Opinion
No. 12–P–1491.
2013-08-30
18 JACKSON STREET ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. 76 EXCHANGE STREET LLC.
By the Court (COHEN, GRAINGER & CARHART, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
This is a dispute concerning a deeded easement. The plaintiff, 18 Jackson Street Associates Limited Partnership (Jackson), appeals from certain determinations in the orders on its motion for summary judgment and for reconsideration and from the entry of judgment following a one-day bench trial. Jackson maintains that the motion judge erred by concluding that the language of the deed did not preclude the defendant, 76 Exchange Street LLC (Exchange), from parking vehicles in the easement.
Background. Jackson owns property located at 18 Jackson Street in Malden abutting property owned by Exchange. It is undisputed that an easement exists over a private way located on Exchange's property, providing vehicle and pedestrian access to Jackson's property. Exchange allowed its employees to park in the easement during their workday, often beginning at 6:00 A.M. and ending sometime between 7:00 P.M. and 10:00 P.M. In addition, Exchange's delivery trucks occasionally stopped in the easement while loading or unloading, blocking Jackson's use of the easement. Beginning in 2005, Jackson requested that Exchange refrain from parking vehicles in the easement. In January, 2008, Jackson filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining Exchange from parking cars in the easement. Jackson and Exchange filed cross motions for summary judgment. On August 16, 2010, the motion judge issued a memorandum of decision and order on the cross motions for summary judgment, allowing the motions in part and denying them in part. In a detailed and well-reasoned decision, the judge found that the language of the deed did not give Jackson exclusive use of the entire easement; rather, the deed conferred upon Jackson the right to convenient passage over a portion of the easement's width. The motion judge also found that Jackson was entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining Exchange from completely obstructing the easement. Jackson filed a motion for reconsideration. Following oral argument, the motion judge affirmed her finding that Jackson is entitled to unobstructed safe passage for vehicles and persons within the easement, but is not entitled to exclusive use of the easement. The motion judge decided, however, that she could not determine how much space was necessary to provide safe passage over the easement based on the summary judgment record. Following a one-day bench trial, a second judge of the Superior Court determined that fourteen feet must remain unobstructed in order to allow safe passage throughout the length of the easement. In a judgment dated July 9, 2012, the court permanently enjoined Exchange from parking vehicles or storing equipment on a fourteen foot wide portion of the easement.
Both properties were once owned by the Malden Redevelopment Authority (MRA). The original deed, dated November 21, 1978, contained several easements, including the one at issue here:
“Said parcel is also conveyed subject to an easement hereby reserved to [MRA], for itself and its successors and assigns, within a location of varying width shown on said plan as a '22' Wide Right of Way' and a '20' Wide Right of Way' between Exchange Street and other land of [MRA] situated on Jackson Street, for pedestrian and vehicular passage.”
The plan referenced in the deed identified the easement's location in relation to the parcels and buildings and described the easement by metes and bounds.
Jackson's complaint also included one count of trespass relating to a dumpster that Exchange allegedly placed on or near Jackson's property. The trespass claim was ultimately resolved by the parties and dismissed by the court on summary judgment.
Discussion. Jackson asserts that the motion judge erred by concluding that the language in the deed does not give Jackson exclusive use of the entire width of the easement. Our review of summary judgment is de novo. See Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007) (“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts in favor of the nonmoving party”).
Jackson does not challenge the findings of fact made in the summary judgment decision or during the bench trial. This appeal concerns only the lower court's legal conclusions.
Here, contrary to Jackson's assertions, the language of the deed did not fix the width of the easement. As the motion judge observed, the language of the deed specifically states that the easement, rather than occupying the entire passageway, lies “within” the twenty-foot wide and the twenty-two foot wide rights of way depicted in the plan. See note 1, supra. The motion judge did not err in concluding that the use of the word “within” clearly indicates that the parties intended for the easement to provide a convenient passage over the specified rights of way, but not to give the dominant estate holder exclusive use over the entire width of the easement.
We are unpersuaded by the assertion that the surveyor's election to provide a sub-sketch of the right of way provides interpretive meaning to the plan that favors Jackson.
Moreover, we reject Jackson's contention that the motion judge failed to consider the plan as if fully set forth in the deed. The motion judge properly relied on the language of the deed in construing the purpose of the easement and looked to the plan only “so far as ... necessary to aid in the identification of the [easement].” Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston, 127 Mass. 374, 376 (1879).
In any event, even if this easement were one of fixed dimensions, “[o]ur cases distinguish between easements and rights of way that are intended to be kept open throughout their full width and those that are intended to grant or reserve only a convenient passage.” Martin v. Simmons Properties, LLC, 82 Mass.App.Ct. 403, 408, further appellate review granted, 463 Mass. 1110 (2012), citing Beaudoin v. Sinodinos, 313 Mass. 511, 516–518 (1943). Moreover, our precedents have held that the servient estate may park vehicles on the easement, as long as such parking does not impair the dominant estate's use of the easement for convenient passage. See Martin v. Simmons Properties, LLC, supra at 408, 411 (since “parking cars is a temporary obstruction,” where easement holder had right to use right of way through its entire width, servient estate owner could, neverthess, park cars in the way, so long as they did not “substantially obstruct the easement holder's ingress and egress”).
Judgment affirmed.