Ex Parte Rostampour

12 Cited authorities

  1. Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.

    848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 745 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that evidence of routine business practice can be used to prove that a reference was accessible
  2. In re Nuijten

    500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 62 times   13 Legal Analyses
    Declining to import a tangible medium element into the claims directed to only encoded signals, which were unpatentable under § 101
  3. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness
  4. In re Van Geuns

    988 F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 91-1088. March 10, 1993. Jack E. Haken, U.S. Philips Corp., Tarrytown, NY, argued, for appellant. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued, for appellee. With him on the brief, was Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before ARCHER, PLAGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. ARCHER, Circuit Judge. Johannes R. Van Geuns appeals from the September 25, 1990 decision of the Patent and Trademark Office

  5. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate
  6. Meitzner v. Mindick

    549 F.2d 775 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 76-577. February 24, 1977. Rehearing Denied April 28, 1977. Eugene Sabol, Fisher, Christen Sabol, Washington, D.C., attys. of record, for appellants; George W.F. Simmons, Robert A. Doherty, Rohm Haas Co., Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel. Herbert B. Keil, Michael P. Bucklo, Johnston, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill., David B. Kellom, Bernd W. Sandt, Midland, Mich., attys. of record, for appellees. Appeal from the Board of Patent Interferences. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,124 times   478 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,990 times   998 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  9. Section 101 - Inventions patentable

    35 U.S.C. § 101   Cited 3,484 times   2270 Legal Analyses
    Defining patentable subject matter as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."
  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)