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Ex Parte Rivas et al

14396161 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 18, 2019)
Ex Parte Rivas et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. In re Icon Health

    496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 46 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[a]nalogous art to Icon's application," which related to "a treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position," included "any area describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the folding bed in" the prior art

  2. Merck Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories

    874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the prior art's disclosure of a multitude of combinations failed to render any particular formulation less obvious

  3. Application of Schaumann

    572 F.2d 312 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 27 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that the prior art patent provides a description of a set of 7 chemical compositions resulting in HEP “just as surely as if they were identified in the reference by name,” where “claim 1 of the [prior art] patent, read in conjunction with the signification given the expression ‘alkyl radical’ in the specification, embrace[d] a very limited number of compounds closely related to one another in structure”

  4. In re Fracalossi

    681 F.2d 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Addressing whether specific anticipation rejection was sufficient evidentiary support for obviousness rejection

  5. Application of Lamberti

    545 F.2d 747 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 16 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-610. December 9, 1976. Kenneth F. Dusyn, atty. of record, for appellants; Melvin H. Kurtz and M. Ted Raptes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board

  6. Application of Preda

    401 F.2d 825 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 8016. October 24, 1968. Wenderoth, Lind Ponack, A. Ponak, Washington, D.C. (John T. Miller, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND, and BALDWIN, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 7 and 8 of application serial No. 269,707

  7. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,990 times   998 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)