reversed on appeal. Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass'n v. Port Auth. 973 F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 1992). Therefore, the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata based on the state trial court's decision granting the Defendants' preliminary objections to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the claims in Counts I-IV of the complaint because they do not seek to have the Court review the state court's judgment or take any action that would render that judgment ineffectual. Rather, Plaintiffs are requesting that the Court stay its consideration of the claims in Counts I-IV until the Court of Common Pleas' judgment is upheld or reversed on appeal. More precisely, Plaintiffs are requesting such a stay in the event that this Court finds Counts I-IV to be barred by res judicata. This Court finds that all Counts of the Plaintiffs' complaint are barred by res judicata under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, thus there is no reason to stay Counts I-IV of the complaint.
II. Count V
A. Barred by Res Judicata
Count V alleges that, "(the Plaintiffs) repeatedly attempted to take their individual . . . depositions in order to preserve key testimony. . . ." Pls' Fed. Compl. at ¶ 39. "As a result of Defendants' efforts, the Pennsylvania Courts have ordered Plaintiffs not to take the depositions, and/or refused to hear appeals by Plaintiffs, on at least five occasions, making access to relief in Pennsylvania Courts impracticable." Id. at ¶ 41. The Plaintiffs are asserting a constitutional claim that is inextricably intertwined with those orders of the state court. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "a federal district court may not sit as an appellate court to adjudicate appeals of state court proceedings." Port Auth., 972 F.2d at 178-79. In Focus, the Third Circuit noted that if the Plaintiffs seek relief of a state court decision before this Court that would void the state courts' orders or require a determination that the state courts' orders were wrong, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction.
A decision on the merits of the Plaintiffs' conspiracy claims under section 1985 would constitute an impressible review by this Court of the rulings of the state and appellate courts in the State Court Action; therefore, dismissal of Count V is compelled under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
B. The State Court concluded that the Defendants are not state actors.
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants under Count V of the federal complaint must be dismissed because the state court has already determined that the Defendants are private parties, not state actors, and thus, cannot be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2) (3). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court is precluded from entertaining a federal court claim that would be the equivalent of an appellate review of the state court order. Focus, 75 F.3d at 840. Therefore, Count V of Plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are granted. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by res judicata, therefore, all counts of the Plaintiffs' Complaint are dismissed.