No. 90-1362. May 13, 1991. Thomas W. Tolpin, Highland Park, Ill., argued for appellant. Teddy S. Gron, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before RICH, NEWMAN, and RADER, Circuit Judges. PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey B. Gorman and Marilyn Katz (hereinafter "Gorman") appeal the decision of the United States
2014-1798 2014-1801 05-07-2015 IN RE: MAGNA ELECTRONICS, INC., Appellant TERENCE J. LINN, Gardner, Linn, Burkhart & Flory, LLP, Grand Rapids, MI, for appellant. NATHAN K. KELLEY, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED, LORE A. UNT, THOMAS W. KRAUSE. PER CURIAM. NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and
Appeal No. 79-597. March 13, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 3, 1980. Robert F. Dropkin and Vincent G. Gioia, Pittsburgh, Pa., attorneys of record for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and MALETZ, Judges. The Honorable Herbert N. Maletz of the United States Customs Court, sitting
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)