411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 52,820 times 96 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
460 U.S. 711 (1983) Cited 2,414 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that because "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony to the employer's mental process," evidence of the employer's discriminatory attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove discrimination
340 U.S. 474 (1951) Cited 9,619 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that court may not "displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo "
456 U.S. 273 (1982) Cited 1,622 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that "[w]hen an appellate court discerns that a district court has failed to make a finding because of an erroneous view of the law, the usual rule is that there should be a remand for further proceedings to permit the trial court to make the missing findings"
Holding an employee may be fired "for good reason, bad reason, reason based on erroneous facts, or no reason at all, so long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason"
Finding that an employer could "regard as" disabled an employee who had lymphoma where the employer had knowledge of employee's diagnosis and a previous employee had died from the same disease
Holding that the plaintiff's diabetes and related medical conditions, which affected “many of the organ systems in his body,” were physical impairments under the ADA
Upholding summary judgment for failure to prove prima facie case of Title VII race discrimination and finding consequent failure of § 1981 claim as a matter of law
Observing that an employer "`may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy . . . selectively'" (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 1998))