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Klickitat Valley Chianina, LLC

No. 76715490 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 16, 2017)
Klickitat Valley Chianina, LLC

15 Cited authorities

  1. Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC

    668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 107 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

  2. In re Bayer

    488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 40 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark

  3. Cold War Museum v. Cold War Air Museum

    586 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that registration per 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) creates a rebuttable presumption of validity, rebuttal of which requires a preponderance of the evidence showing

  4. In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd.

    797 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 15 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Discounting advertising expenditures concerning FISH FRY PRODUCTS where the evidence relied on included ads promoting another mark

  5. In re Steelbuilding.com

    415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 26 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning

  6. Yamaha Intern. Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co.

    840 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 46 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding secondary meaning for shape of guitar head always appearing in advertising and promotional literature

  7. In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States

    675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 8 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor

  8. Application of Abcor Development Corp.

    588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 36 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

  9. In re Loew's Theatres, Inc.

    769 F.2d 764 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 26 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding incontestable mark DURANGO for cigars insufficient to establish distinctiveness of DURANGO for chewing tobacco

  10. In re Gyulay

    820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

  11. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,866 times   125 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,596 times   273 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

  13. Section 2.41 - Proof of distinctiveness under section 2(f)

    37 C.F.R. § 2.41   Cited 12 times   4 Legal Analyses

    (a)For a trademark or service mark - (1)Ownership of prior registration(s). In appropriate cases, ownership of one or more active prior registrations on the Principal Register or under the Trademark Act of 1905 of the same mark may be accepted as prima facie evidence of distinctiveness if the goods or services are sufficiently similar to the goods or services in the application; however, further evidence may be required. (2)Five years substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce. In appropriate