Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the
Patent Appeal No. 6713. November 17, 1961. Marcus Lothrop, San Francisco, Cal., Harry W.F. Glemser and Bacon Thomas, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (R.E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Com'r of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions
Patent Appeal No. 5200. June 27, 1946. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, Serial No. 465,965. Proceeding in the matter of the application of Edwin Cowles for a patent on apparatus for disseminating materials in liquids. From a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the decision of the Primary Examiner rejecting claims 4, 5, 7 and 8, the applicant appeals. Affirmed. Emery, Varney, Whittemore Dix, of New York City (Nichol M. Sandoe
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)