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Ex Parte Ulrich

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,545 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc.

    637 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 83 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding a reference analogous if it logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering his problem

  3. In re Clay

    966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 88 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that a reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA "would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] problem ... by considering" that reference

  4. Scientific Plastic Prods., Inc. v. Biotage Ab

    766 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 8 times

    Nos. 2013–1219 2013–1220 2013–1221. 2014-09-10 SCIENTIFIC PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., Appellant, v. BIOTAGE AB, Appellee. Frederick C. Laney, Niro, Haller & Niro, of Chicago, IL, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Paul K. Vickrey. Of counsel on the brief was David M. Quinlan, David M. Quinlan, P.C., of Princeton, NJ. George C. Beck, Foley & Lardner, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Michael R. Houston, of Chicago, IL, and Debra D. Nye, of San Diego,

  5. In re Gulack

    703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 31 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that even though the claim included printed matter, the printed matter was still entitled to patentable weight because there was a functional relationship between the printed matter and its underlying substrate

  6. Application of Montgomery

    214 F.2d 136 (C.C.P.A. 1954)

    Patent Appeal No. 6043. June 24, 1954. Everett N. Curtis, San Diego, Cal., and Emory L. Groff, Washington, D.C. (Albert J. Kramer, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant. E.L. Reynolds, Washington, D.C. (Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before O'CONNELL, JOHNSON, WORLEY, COLE, and JACKSON (retired), Judges. COLE, Judge. Robert M. Montgomery has appealed here alleging error in a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,124 times   478 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)